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This dissertation examines the syntax and semantics of clausal complements. It identifies 
semantic underpinnings for some syntactic properties of the arguments of propositional 
attitude verbs. The way clausal arguments compose with their embedding predicates is 
not uniform and semantic differences emerge from the syntactic context clausal 
arguments appear in. Three case studies are taken up: clausal arguments of nouns, 
dislocated clausal arguments (sentential subjects and topics), and infinitival complements 
with overt subjects (AcI constructions). 
Chapter Two assembles evidence to support Stowell’s (1981) claim that the 
clausal complements of nouns are modifiers. It is shown that the clausal complements of 
nouns behave like adjuncts in their ability to bleed condition C (Kuno 2004 and Jacobson 
2003, and explored here further). The compositional strategy used to compose attitude 
nouns with their arguments, following Kratzer (2006), is shown to account for this 
behavior and to be commensurate with observations made by Grimshaw (1990). I then 
show how the modifier status of clausal complements of nouns is determined by the way 
in which nominals are formed from clause-taking verbs. 
ix 
Chapter Three examines another complementation strategy, found with fronted 
clauses. New data from binding is provided in support of Koster’s (1978) hypothesis that 
clauses do not move. Specifically, fronted clauses fail to show the effects of syntactic 
reconstruction. An analysis, making crucial use of de re attitude ascription, is offered to 
account for ‘apparent’ binding into fronted clauses.  
Chapter Four makes the case for enriching the meanings of clausal complements. 
By examining some new patterns with accusative with infinitive (AcI) constructions 
(such as I see him to be a fool), I argue for decomposing certain doxastic attitude verbs, 
putting the introduction of alternatives into the complement. Here too the role of de re 
attitude ascription is shown to play a crucial role. It is argued that AcI constructions 
involve de re attitude ascription, with added constraints (determined by the lexical 
content of the embedding verb) on the nature of the Acquaintance Relation (Kaplan 1968, 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO SELECTION 
 
1. Meaning and form correspondences in clausal complementation 
 This dissertation is about complement clauses – embedded sentences that serve as 
arguments to verbs and other predicates. The focus is on the interaction between the 
syntactic properties of complement clauses and the lexical semantics of propositional 
attitude predicates. 
Work on clausal complementation has always been about the relation between the 
lexical semantics of embedding verbs and the meanings of various clausal projections 
(Rosenbaum (1967), Kiparksy and Kiparsky (1970), and Bresnan (1972)). Complement 
clauses come in a variety of syntactic shapes, which correlate in sometimes very 
systematic ways with the kinds of meanings they can express and the verbs they 
complement. Even just looking at English – indeed limiting ourselves to the clausal 
complements available to one verb – we can see how the syntactic make-up of a 
complement seems to correspond with different meanings. A well-known paradigm cited 
in this respect involves perception verbs, like see, which take various syntactic 
complements, each of which delivers different interpretations for the embedding verb: 
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(1)  Varieties of Perception Reports 
              Syntax   Meaning   
 
 a. John saw Fred leave early.    bare infinitive  direct percep. 
 
 b. John saw Fred leaving early.   gerundive  direct percep. 
 
 c. John saw Fred owning a house.  gerundive   imaginative  
 
 d. John saw Fred to be a party-pooper.  infinitive  belief 
 
 e. John saw that Fred left early.   finite clause   factive 
 
It is now a clichéd observation about this paradigm that the presence of inflectional 
material in the complements – like tense, aspect, or the presence of the infinitival particle 
to – corresponds to an interpretation of see that reports a belief of the subject – that is, 
semantic opacity. 
When verbs of perception appear with a bare infinitival complement, as in (1)a, 
they express direct perception reports. These are transparent or epistemically neutral, in 
that they do not implicate the beliefs of the subject in any way (Barwise 1981, 
Higginbotham 1983). This is why the following is not a contradiction: 
(2)      Edina saw Fred leave the house early, but she thought he was just looking out 
the door. 
 
With syntactically ‘larger’ complements, see reports are epistemically non-neutral, 
meaning that they implicate an attitude on the part of the subject toward the content of the 
complement. So for instance, with an infinitival complement, (1)d, see reports a belief or 
judgment. Unlike the direct perception report, the complement is epistemically non-
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neutral (Jesperson 1940, see also Higginbotham 1983, Kroch et al 1988). This see 
ascribes a belief to the subject, and that’s why the following comes out as a contradiction: 
(3) Edina saw Fred to be a party-pooper, #but she thought he wasn’t. 
 
With finite clause complements, see describes an epistemically non-neutral (factive) 
attitude (1)e, expressing what is often termed indirect perception. These correspondences 
between meaning and form are tantalizing for those who want to understand the syntax-
semantics interface, because they suggest that meaning and form are correlated in a non-
arbitrary way, and it gives hope to the idea that complementation patterns simply fall out 
from the interactions of the meanings of verbs and particular kinds of complements 
(Pesetsky 1992, Levin 1993, among others). Of course, this calls for a theory of clause 
meaning that can match up various verb meanings with the right syntactic complements. 
This dissertation does not provide a theory of complementation that will account for all 
the correspondences in the see paradigm. That is a large project – several steps need to be 
taken before we can get there. 
In this work, I take one step toward that goal by examining the kinds of 
complements available to propositional attitude predicates. The empirical focus is on 
different syntactic configurations of complements to attitude verbs, and the central result 
of this dissertation is two-fold. First, once a variety of complementation strategies under 
attitude verbs is recognized, we have the tools for solving – or at least mitigating – some 
syntactic puzzles. Second, capturing certain correspondences between the lexical 
semantics of an embedding predicate and the syntactic shape of its complement requires 
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us to “reassign” what looks to be lexical meaning into functional projections in the 
embedded clause. This move – factoring out meanings once thought lexical into 
meaningful functional projections – has been taken recently by a number of authors. 
Morzycki (2005) made the case for adverbs. Ramchand (2008) applies the idea to lexical 
aspect. Borer (2005a,b) takes the most radical step and removes all real linguistic 
meaning from lexical items. We won’t go that far, but I will try to make the case that at 
least some lexical meaning should be factored out to functional heads. One advantage of 
this is to get traction on some problems in complement selection, to which I now turn. 
1.1. S-selection and C-selection 
The form-meaning correspondences we find with see are the ideal case. More 
often than not, the mapping between syntactic and semantic type is not so 
straightforward. (And, in fact, Chapter Four reveals that even the clean-looking see 
paradigm shows mismatches between the surface syntactic type of a complement and its 
meaning.) Grimshaw (1979) argued that syntactic and semantic selection were to some 
extent independent and that predicates must be able to independently encode both 
semantic and syntactic information about their complements. The former kind of 
selection came to be known as s(emantic)-selection, the latter c(ategory)-selection 
(Pesetsky 1982). Grimshaw pointed out that verbs with the same semantic requirements 
can take complements of different syntactic categories. Both ask and wonder select, in an 
intuitive sense, for a question. However, their options for realizing the complement 
syntactically are different: ask allows the question to be realized as a whole wh-clause 
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(4)a, a noun phrase (4)b, or by nothing at all (4)c (a null complement), while wonder 
allows only the clausal option: 
(4) a. John asked me what the time was.  
b. John asked me the time. 
c. John didn’t know the time so he asked me. 
(5) a.   John wondered what the time was.  
b. *John wondered the time. 
c. *John didn’t know the time but he wondered. 
 
A predicate’s syntactic selectional requirements and its semantic requirements can be on 
different tracks, so to speak. Grimshaw concluded that syntactic and semantic selection 
must be independently given in lexical entries. 
Once both c-selection and s-selection were posited as part of lexical information, 
it was noticed by Grimshaw herself (Grimshaw 1979:317n.33) that this over-generated 
complements patterns, allowing for cross-classification of semantic and syntactic 
complements types that did not exist. For instance, lexical entries could be written to s-
select for questions but c-select for only noun phrases and not sentential complements. It 
turns out that if a predicate selects for a semantic category it always c-selects for an 
unmarked, or ‘canonical’ syntactic expression of that semantic category. So there are no 
predicates such as know2 that select for embedded questions only in the form of NPs but 
not wh-CPs: 
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(6) a.   John knew2 the time.         (not an attested pattern) 
b. *John knew2 what time to leave.  
 
Instead there are predicates like English know that c-select for both types, and predicates 
like wonder that only select for what Grimshaw called the canonical structural realization 
(CSR) of questions, which is the syntactic category expressed by wh-clauses. 
 Grimshaw (1981) proposes to solve the over-generation problem by implementing 
CSRs as part of UG. The CSR of the semantic types question and proposition will be, in 
current terminology, a CP. A child learning the complement patterns of English will 
observe that certain verbs select for propositions (or questions, or events) in virtue of 
some sort of semantic knowledge, and will know that the CSR of propositions is CP. 
Subcategorization for CP is achieved for free, then. But without any evidence, the 
subcategorization of NP will not be postulated. If the child has evidence that a predicate 
that s-selects for a question can c-select a NP, then that can be added to the lexical entry. 
However, no situation could arise where only a NP expressing a proposition is possible, 
since if a proposition is what is s-selected, according to the CSR (actually, Grimshaw’s 
Context Principle) then it will also select CP. 
 There is no doubt that something like CSRs need to be accounted for, even if all 
the facts adduced for them might not play out. The fact is, certain clause meanings more 
readily map to certain syntactic constructions. And this is what we see with the see 
paradigm. Some linguists addressing clausal complementation have avoided the CSR 
problem altogether in positing that what look like non-canonical complements really have 
hidden structure that corresponds to a CSR. So all predicates that select for embedded 
propositions or embedded questions select for sentential complements, say CPs or IPs. 
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This view is found in Larson et. al. (1997). Larson and his colleagues have argued that all 
forms of intensionality (by which they mean predicates that are intensional operators like 
attitude verbs1) require sentential complements. This isn’t the view taken in this 
dissertation, although we will see that some instances of complementation require a richer 
syntactic representation than meets the eye. 
 Pesetsky (1982, 1992, 1993) proposes to solve the over-generation problem by 
eliminating c-selection. He argues that once we have s-selection, c-selection is 
superfluous, and its effects can be regulated independently. On this “s-selection only” 
hypothesis, the syntactic expression of a complement is regulated by abstract case: noun 
phrases, but not sentential complements, need case. So if a predicate selects for, say, 
embedded questions it can always have a sentential complement but only a noun phrase 
complement if the predicate is a case assigner. Know and ask assign case, so they can 
take both CPs and DPs. Wonder does not assign case2 so it only allows complements 
made available by the CSR of questions. Ruled out is the pattern in (6) since it disallows 
the sentential complement (which comes for free) but allows the noun phrase 
complement. 
Pesetsky’s s-selection only hypothesis, while attractive, has never been carried out 
extensively. There are also counterexamples to Pesetsky’s claim about case being the 
relevant syntactic factor (see Odjik 1997, Rothstein 1992, Alrenga 2005, among others). 
                                                 
1 All meanings are intensional, on the approach I take. I believe Larson et al.’s claim is that an 
intensional operator must always select a whole clause. 
2 Pesetsky supports this with the fact that wonder cannot be passivized, an operation that ought to 
be available to case assigners. While wonder does not assign case to certain DPs, it can clearly assign case 
to phrases that sit in its internal argument position, as shown by the wh-element in free relatives: what John 
wondered was whether Fred had the drive to win. 
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Moreover, it doesn’t always seem possible to predict the shape of a clausal complement 
purely from the semantics of the embedding verb. Pesetsky resigns that some “syntactic 
residue” in the form of idiosyncratic syntactic selection is required. Certain predicates 
simply select for a type of head (in many cases prepositions). This kind of selection 
cannot be reduced to s-selection or case but requires a form of lexical (L-) selection. 
According to Pesetsky, the choice between infinitival and finite complements is also a 
case of L-selection. For instance, believe allows a infinitival complement and a finite 
complement, whereas a verb like argue is compatible only with a finite complement: 
(7) a. Edna believed Fred to be innocent. 
b. Edna believed that Fred was innocent. 
(8) a. *Edna argued Fred to be innocent. 
b.   Edna argued that Fred was innocent. 
 
At first glance, there appears to be no meaning difference between the finite and 
infinitival complement of believe. So it would appear that we must stipulate syntactic 
selection to ensure that argue allows only finite clausal complements. 
We shouldn’t give up on semantic selection so easily, though. Differences 
between (certain) infinitival and finite clauses are the topic of Chapter Four. There I 
make the case that we don’t want to reduce the selection of to an idiosyncratic feature of 
lexical items. We’ll see that for certain verbs, an infinitival complement imbues the 
embedding predicate with a meaning that other clausal complements can’t.  
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What I hope to provide with this dissertation are ways of capturing Grimshaw’s 
CSRs. I do this by assigning more complex meanings to embedded clauses than is usually 
recognized. As noted, one of the themes of this dissertation is that elements of meaning 
once thought to be part of an embedding predicate are factored out to meaningful 
elements in the complement. I make the case, following Kratzer (2006), that 
complementizers can introduce propositions of various sorts. And, I argue that certain 
infinitivals carry a meaning that places meaning restrictions on the predicates that embed 
them. I focus on complements that are used to report attitude ascriptions, since there is a 
rich semantic and philosophical literature on propositional attitudes. They offer an ideal 
place to investigate the mapping between syntactic type and semantic types of 
complements. 
Before turning to the details of the chapters, then, I lay out the basic semantic 
assumptions of this dissertation, particularly the semantics of attitude reports. 
2. The semantics of attitude reports 
 Belief reports, and other propositional attitude ascriptions, describe a relation 
between an attitude holder, the subject, and a proposition. I use proposition in the usual 
sense: a set of possible worlds – or the characteristic function of such a set. I assume 
predicates have world arguments. An adjective like innocent denotes a function from 
individuals to worlds to truth values: it is true of an individual x and a world w if x is 
innocent in w. 
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(9)  [[   innocent ]]  = λx.λw.innocent(x)(w) 
 
On the simplifying assumption that the copula be is semantically vacuous, the tenseless 
sentence Fred be innocent is the proposition below. Innocent applies to the constant Fred 
via functional application, returning a function from worlds to truth values:  
(10) [[   Fred be innocent ]]  = λw.innocent(Fred)(w) 
 
With this in mind, we can turn to the analysis of attitude verbs given by Hintikka (1962, 
1969). Hintikka proposes that a propositional attitude determines a set of worlds, and this 
set is dependent on the attitude, the attitude holder, and the world in which the attitude 
holder resides. Belief, for instance, defines a set of possible worlds which, for all the 
holder of the belief can determine, are worlds she is in. And to ascribe a belief to 
someone is to assert that her belief worlds are all worlds where the complement 
proposition is true. So a report like the one below asserts that all those worlds that are 
compatible with Edna’s belief, are worlds in which Fred is innocent (again ignoring the 
contribution of tense).  
(11)  Edna believes that Fred is innocent. 
 
As is apparent from this description, and as is proposed by Hintikka (1969), attitude 
ascription involves universal quantification over possible worlds. The quantification is 
restricted by the set of worlds compatible with what the subject believes, and this is often 
expressed with the notion of doxastic alternatives, which are needed for self-locating 
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beliefs (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989, and others). Doxastic alternatives are defined 
below. 
(12)  Doxx,w = { w′ : it is compatible with what x believes in w that w′ is the world x    
              lives in } 
 
The verb believe, then, is treated as universal quantifier over possible worlds, restricted 
by the set of worlds provided by Dox. The clausal complement denotes a proposition, a 
set of possible worlds, and occupies the nuclear scope of this universal quantifier. I notate 
the evaluation world as w0: 
(13) a.  [[   believe]]  = λp.λx.λw. ∀w′(w′∈Dox(x)(w) → p(w′)) 
 
b.  [[   Edna believes that Fred is innocent ]]  =  
        ∀w′(w′∈Dox(Edna)(w0) → innocent(Fred)(w′)) 
 
Enrichments to this basic design will be needed, which I will introduce throughout the 
dissertation. None of this tells us anything about belief systems, but it is sufficient, it 
seems, for the purposes of understanding belief ascription, which is the linguist’s 
concern. And, it should be acknowledged, the possible worlds account of attitude 
ascription has difficulty with things like mathematical beliefs (see Cresswell and von 
Stechow 1982, although this is an issue I put aside). 
  Different attitude verbs quantify over different alternatives: the worlds compatible 
with what Mary hopes are not the same as those worlds compatible with what she 
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believes or fears or, for that matter, what she might claim. Hence the following kinds of 
sentences are not contradictory: 
(14) a. Edina believes that Fred is guilty, but she hopes that he is innocent. 
b. Edina claimed that Fred was innocent, but (really) believes that he is guilty. 
c. Edina hopes that Fred is innocent, but she fears that he is guilty. 
 
My interest here is in the nature of the complement clause: on the formulation above, the 
complement of believe and other attitudes denotes a proposition.  
   The semantics of attitude verbs, as we will see, often requires more complex 
objects than these. This formulation ignores the role of tense. In particular, complement 
clauses are typically taken to denote properties of times (see e.g. Kratzer 1998). What is 
important at this point is simply the way in which the complement combines with the 
embedding predicate – as the propositional argument of the verb. This is the standard 
Hintikka account. In the following chapters of this dissertation, this is the component that 
comes under scrutiny. 
3. The syntax of attitude reports: chapter summaries 
The dissertation is at its simplest an exploration of semantic selection in the 
following four syntactic configurations in which a predicate like believe takes a clausal 
complement. 
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(15) a. John believed that Fred was innocent. 
b. John’s belief that Fred was innocent is unfounded. 
c. That Fred was innocent, John didn’t believe. 
d. John believed Fred to be innocent. 
 
The clausal complement in (15)b is a complement to the nominalization of believe. In 
(15)c, the clausal complement appears dislocated from the embedding verb, a sentential 
topic construction. And in (15)d, the complement clause appears as an infinitival clause 
with an overt subject; this is known as an exceptional case marking construction, or ECM 
(the same complement type in (1)d, where see expresses a type of belief). Unlike what we 
saw with the see paradigm, the various shapes and positions of these complements 
appears at first glance not to affect the meaning of believe. Each involves the verb believe 
taking a propositional complement, it would seem, and there are simply some low level 
syntactic differences among these construction types. 
In the following chapters I argue that this impression is wrong, and that these 
different syntactic configurations actually involve slightly different methods for putting 
together the attitude verb with its complement. The constructions in (15)b through (15)d 
are the topics of chapters two through four, respectively. Each of these constructions has 
played a central role in syntactic theorizing because they exhibit some central syntactic 
puzzles. I show that the solutions to these puzzles rest on the semantics of 
complementation.  
 Chapter Two examines properties of clausal complements to nouns as in (15)b. 
The interest, for the syntactician, is that these complements appear to behave differently 
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than arguments of predicates normally do. In fact, as noticed by Stowell (1981) and 
Higgins (1979), clausal complements to the noun belief, and others, appear to identify the 
content of the belief. This led Stowell to conclude that clausal complements are modifiers 
of nouns, rather than true arguments. I provide evidence to support Stowell’s (1981) 
claim: clausal complements of nouns are modifiers, both semantically and syntactically. 
In addition to assembling a range of evidence to this effect documented in the literature 
(Higgins 1979, Grimshaw 1990, Kratzer 2006), I use evidence from binding theory to 
show that the clausal complements of nouns behave like modifiers, specifically in their 
ability to bleed condition C violations (Kuno 1997, Jacobson 2003, Lasnik 2003). This 
provides the crucial syntactic evidence that clausal complements to nouns are not 
arguments. The compositional strategy used to compose attitude nouns with their clausal 
complements, following Kratzer (2006) and a similar approach in Potts (2002), is shown 
to account for this behavior. I then discuss the counter-examples, including proof (Safir 
1985). We end with a strong empirical fact: clausal complements to nouns are always 
modifiers. The source for this restriction is discussed. 
 Chapter Three examines another kind of complementation strategy, found with 
fronted clauses—sentential subjects and topics of the sort shown below: 
(16)   That John was going to win, I don’t think anyone expected. 
 
New data from binding is provided in support of Koster’s (1978) satellite hypothesis, 
which is that fronted clauses are not syntactically moved to, but are base-generated in, 
their surface position. An analysis, making crucial use of de re attitude ascription 
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(Kaplan 1969, Lewis 1979), is then offered to account for what appear to be apparent 
problems for such an analysis, including the fact that it appears that quantifiers can bind 
into the fronted clause, as shown in the following case. The pronoun he is interpreted as a 
variable, co-varying as a function of the quantificational expression any young man. 
(17)  That he’ll end up acting like his father, I don’t think any young man expects. 
 
While it is tempting to interpret these data as showing that clauses must “reconstruct” for 
the purposes of variable binding – that is, that they must be at some level of syntactic 
representation in a position structurally below the quantificational binder (see Takahashi 
2009) – I show not only that reconstruction is not needed (by making use of the semantics 
for de re and de se attitude ascription), but that reconstruction indeed does not happen.  
Thus, the data offer new support for the claim that clauses do not undergo movements 
like other arguments (noun phrases for instance). I suggest that this can be traced to a 
particular property of clauses that, following Embick and Iatridou (1997), prevents them 
from participating in agreement relations. Again, what is crucial in understanding the 
behavior of moved complements like these are the semantic tools offered to us. Using 
those tools avoids unwarranted syntactic assumptions. 
  Chapter Four examines non-finite complements to attitude verbs, in particular 
those infinitival complements with overt, accusative subjects, known in the syntactic 
literature as exceptional case marking constructions (ECM), or – more theory-neutral – as 
accusative with infinitive constructions (AcI): 
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(18) a. John believes her to be upset. 
b. I see him to be a selfish, bon vivant. 
 
Several generalizations about the class of verbs that can have AcI complements are made, 
primary among them the fact that AcI complements are used to report beliefs. This is no 
trivial observation, I will argue, because with a number of verbs – including see – this is 
the only meaning that AcI allows. Finite clause complements of see (and others of its 
class), however, can only report factive, indirect perception.  
Based on data like these, which hold of a wide range of predicates, we’ll see that 
AcI constructions must denote more than mere propositional complements in the narrow 
sense. That is, in order to capture the belief interpretation of see with an AcI complement 
(but not a finite one), I suggest that AcI complements themselves are responsible for the 
meaning taken on by see in these cases. I do this by factoring into the head of the 
infinitival modal quantification, in particular, the belief alternatives of the subject. The 
correspondence between the syntactic shape of the clausal complement and the 
interpretation of the embedding verb, on this approach, is not the result of selection 
(syntactic or semantic) at all. The situation is reversed. The complement bears a meaning 
that only certain verb roots can combine with – hence the moniker ‘natural selection’. 
Sometimes verb roots can be pushed into this syntactic context and this, I argue, helps to 
explain the “fuzziness” (Pesetsky 1991) in judgments about AcI constructions. In this 
respect, Grimshaw’s notion of canonical structural realization is implemented, in a way 
presaged by Bresnan (1972), by meaningful heads in the complement clauses. 
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CHAPTER II 
CLAUSAL COMPLEMENTS OF NOUNS 
 
1. Introduction: Stowell’s conjecture 
 Stowell (1981) famously proposed that CPs that appear to complement nouns, as 
in (1)a and (1)b, are not true arguments of the noun but appositive modifiers. 
(1) a. The theory that pigs fly actually has a lot of support. 
b. The belief/claim/observation that pigs fly is crazy. 
 
The CP complements of nouns exhibit some surprising properties both semantically and 
syntactically – surprising if they were actually true arguments of the nouns. Higgins 
(1973) and Stowell (1981) both expressed the intuition that the CP complements in (1) 
describe the “content” of the theory or belief or claim. They supported this intuition by 
noting that CPs could appear in post-copular position, where they also identify the 
content of the subject nouns (2)a and (2)b: 
(2) a. The theory is that pigs fly. 
b. The belief/claim/observation is that pigs fly. 
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Stowell’s claim that the CPs in (1) are appositive modifiers was crucial to his analysis of 
the syntactic distribution of clausal arguments.3 While there is little evidence that the CPs 
in (1) are appositives – they haven’t the required intonation characteristics of appositives 
– the intuition that these CPs bear a different relation to the head noun than true 
complements does find support. It is this support that I wish to detail and expand upon in 
this survey.  
  As Stowell (1981) and Grimshaw (1990) detail, the derived nominals in (1) – in 
particular the derived nominals such as belief and claim – denote just what their objects 
do: they are not event nominals but rather are object or result nominals. From this 
observation, it is often concluded that such nouns do not take CP arguments. This 
conclusion, however, has been challenged in various places in the literature (most 
recently, for example, by Pesetsky and Torrego 2004). In this chapter I assemble various 
pieces of evidence, some old and some new, in support of Stowell’s original conclusion 
that the CP complements in (1) are not true arguments. 
 Several proposals for how the CPs in (1) do compose with the noun have been 
proposed, and they share the claim that the CPs compose with the nominal via a 
modification relation. In later parts of this section I will describe two approaches. The 
two approaches differ substantially in their semantics, and I will devote some discussion 
to the difficult questions that comparing the two brings up. One approach starts with the 
                                                 
3 Stowell’s analysis was motivated in part by his Case Resistance Principle (CRP), which relied on 
the requirement (Aoun 1979) that an argument has to be case marked to be visible for theta-assignment. 
Nouns do not case-mark, so the evidence that their complements are not arguments was important to this 
version of the theory. For unaccusatives, Stowell proposes derivations where the clauses move to subject 
position and then further vacates that position by extraposition, leaving an expletive. That kind of 
derivation is not possible in nouns. 
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idea that propositions can be understood as denoting in the domain of individuals 
(Cresswell 1973). Chierchia (1984) argues that CPs can denote in the entity domain by a 
nominalization function. Potts (2002) – a recent implementation of this idea that deals 
with data we will be looking at below – further suggests that these can be shifted into 
predicates by other type-shifting mechanisms (Partee 1987). In another approach, Kratzer 
(2006) has initiated a program that treats CPs as predicates of things, like beliefs and 
rumors, that have propositional content (a notion that will be clarified as we proceed). 
The CP composes with the NPs belief and rumor via predicate modification. On both 
approaches, the relationship between clauses and their embedding predicate, then, is not 
one of function application, but one of modification. 
 My contribution in this chapter is to provide more syntactic evidence that CPs 
behave as modifiers when they appear in construction with nouns – that is, to support 
Stowell’s conjecture and use Kratzer’s system in the process. As noted above, one set of 
evidence comes from considerations of the argument structure of nominals, like those in 
(1), that take CPs. A modification account in the spirit of Kratzer (2006) is then defended. 
After that, I will address de-verbal nouns, as in (1)b, and the full set of cases that Higgins 
and Stowell discuss. These will provide an analogous argument for treating CPs as 
predicates. 
 The second argument for the modifier status of CPs will come from certain 
reconstruction asymmetries between arguments and adjuncts. Modifying adjunct clauses, 
such as relatives, can obviate certain reconstruction effects (Lebeaux 1988). Early reports 
in the literature (Lebeaux 1988, Freidin 1986) claimed that, in contrast, clausal 
complements of nouns behave like arguments in this respect and feed Condition C 
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violations. I spend some time showing that, to the contrary, clausal complements to nouns 
behave just like relative clause modifiers in their ability to obviate reconstruction, as 
several authors have argued (the best cases coming from Kuno 1997). I’ll review some of 
the interesting reasons why the data in this area is disputed, and show that once certain 
confounds are controlled, the data come out in favor of treating CPs as modifiers. 
 Another piece of supporting evidence for the view of CPs as modifiers comes 
from a set of data surrounding predicates in the so-called prove-class. The CP 
complements to nouns like proof do not pattern, as pointed out by Safir (1985), like the 
predicates found in the Higgins-Stowell facts (as in (2)). However, I show that Safir’s 
examples can be understood once we recognize the difference in the kinds of nominals 
these predicates form. I show that the CP complements of these nouns nonetheless 
behave like modifiers in their ability to selectively bleed Condition C. 
2. Nouns and CPs: clauses are not arguments 
 In this section I make a very straightforward argument for treating CPs – at least 
CP complements of nouns – as predicates. This argument is, essentially, a distributional 
one: non-derived nouns, what I call content nouns like theory (1) don’t take arguments, 
so the CPs they appear in construction with cannot be arguments either. The conclusion is 
that they must stand in a modification relation to the noun.  
 A content noun describes things that carry information – they seem to define or be 
associated with propositional content. A story, for instance, might tell us what was 
happening in imaginary worlds; a theory offers someone’s conception of how the world 
is; a myth is something that describes a counter-factual state of affairs.  
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 The complement CPs of content nouns can appear in construction with the noun 
(3) or in post-copular position (4). 
(3) CPs and non-derived nouns 
 
            the idea 
        the story 
        the theory  
 I don’t believe  the scoop       that Fred didn’t report his income. 
         the myth   
        the notion 
 
(4) CPs as post-copular elements 
    the idea 
   the story 
   the theory  
   the scoop      is that Fred didn’t report his income. 
   the myth   
   the notion 
 
 We are used to thinking about the CPs in (3) as complements of the noun because 
the only other thing a CP that looks like this could be is a relative clause. But, of course, 
we learn in introductory syntax that these aren’t relative clauses: they do not have a gap 
position that corresponds to the head noun: 
(5) a. The rumor [that Fred didn’t report his income]  complement CP 
b. The rumor [that the tabloids reported].   relative CP 
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In fact, there is an easy way to show that the complement CP is not an argument, at least 
in the sense that the CP doesn’t saturate an argument position of the noun. Nouns like 
rumor and theory and other content nouns do not select for the kinds of DPs arguments 
that generally ‘stand in’ for clauses (the idea of ‘stand in’ will be refined below). Nouns 
can in general take DP arguments, as long as case is made available to those arguments. 
This is usually English of. This can be seen in the de-verbal nouns in (6) and the 
relational nouns in (7):  
(6) a. John’s repetition of his claim.  
b. The Romans’ destruction of the city. 
(7) a. The niece of my brother’s father (is nice). 
b. The capital of Wisconsin (is friendly). 
 
Furthermore, verbs that select for CPs can, when nominalized, select what feels like the 
same argument in the guise of a DP. The usual requirement of case applies (in the case of 
de-verbal hope, the preposition for is required). The nominalization of prove can take a 
DP argument that refers to the thing proved, and the nominalization of hope takes a DP 
argument that refers to things hoped:4 
                                                 
4 The nominal proof is something of a problem for the approach that clausal complements are 
modifiers and I devote Section 5 to it. 
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(8) a. John proved that he was a citizen.   Verbal complement CP 
b. Do you have any proof of/for that.   Nominal complement CP 
(9) a. John hoped that he would win.   Verbal complement CP 
b. Do you have any hope for that.   Nominal complement CP 
 
It is not possible, however, to replace the clauses in (3) – the CP ‘complements’ of non-
derived nouns – with a DP.  
(10)    No DP arguments to non-derived nouns 
 
   the idea 
   the story 
   the theory  
   the scoop         *of that, I don’t believe. 
   the myth   
   the notion 
 
Unlike prove or hope – whose nominals continue to take DP ‘versions’ of their clausal 
complements – these non-derived nouns cannot take arguments of this sort. The simple 
conclusion, then, is that the CP is not an argument either. Before turning to what to make 
of this, let me make a brief digression, for completeness’s sake, on the kinds of DPs these 
nouns can appear with. 
2.1. The res argument 
It is important to note that non-derived content nouns can take certain of-marked 
DPs, as shown below:  
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(11) a. His story of Mary’s birth is frightening. 
b. The rumor of John’s resignation is spreading. 
c. Theories of the crop circles’ origins are mostly crap. 
 
These are perhaps better expressed with adjuncts introduced by about; in that case we can 
see that this ‘argument’ can co-occur with a that-clause: 
(12) a. The story about Mary’s birth is that it was difficult. 
b. The rumor about John’s resignation is that it was forced. 
c. The theory about the crop circles’ origins is that aliens made them. 
 
These expressions represent the res argument – what the rumor or story is about (Quine 
1956, Cresswell and von Stechow 1982) not the content of the rumor or story. Res 
arguments are more easily seen with attitude verbs. In the examples in (13), John has a 
belief about some res, Ortcutt, and the belief he has about this res is that he was a spy.  
(13) a. Bernard’s belief of Ortcutt is that he was a spy. 
b. Bernard’s believed of Ortcutt that he was a spy. 
 
It is generally believed that de re attitude ascriptions have a res argument and that this res 
argument can be expressed (see Kratzer 1998 for discussion and applications). Many 
things can be the res including things that have content themselves: 
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(14)    John’s belief about that idea is that it is wrong. 
 
The semantics of de re belief ascription requires more machinery than I wish to go into 
here (they will be taken up in great detail in the following chapter). The point here, 
though, is that these arguments are different from the kinds of things that spell out the 
content of the rumor or story. 
2.2. Kratzer’s conjecture 
 Returning to the main thread of the discussion, the data in (10) showed that 
content nouns do not take arguments. And I used that fact to argue that the CPs that they 
appeared in construction with are not arguments. The reason, it would seem, is that non-
derived content nouns like story or rumor are not relational – that is, unlike capital or 
niece. Nor are content nouns of this sort derived from verbs, where it is often thought that 
an argument structure remains available in certain kinds of nominalizations (Grimshaw 
1990). If content nouns were either of these types of nouns, we would expect a DP 
argument to show up as long as it were case licensed. But there don’t appear to be 
internal arguments of content nouns that can be expressed, even with the help of 
prepositions. It would appear, then, that these are common nouns that describe certain 
types of individuals, in many cases abstract individuals. We’re led to a simple 
conclusion: If the CP is not an argument, then it must be an adjunct or modifier of some 
sort. What kind of thing is a that-clause that modifies common nouns like story or 
rumor? Kratzer (2006) argues that that-clauses are, like relative clauses, predicates. They 
are predicates of the same thing that content nouns are.  
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 Content, propositional content, can be modeled with possible worlds. But what 
possible worlds? The kinds of individuals described by common nouns like story, myth, 
or rumor, define accessible worlds. A particular story or rumor in the actual world can, 
for any possible world, determine whether that world is compatible with the rumor or 
story. 
 That individuals in general have propositional content associated with them has 
some initial plausibility. Stalnaker (1984) provides a precedent for recovering ‘content’ 
of this sort from individuals. His example is of a tree trunk with 78 rings on it. This state 
of this individual indicates the age of the tree (or the proposition that the tree is 78 years 
old). The mechanisms for this indication relation are complex and relate to the fact that 
its intrinsic state correlates (via a causal relation) with the environment (Stalnaker 1984, 
p.13ff). It is very plausible to assume that there exist certain kinds of individuals from 
which content can be recovered. Quite generally, then, things can provide domains of 
possibilities. This has been pursued in the area of modality by Hacquard (2005), where 
events are such things, and Kratzer (2009a). 
 That content nouns are associated with content is further shown by the fact that 
they can be the subjects of verbs that take complements that describe content of their 
subject: 
(15) The story says/claims/indicates/shows that Mary is the guilty one. 
  
Assume, then, that content nouns denote sets of individuals that carry information, which 
we will take to be propositional content. When helpful, I will subscript variables of this 
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sort of individual as xc, to distinguish them from other ordinary individuals that do not 
carry content: 
(16)  [[ story ]]     = λxc.λw.story(xc)(w) also: rumor, idea, theory, myth, etc. 
 
If CPs are predicates that modify such nouns, then they must be predicates of contents. 
Kratzer’s (2006) analysis achieves this by turning propositions into predicates of 
contents. She proposes that complementizers themselves have content arguments, and can 
be treated as predicates of content if that argument remains unsaturated. The semantic 
role of the complementizer is to say that the content of the complement proposition 
identifies the content of the individual rumor or story. We need to get from the 
individuals to their content. Suppose that we can recover content in the following way: 
the content of some individual is a set of possible worlds. I’ll treat this as a function, 
fCONT, that applied to an individual returns a set of possible worlds: 
(17) fCONT(x) = {w: w is compatible with x} 
 
Complementizers also have a propositional argument, type 〈s,t〉 (where s is the type of 
possible worlds; t is the type for truth values). The role of the complementizer is to say 
that the content (a set of possible worlds) of some individual is the embedded 
proposition.  
(18) [[ COMP ]]  = λp.λxc .fCONT(xc) = p  (after Kratzer 2006) 
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The complementizer says that the content of an individual is the proposition that it 
embeds. This accords with our intuitions that in (19) the content of the rumor is that Patsy 
is innocent.  
(19) The rumor that Patsy is innocent. 
 
What I am interested in here is how Kratzer’s complementizer returns a CP that is a 
predicate of contents. This allows the CP and NP to compose via Predicate Modification 
(here I don’t explicitly represent a world argument of the common noun story): 
(20) The story that Edna was stealing. 
 
                     DP: e 
     
      D                NP: 〈e,t〉  by Predicate Modification:   
       the 
                  N: 〈e,t〉        CP: 〈e,t〉    
              story 
                           C:〈〈st〉,〈e,t〉〉     TP: 〈s,t〉 
            that 
                               Edna was stealing   
 
 [[  [TP] ]]  = λw.stealing(Edna)(w)   
 [[  [CP] ]]  = λx. [fCONT(x) = λw’.stealing(Edna)(w’))] 
 [[  [N] ]]    = λx.rumor(x) 
 [[  [NP] ]]  = λx.[ rumor(x) ∧ [fCONT(x) = λw’.stealing(Edna)(w’))] 
 [[  [DP] ]]  = ιx.[ rumor(x) ∧ [fCONT(x) = λw’.stealing(Edna)(w’))] 
 
The semantics has treated the complement proposition as being the unique content of the 
noun. We could have also imagined that the content of the noun merely implies the 
complement proposition. However, we need the propositional complement to specify the 
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(unique) content of the noun because we want to block multiple modifiers. Unlike 
relative clause modifiers, which can stack, CPs that spell out the content of the noun can 
appear just once – even if their content is compatible:5 
(21) a.*The rumor that Fred was happy, that he was in Paris, that he could see ghosts. 
b. The rumor that Fred made, that Jill believed, that Bill spread to his friends… 
 
The semantics attributed to the complementizers, however, will in the general case rule 
this out. Since the complementizer identified the content of the noun with a proposition, 
stacking them would amount to saying that the propositions are identical. 
(22) a. *The rumor that Fred was happy, that he was in Paris. 
b. [[  (22)a ]]  = ιx.[ rumor(x) ∧ [fCONT(x) = λw’.happy(Fred)(w’))] ∧ [fCONT(x) = 
λw’.in-Paris(Fred)(w’))]] 
 
Since fCONT is a function, if fCONT(x) = p (e.g. the proposition denoted by that Fred was 
happy) and fCONT(x) = q (e.g. the proposition denoted by that he was in Paris), then p = 
q. But these two propositions, p and q, cannot be identical, and so the descriptions given 
by stacked CPs like this can’t be true of any individual.  
 Of course, this does predict that two mathematical statements could be stacked, 
since they will be true at all the same worlds, namely, all possible worlds. Understanding 
                                                 
5 The CPs can of course form a conjunction. The above examples are to be interpreted not as the 
conjunction of CPs, but iterated intersection. I thank Rajesh Bhatt for pointing this out and Angelika 
Kratzer for assisting with a remedy. 
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how mathematical statements conform to a possible world semantics has proved difficult 
(see e.g. Cresswell and von Stechow 1982), and I merely leave this as an open problem. 
 An example such as (23), on the other hand, could be treated as a predicational 
sentence. 
(23) The story is that Pasty is innocent. 
   
                      TP: t 
     
      DP: e                    TP: 〈e,t〉    
   
      D         N: 〈e,t〉        BE  CP: 〈e,t〉    
     the    story        
                 story        C:〈〈st〉,〈e,t〉〉     TP: 〈s,t〉 
 
                      Edna was stealing   
 
The copular be here will take an argument of type e and a predicate of type 〈e,t〉 (here the 
CP) and applies the latter to the former (again, world variables not represented): 
(24)        [[  [CP] ]]  = λx. [fCONT(x) = λw’.stealing(Edna)(w’)) 
      [[  [DP] ]]  = ιx.[ story(x)] 
 
                         [[  BE ]]    =      λX ∈ D〈e,t〉 . λx ∈ De. X(x)  
 
      [[  [TP] ]]  = BE(ιx.[ story(x)])(λx.[fCONT(x)(w’) = λw’.stealing(Edna)(w’))]) 
          
However, we need to reconsider what kind of copular constructions is involved in these 
sentences. Potts (2002) shows that these are equative constructions, not predicational, and 
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he offers an analysis of clausal complements to capture this. It is to Potts’ proposal that I 
turn now. 
2.3. Potts (2002) 
Potts starts with the observation that small clauses do not allow for the kind of 
predication that is sometimes called specificational, or equative. For instance, the 
predication in (25)a cannot be used as small clauses (25)b and (25)c (Heycock and Kroch 
1999, from which the following data is taken). 
(25) a.   Your attitude towards Jones is my attitude toward Davies. 
b. *I consider your attitude toward Jones my attitude toward Davies.  
c. *I consider my attitude toward Davies your attitude toward Jones.  
     (Heycock and Kroch 1999:(29)) 
 
In small clauses, at least one of the phrases must be predicative. Potts (2002:67-68) offers 
evidence that CPs can’t be predicates because they cannot occur with content nouns as 
the predicate. 
(26) a. *I consider the problem that she is bonkers.  
b. *I consider that she is bonkers the problem.  
c. *I consider it the problem that she is bonkers.  
     (Potts 2002:68(33)) 
 
This would appear to cast doubt on the analysis of CPs as predicative. Potts uses these 
data to justify an approach whereby propositions can be shifted, into the entity domain 
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(Cresswell 1973) by a type-shifting operation nominalization (Chierchia 1984, 1985). 
Nominalization takes a functional type and returns an entity type. Nominalization of a 
proposition returns an individual of the “proposition sort”. Potts characterizes this shifter 
as one that takes a property of worlds (propositions) and returns an individual that is the 
sum of the worlds in the input propositions. So nominalization, represented by ∩, applied 
to a proposition p returns an individual, notated xp, which is the unique plural individual 
composed of just those worlds in which p is true. 
(27) If p ∈ D〈s,t〉, then ∩
p(p) = [ιxp : ∀w ∈ p: w ≤ xp] and  ∩p(p)  ∈ De6 
(Potts 2002:4(7)) 
(28) a.λw[innocent(Edna)(w)] 
b. ∩p[λw[innocent(Edna)(w)] = w1 ⊕ w2 ⊕ w3 … 
 
A nominalized proposition, then, is of type e, and built into the nominalization function is 
uniqueness. This is how Potts explains why the CP cannot be a predicate in the small 
clause construction: a CP is not a predicate. On the other hand, the copular constructions 
involve equative be which (following Partee 1987, Heycock and Kroch 1999) requires its 
two arguments to be of the same type. Equative be is given bellow, where τ stands for 
any type, here type e: 
                                                 
6 It has been pointed out to me that (27) is too weak. We need to ensure that xp doesn’t include 
worlds that are not in p. 
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(29)    [[  be ]]  = λX ∈ Dτ. λY ∈ Dτ. [X = Y]   
 
The composition then proceeds by equating the subject the problem and the CP that Edna 
is innocent – they are both of the same type – type e. 
(30) [[ problem ]]  = λxp problem(xp)  
(31) [[ the problem ]]  = ιxp problem(xp) 
(32) [[ the problem is [∩p [that Edna is innocent] ]]  = 
  ιxp problem(xp) = ∩p[λw[innocent(Edna)(w)]  
 
The advantage in Potts’ account is that the CP is of an individual type to start with and 
this predicts the ungrammaticality of CPs in small clauses (26). Potts needs to do 
something extra, though, to allow the CPs to compose with nouns. He does so by shifting 
it into a set-denoting type, a predicate, via the operation IDENT, Partee (1987). IDENT 
takes the individual propositional correlate, xp of type e (which is the result of 
nominalizing the clause) and creates a predicate of the form λyp. yp = xp. This can then 
combine successfully with the noun proposal by predicate conjunction. 
(33) George favors the proposal that we destroy Alaska.  
  a. .   [[  proposal ]]  = λxp.proposal(xp) 
   
b. [[  IDENT(that we destroy Alaska) ]]    =     
             IDENT(∩p(λw[destroyw(w)(alaska)(we)])) = λyp[yp = 
      (∩p(λw[destroyw(w)(alaska)(we)))] 
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c. [[  proposal that we destroy Alaska ]]    =   
λyp[proposal(yp) & yp = (∩p(λw[destroyw(w)(alaska)(we)) 
(after Potts 2002) 
 
On Potts’ account we need some way to prevent IDENT from creating the needed 
predicative type in the small clause cases. If IDENT is freely available, why not use it to 
shift the CP into a predictive type there as well? On the other hand, the approach which 
takes the CP denotation as predicative from the start will have to find a way of preventing 
it in the small clauses cases as well. 
We might modify Kratzer’s account (as in (18)) to ensure that it denotes 
something of type e to start with (as with Potts analysis). The only thing we would do is 
revise what (18) does. Instead of returning a property of content individuals as in (34)b, a 
CP would denote the unique individual whose content is expressed by the complement 
proposition (34)c. 
(34) a.     [[  that we destroy Alaska ]]  = 
b.  λxc .fCONT(xc) = λw.destroy(Alaska)(we)(w)  type e,t 
c.  ιxc. fCONT(xc) = λw.destroy(Alaska)(we)(w)  type e 
 
We then will need to use IDENT to compose the CP with the noun as in Potts (2002). So 
IDENT applied to a CP of the form in (34)c will give the following: 
(35) a. IDENT(ιxc. fCONT(xc) = λw.destroy(Alaska)(we)(w)) = 
b. λyc. [yc = ιxc. fCONT(xc) = λw.destroy(Alaska)(we)(w))]   
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The CP, after IDENT has applied, will denote the property of being the thing that is 
identical to the unique thing whose content is the proposition that we destroy Alaska. 
This is intersected with the noun proposal: 
(36) a. [[  the proposal that we destroy Alaska ]]  =  
b. ιy. [proposal(y) & [y = ιx. fCONT(xc) = λw.destroy(Alaska)(we)(w))]]   
 
This move, however, suffers from just the same problem as Potts’ does: what prevents us 
from applying IDENT to give a CP the right type to serve as the predicate in a small 
clause? We want to create predicate-types for the purposes of intersection with the noun, 
but that gets us into trouble in preventing the small clause cases. This is a genuine 
problem. On either approach we have yet to derive the small clause restriction, and this 
remains an open question. 
2.3.1 Contents or nominalized propositions? 
The semantics of the two proposals is crucially different, however. Here are the 
formulas assigned to the proposal the we destroy Alaska in the two approaches: 
(37) a. ιyp[proposal(yp) & [yp = (∩p(λw[destroyw(w)(alaska)(we))]] (Potts 2002) 
 
b. ιy[proposal(y) & [fCONT(y) = λw.destroy(Alaska)(we)(w))]]   
 
Under the nominalization approach as in (37)a, the proposal is identified with a 
proposition. That is, what proposal describes is something (a nominalized proposition) 
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that is identical to the (nominalized proposition) expressed by that we destroy Alaska. In 
(37)b, no such identification is made. The noun proposal describes something that has 
propositional content. The CP then describes a thing whose content is expressed by the 
proposition that we destroy Alaska. 
 There are reasons to avoid saying that a proposal is a proposition, as (37)a does. 
Proposals – and rumors, stories, theories, ideas, and others – come into existence at 
particular times (the proposal that… was made last year); they may be reported or spread 
and they may have qualities like being mean or nasty (they spread a nasty rumor that…), 
and they may cease to exist (that proposal that… is dead). Propositions don’t have these 
properties: they can’t, for instance, be mean. 
 We can talk of rumors and proposals being false, too, but when we do so, they 
nonetheless remain actual proposals and rumors. If we identify a rumor with its 
propositional content, and if the propositional content is the sum of non-actual worlds 
(and this sum was indentified with the proposal), then the rumor would be non-actual. In 
(37)b, no such identification is made. Since the proposition describes the content of the 
rumor (it isn’t the rumor itself), the content of the rumor can be false but the rumor can 
truly be a rumor.7 
 On the other hand, talking about the content of things like rumors and proposals, 
as in (37)b, has difficulties. CPs, on this approach, express properties that are true of a 
thing just in case its content is the proposition expressed by the embedded clause. So that 
life is beautiful expresses a property of things just in case the content of that thing is the 
                                                 
7 It would be necessary now to spell out what predicates like is false (as in the rumor that Edna is 
innocent is false) are true of. They must be properties of the content of the rumor, not the rumor itself. 
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proposition that life is beautiful. The content of the French expression la vie est belle is 
the same, and so we should be able to say: 
(38) *The French sentence that life is beautiful is La vie est belle. 
 
On the approach in (37)b this should mean ‘The French sentence whose content is the 
proposition that life is beautiful is La vie est belle.’8 I leave these difficult questions for 
future study. I will assume the Kratzer-style account since it avoids the most immediate 
problems of literally identifying things like proposals and rumors with propositional 
content. 
On either approach, though, the important result is that the complement to the 
noun intersects with the noun’s denotation. There is no predicate-argument relation. 
That’s the take-home message – and it’s one I’ll provide more evidence for throughout 
the rest of the chapter. I’ll turn next to the nominalizations of verbs, where the very same 
thing happens. 
3.  The Higgins-Stowell facts 
 The kind of paradigm found with non-derived nouns – showing that their CP 
complements are modifiers – extends to nouns derived from attitude verbs. As Higgins 
(1973) and Stowell (1981) showed, CPs that combine with many de-verbal nouns show 
                                                 
8 We would need to say: The French sentence that expresses that life is beautiful is “La vie est 
belle”. The noun sentence cannot take CPs that describe their content. Much like picture and book. Both 
have content but we cannot say *The picture that Washington is crossing the Delaware and *The book that 
Jesus was actually married.  
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the same predicate-like properties as clauses that combine with non-derived nouns: they 
act as predicates in post-copular position. 
(39) a. The belief that Edna was stealing (is false) 
b. The belief is that Edna was stealing. 
(40) a. Andrea’s guess that Bill was lying. 
b. Andrea’s guess was that Bill was lying. 
(41) a. John’s claim that he would go.  
b. John’s claim was that he would go.  
(42) a. Paul’s explanation that he was temporarily insane. 
b. Paul’s explanation was that he was temporarily insane. 
    (Stowell 1981: 199(154a-c)) 
 
This behavior obtains for some infinitives as well – those that characterize the content of 
the nominal (Higgins 1973, Stowell 1981): 
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(43) a. Jack’s desire was to finish on time.    
b. Jack’s desire to finish on time (is a good sign).  
(44) a. Jack’s hope was to be my friend.    
b. Jack’s hope to be my friend (is crazy). 
(45) a. Jim’s promise was to go swimming.  
b. Jim’s promise to go swimming (was reneged).   
(46) a. John’s decision was to swim.     
b. John’s decision to swim (was reckless) 
 
In contrast, certain non-finite clauses behave differently in this respect (Higgins (1973), 
Stowell (1981)): they can appear as clausal complements to the noun, but they cannot 
appear in the copular construction, which suggests they are not predicates: 
(47) a.   Jack’s attempt to finish on time. 
b. *Jack’s attempt was to finish on time.   (Stowell 1981: 201(156/9a)) 
(48) a.    Jack’s pretense to be my friend. 
b. *Jack’s pretense was to be my friend.   (Stowell 1981: 201(156/9b)) 
(49) a.   Jim’s refusal to go swimming.    
b. *Jim’s refusal was to go swimming.   (Stowell 1981: 201(156/9c)) 
    
The proposition that he go swimming is not the content of Jim’s refusal; it’s the thing he 
refused to do. It’s an argument. 
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 So how do CP predicates compose with the deverbal nouns claim and belief and 
hope and so on? These verb roots take as an internal argument something that bears 
content: 
(50) a. John believed the rumor. 
b. Mary claimed something that other people object to. 
c. John decided that. 
d. John told Mary his sad story. 
 
As Kratzer (2006) argues, these verb roots are to be decomposed, like other verbs, by 
factoring out the external argument – the Agent or Holder of the eventuality (which is 
either a state or an event proper) (Kratzer 1996). The verb root then has an event 
argument and a content argument.9 
(51)       [[  verb claim]]     = λxc.λe.claim(xc)(e) 
 
We can now examine how de-verbal nouns are formed from these verbs. The conclusion 
of the next section will be that the derived noun involves the existential closure of the 
verb’s eventuality argument, leaving the internal argument open for composition; hence 
the noun claim has the same type structure as the non-derived content nouns: 
                                                 
9 I am leaving out a world argument for these verbs to make the following exposition about the 
composition clearer. Ultimately, these verbs will have to be intensional.  
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(52)       [[ noun claim]]     = λxc.∃e.claim(xc)(e) 
 
The composition of the CP with the derived noun will proceed just as with the noun: via 
predicate conjunction. 
(53)           [[ claim that Edna was stealing ]]     
    = λxc.∃e [claim(xc)(e) & [fCONT(xc) =  λw’.∃e[stealing(Edna)(e)(w’))]]] 
This analysis of nominalization needs justification, which I turn to next. 
3.1. The importance of object nominals 
 Here I describe the formation of the de-verbal nouns from attitude verbs. In the 
process, we will find yet another syntactic argument for treating clausal complements of 
nouns (derived or otherwise) not as true arguments but as modifiers. The argument is 
basically that of Grimshaw (1990), and here I hope to add additional data and provide a 
formal implementation. The argument is simple and analogous to that made for non-
derived nouns: object nominals do not allow their internal arguments to be saturated, and 
yet object nominals still allow that-clause complements. If these complements were true 
arguments that saturated the object position, we couldn’t explain why they can appear 
where other object-saturating arguments can’t. If they are modifiers, we can explain their 
ability to appear in these cases. Crucially, the argument presented doesn’t rely on abstract 
case. We’ll see that the nouns are “defective” in more than just their ability to assign 
case. They are defective in their argument-taking abilities. 
 To be able to make this argument, I need to first introduce how object nominals 
are formed in the easy cases. With that in place, it will become easier to see how object 
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nominals are formed from attitude verbs, which will in turn provide the background for 
showing why the CPs that complement derived nouns are predicate modifiers. 
 The kinds of nominalizations that attitude verbs like believe form are of the sort 
classified by Grimshaw (1990) as result or object nominalizations. Object nouns appear 
to denote the thing that the internal argument does. Belief refers to a thing believed. The 
(non-attitude) verb love can likewise denote a thing loved. 
(54) a. John’s belief is crazy. 
b. The love of John’s life is very nice. 
 
The relevant fact about object nominals is that the object argument cannot be saturated 
(Grimshaw 1990). To see this, we need to compare object nominals to event (or 
eventuality) nominals10, whose internal argument DPs can be expressed (with the help of 
of). Take the verb love, which can form both types of nominals. The eventuality nominal 
in (55)b denotes a state – hence the predicate last forever can be true of that state. In this 
case, the internal argument must be present (with of-case). The object nominal, in (55)c, 
does not allow the internal argument to be expressed: 
                                                 
10 From hereon, I will use the cover term eventuality for both states and events proper (Bach 
1986). I use l as the semantic type for eventualities. As for the variables, I will use s for states and e for 
events proper. 
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(55) a. John loved Mary.     Verbal 
b. John’s love of Mary lasted forever.  Eventuality nominal 
c. John’s love (*of Mary) was a nice woman  Object nominal 
 
I take the formation of an object nominal to involve existential closure of the eventuality 
argument of the verb root. I will house the existential quantifier that performs this 
operation in Nom, a nominalizing head. Furthermore, external arguments are not 
arguments of the verb root (Kratzer 1996). Thus a ‘transitive’ verb root has an internal 
argument and an eventuality argument; external arguments are added by Voice heads 
(Kratzer 1996), giving agents (for events proper) and perhaps holders (for states). 
Nominalizing a verb root then will either close off existentially the eventuality argument 
or the internal argument. If the former, nominalizing the root of love returns a predicate 
of individuals, a predicate of loved things, which can then be selected by a determiner, for 
instance: 
(56) Object nominal 
  a. The love (of John’s life was Mary) 
 
  b.     DP: ιx.∃e [love(x)(e)] 
  
                 D    NP: λx.∃e [love(x)(e)] 
  
             the      Nom:∃         V    
            
                    λx.λe.love(x)(e) 
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On the other hand, if the internal argument is saturated, as in the case below, then an 
object nominal cannot be derived. The NP will be of the wrong type – since the internal 
argument/object position is saturated, the NP cannot denote a property of loved 
individuals. The article the needs to operate over a property; the denotation of the NP is a 
formula. The semantic computation crashes because no property is available for the 
determiner. 
(57) No internal arguments for object nominals 
 
  a. *The love of Mary.   (*on object nominal structure/interpretation) 
 
  b.    DP: *ιx.∃e [love(Mary)(e)]       ← computation crashes 
  
                  D   NP: ∃e[love(Mary)(e)] 
  
               the        NP:λx.∃e[love(Mary)(e)]         DP  
                  
            Nom:∃          V                                 of  Mary    
 
                 λx.λe.love(x)(e) 
 
 
Instead, only an event nominal can be formed if the internal argument is saturated. 
Eventuality nominals denote the eventuality described by the verb – so in (55)b, the 
predicate last forever is something that is true of John’s love state, not of the object of 
John’s love. Hence, eventuality nominals have something like the structure below. The 
role that the possessor plays is complex; I will treat, for the purposes of the composition, 
the genitive as an all-purpose argument-introducing head. Here, the likely candidate has 
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the meaning of a state holder.11 The possessor takes a property of eventualities and 
returns the unique event whose holder is the possessor. 
(58)  Eventuality nominal 
 
  a. John’s love of Mary (lasted forever). 
 
  b.  DP: ιe[Holder(John)(e) & love(Mary)(e)] 
 
      John            D’: .λx.ιe[Holder(x)(e) & love(Mary)(e)] 
  
                  D           λe[love(Mary)(e)] 
                     ’s 
               λP.λx.ιe[Holder(x)(e) & P(e)]   V   DP   
                      λx.λe.love(x)(e)             of Mary 
 
 
This DP denotes the unique state (held by John) which is a state of loving Mary – which 
can be temporally situated. 
Now to object nominals formed from attitude verbs. The important data point here 
is that, as with other object nominals, the internal argument cannot be saturated. We’ve 
seen that verbs like believe have a content argument, which appears as their internal 
                                                 
11 This doesn’t, of course, do justice to the argument-taking properties of eventuality nominals. 
We are going to have to understand the passive nominals, as in John’s murder. Recovering the argument 
via a general relation encoded in the possessive might be a possibility, but it can’t be limited to Agents or 
Holders. But perhaps it can be limited to event participants. It will quite generally prevent us from being 
able to get non-arguments to be in the possessor position. This would work to eliminate the possibility of 
raising nominals (Kayne 1984): 
(i) *John’s semblance/promise/belief to be a lawyer. 
A semantic account of the lack of raising nominals is an avenue I leave for future work. In particular, it 
would require also understanding expressions like Yesterday’s meeting, which would require talking about 
time arguments for event-denoting nouns like meeting. 
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argument in the verbal cases. (the (b) cases below). When a nominal is formed, this 
argument cannot be expressed (the (a) cases).12,13  
(59) a. *John’s belief of that idea.   object nominal 
b.   John believed that idea.   verb 
(60) a. *John’s claim of something.  object nominal 
b.  John claimed something.   verb 
(61) a. *Her thought of that.   object nominal 
b.  She thought that.    verb 
 
This restriction is the result of the way object nominals are built from the corresponding 
verbal roots just as with love. If the internal argument position of believe is what that idea 
saturates, forming an object nominal isn’t possible if the object argument has been 
saturated. The failure of these derived nominals to take DP complements helps to settle 
an important confound in examining the complementation properties of nouns: licensing 
considerations, such as case. The fact that these are ungrammatical gives us a way of 
                                                 
12 These verbs can take of-marked DPs, but again as noted in the text, those express the res 
argument of believe (and can appear as about-adjuncts too). Lot’s of things can be the res, including 
content nouns themselves (see (ib)): 
(i)  a. John’s belief of Ortcutt is that he is driving too fast. 
     b. John’s belief about that idea is that it is wrong. 
We know this is a different argument from the content argument because they can co-occur in 
verbal structures with the clausal complement: 
(ii) a. John believed of Ortcutt that he was driving too fast.  
      b. John believed about that idea that it is wrong. 
13 I have seen this observation made, in a slightly different context, by Zucchi (1989). I was made 
aware of it in conversations with Kyle Johnson. 
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factoring out any consideration of case, or whatever mechanism is responsible for DP 
licensing. Any time a CP can appear but a DP can’t, we could always appeal to case as 
the regulating factor. On that view, a DP is not available because case is not available, 
but a CP is because it doesn’t “need” case (as in various approaches taken by Pesetsky 
(1982) and others). However, the nominal case-marking of, whatever its source may 
ultimately be, ought to be available if indeed these were true arguments of the noun. 
 The answer, then, does not lie in the case-marking properties of nouns, but in 
semantic structures assigned to object nominals. Object nominalization renders the 
predicate unable to compose with the internal argument. This is what happens in the case 
of belief: If we saturate the internal argument, we get a formula, something which a 
determiner like the cannot compose with and the semantic computation crashes. 
(62)  Object nominal 
  a. *The belief of that idea.   (* on object nominal structure) 
 
  b.    DP: *ιx.∃e [belief(that idea)(e)]  ← computation crashes 
  
                 D   NP: ∃e [belief(that idea)(e)] 
  
             the        NPλx.∃e[love(Mary)(e)]           DP  
                  
            Nom:∃          V                   of  that idea    
 
                  λx.λe.believe(x)(e) 
 
Now we are in a position to see what happens when a CP is in construction with an object 
nominal derived from believe. Since CPs do not saturate the internal argument of the 
predicate, but modify it by intersection, the object nominal can be intersected with the 
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predicate of contents furnished by the CP. For space I do not spell out the content of the 
CP, but the reader can verify that the types work out if CPs are predicates of contents.  
(63)  Object nominal intersected with CP modifier  
  a. The belief that pigs actually do fly (is widespread). 
 
  b.      DP: ιx.∃e [believe(x)(e) & [[CP]](x)] 
  
                  D   NP: λx.∃e [believe(x)(e) & [[CP]](x)] 
  
              the    NP: λx.∃e [believe(x)(e)]      CP: λx.[[CP]](x)  
                  
              Nom:∃    V                 that pigs actually do fly   
 
                 λx.λe.believe(x)(e) 
 
Treating CPs as predicates captures the fact that while the nominal belief does not take a 
content argument (in virtue of being an object nominal), the CP can nevertheless 
compose (being a predicate). 
 This section has made the case for treating clausal complements (to derived 
nouns) as modifiers by providing a negative argument: since true object arguments do not 
appear with this class of derived nouns (being object nominals), and since clausal 
‘complements’ do, then they must not be arguments that saturate an argument position. 
Given the discussion above, the idea that CPs modify (that is, compose by intersection 
with a predicate of the same type) is the most natural conclusion. In the next section, I 
wish to provide positive evidence that the CP complements to nouns do not saturate an 
argument position but rather stand in a modification relation. The evidence comes from 
reconstruction. 
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4. Further syntactic evidence for the modifier analysis of CP complements 
If CPs are really modifiers we expect them to behave as such in other respects. In 
particular, we expect there to be some syntactic evidence that they are modifiers. In the 
next sections, I use diagnostics for the modifier/argument distinction that involves the 
selective bleeding of Condition C that holds for adjuncts but not complements (van 
Riemsdijk and Williams 1981, Freidin 1986, Lebeaux 1988, 1990 among others). I will 
confirm that – after reviewing some conflicting reports in the literature – clausal 
‘complements’ can late merge to nouns (and hence, in line with observations in Jacobson 
2004, Kuno 2004, Lasnik 1998, 1999, and McCarthy 2003). I will spend some time 
reviewing the data marshaled for and against this position in the literature. The 
conclusion is that when we control for certain confounds in the data, we discover that 
clausal complements to nouns act like modifiers for the purposes of late merge, thus 
providing positive, syntactic evidence for the proposals above.  
4.1. Argument / modifier asymmetries and Condition C 
 In certain respects, Wh-moved material acts as though it is present in the gap 
position for the purposes of binding conditions, like Condition C. A referring expression, 
for instance the proper name Nixon, cannot be co-valued with the pronoun he it moves 
over.  
(64) a. *Which investigation of Nixon1 did he1 resent? 
b. *Which book about John’s1 library did he1 read? 
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The result is ungrammatical in the same way that the following examples without 
movement are: 
(65) a. *He1 resented which investigations of Nixon1? 
b. *He1 read which book about John’s1 library?   
 
Here the referring expression is c-commanded by the co-valued pronoun, a structural 
configuration thought to be ungrammatical. Since in (64), Nixon cannot be co-valued 
with he, it is often thought that the moved phrase is subject to binding conditions as if it 
were in its base position. That is, the binding theory assesses a syntactic representation 
for (64) that looks like (65). 
 It has long been suggested that there is an asymmetry, however, between 
arguments and modifiers when it comes to their sensitivity to these connectivity or 
‘reconstruction’ effects with Condition C (van Riemsdijk and Williams 1981, Freidin 
1986, Lebeaux 1988). When a proper name is an argument within the moved expression, 
a disjoint reference effect is generally thought to hold (as we saw above, and repeated 
below). If the referring expression is contained in a modifier, however, the disjoint 
reference effect is lifted.  
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(66) a. *Which investigation of Nixon1 did he1 resent?   argument 
b. Which investigation near Nixon’s1 house did he1 resent?  modifier 
    (Safir 1999: ft1 589) 
(67) a.*Which book about John’s1 library did he1 read?   argument 
b.  Which book from John’s1 library did he1 read?   modifier 
    (Fox and Nissenbaum 1999:6(6)) 
 
Lebeaux (1988) proposed that this difference would follow if the representation that the 
binding theory assessed did not require that modifiers be in the base position. We’ll see in 
a moment the techniques currently used to capture this difference. 
 Many speakers, though, often do not find a strong contrast between arguments 
and modifiers. Part of the problem, is that the modifier/argument status is unclear for 
many nominals. We have already seen, in the discussion about object versus eventuality 
nominals, that nouns are often ambiguous in their argument-taking properties (Grimshaw 
1990). Following a strategy pointed out to me by Kyle Johnson (p.c.; see Johnson 2009), 
one way to force argument status on a referring expression is to make sure we have an 
eventuality nominal. And one way to do that is to choose a verbal gerund, especially one 
with a small clause complement. This will ensure that the relevant name is not part of a 
modifier. In the cases below, the referring expression is syntactically case-marked as the 
object of the verbal gerund. And, indeed, the disjoint reference effect is clear: 
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(68) a. *Whose painting John1 nude does he1 resent most? 
b.  Whose painting him1 nude does John1 resent most? 
(69) a. *Whose finding Hector1 insufferable at the meeting was he1 unaware of? 
b.   Whose finding him1 insufferable at the meeting was Hector1 unaware of? 
 
In fact, these induce a disjoint reference effect in the way that cases where the 
modification status is clear don’t: 
(70) a.  Whose painting Mary nude in John1’s backyard does he1 resent most? 
b. Whose browsing the web during Hector1’s speech was he1 unaware of? 
 
I conclude, then, that there is a modifier/argument distinction in the selective bleeding of 
condition C.  This is important to establish, since we need to be sure the test we run 
concerning clausal complements is legitimate. Let me briefly describe the standard 
approach to the adjunct/argument asymmetry in the literature. 
4.2. The Late Merge account 
 The most recent understanding of connectivity and other reconstruction effects is 
the copy theory of movement (Chomsky 1995). Under the copy theory of movement, 
movement involves the creation of a copy of some phrase and the merge of that copy in a 
higher position. In a sense, then, phrases leave copies of themselves, and those copies are 
subject to the same requirements that overt phrases are (further spell-out principles 
determine which copy is pronounced, see Fox 1999). So the gap of the moved wh-phrase 
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is occupied not by a mere trace but by a copy of the moved expression. (64)a, repeated 
below, has the representation below, where a condition C effect is induced by the lower 
copy of the wh-phrase: 
(71)  *[Which investigation of Nixon1] did he1 resent [Which investigation of Nixon1]? 
 
Lebeaux’s proposal – updated in the copy theory of movement framework (Chomsky 
1995, Fox 1999, Fox and Nissenbaum 1999) – is that modifiers can be present in some 
copies but not others – a process now dubbed late-merge. So the wh-phrase in (66)b can  
merge without its adjunct; the higher copy, however, contains the adjunct. No Condition 
C violation is induced.  
(72) a. Modifier – late-merged to higher copy  
  [Which investigation near Nixon’s1 house] did he1 resent [Which investigation]? 
   
  b.  Argument – merged in base position 
   *[Which investigation of Nixon1] did he1 resent [Which investigation of Nixon]? 
 
The late merge option is not available for arguments, Lebeaux argued, because of the 
Projection Principle. The Projection Principle states that a predicate’s thematic or 
argument-structure requirements must be satisfied at all levels of representation. As a 
consequence, complements cannot be present at one point in the derivation but not 
another. Fox (1999) argues that once the move is made to the copy theory of movement, 
the argument/adjunction asymmetry falls out naturally from compositional mechanisms. 
Take for example the noun investigation. If its argument is merged only in the higher 
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copy, then that means the lower copy of investigation has an unsaturated argument 
position. This would render it the wrong type and it wouldn’t compose with the element 
that selects it.14,15  
4.3. Complement clauses and Late Merge 
 In addition to the PP adjunct/complement asymmetries above, Freidin (1986) and 
Lebeaux (1988) claimed that there was an argument/modifier asymmetry in the case of 
clausal elements. An example of this purported contrast is shown below. In the (a) case a 
referring pronoun is in a ‘complement’ clause; in (b) it is in a relative clause: 
(73) a. *Which claim that Mary had offended John1 did he1 repeat? 
b.  Which claim that offended John1 did he1 repeat? 
 (Safir 1999: 589(1)) 
 
The relative clause in (b), being an adjunct, can late merge and thereby bleed Condition 
C. The clausal complement in (a), on the other hand, must be merged in the base position. 
This forces the referring expression below its co-valued pronoun. These two 
representations are shown below: 
                                                 
14 Spelling this out fully actually requires recourse to Fox’s trace conversion mechanism (Fox 
1999, see also Sauerland 1998). Not only is this mechanism troublesome (see Johnson 2009), it will take us 
too far afield. The simple message about modifier/argument distinctions is sufficient presently. 
15 Optional arguments, as in the picture (of John), might act like modifiers for the purposes of late 
merge. It is hard to see how the semantics would rule this out. And this comports with the lack of clarity of 
the data in these cases. 
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(74) Relative Clause – late-merger  
a. Which claim that offended John1 did he1 repeat? 
b. [Which claim that offended John1] did he1 repeat [which claim] 
 
(75) Complement Clause – no late-merger 
a. *Which claim that Mary had offended John1 did he1 repeat? 
b. *[Which claim that Mary had offended John1] did he1 repeat [Which claim that 
Mary had offended John1]? 
 
Based on the contrast in (73) alone it would seem that clausal ‘complements’ to nouns are 
indeed complements, since they cannot late-merge. A number of linguists in a variety of 
frameworks, however, have suggested that the contrast between argument and adjunct 
CPs (in contrast to argument and adjunct PPs) is not robust. This is the topic of the next 
section. 
4.4. The facts: controlling for the confounds 
Perfectly grammatical examples of ‘complement’ clauses of nouns obviating 
Condition C effects have been cited in the literature. A sample is shown below from 
various sources. (See Postal 1997, Kuno 2004, Safir 1999, Lasnik 1998, 1999, McCarthy 
2004, Landau 2007.)  
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(76) a. The fact that John1 has been arrested he1 generally fails to mention. 
b. Whose allegation that Lee1 was less than truthful did he1 refute vehemently? 
(Kuno 2004)  
c. How many arguments that John’s1 theory was correct did he1 publish? 
(Safir 1999: ft1, modified from Barss) 
 
While the contrast in (73) is clear, it’s surprising that Condition C violations do not 
appear in the examples above. What gives? Before rushing to any conclusions about what 
we know, it is helpful to pause to ask why the data should be so inconclusive, and to 
examine what factors and possible confounds contribute to the judgments. After that, I 
will offer examples that systematically control for those confounds. I will make the case 
that clausal complements to nouns behave as modifiers (they can ‘late merge’), providing 
syntactic evidence for the analysis of CPs. 
4.4.1 The perspective confound 
 There are several reasons why the data is not stable and why certain examples 
tend to be degraded. The first, noted by Kuno (1997) and Kuno (2004), is that perspective 
is a crucial factor in the acceptability of these types of sentences. Clausal ‘complements’ 
that specify the content of some noun tend to be degraded when a referring expression in 
the CP is co-valued with the agent or author to whom the content of the CP is ascribed. 
For instance, in (73) John is likely the perspectival centre – or ‘author’– of the claim 
repeated, but a referring expression is used in the CP that reports the content of his 
utterance. Kuno (1997) suggests that changing the perspectival center of a report can 
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alleviate the confound. Safir (1999) offers a pair where this factor is potentially 
controlled for: 
(77) a. ?Which claim that Al1 had defeated Lea was he1 unaware of? 
b. *Which claim that Al1 had defeated Mary did he1 later admit he1 made? 
(Safir 1999(63)) 
 
In (a), Safir suggests that content of the claim is not something Al would himself utter – 
he was unaware of it. In (b), the claim is something that Al would say: “I defeated Mary”. 
The judgments are, as Safir points out, not too robust. The issue here involves de se 
attitudes, and how de se counterparts are expressed in the complements of attitude 
ascriptions. In the (b) case, we are reporting a claim that Al is making about himself and 
the content of the claim involves the person he knowingly identifies as himself, hence the 
first person paraphrase. De se counterparts involve more than just co-indexing two 
referring-expressions, and a great deal of work goes into characterizing de se belief and 
de se pronouns (Kaplan 1977, Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989, Schlenker 1999, Anand 2006; 
and see Chapter Three where the issue is taken up more fully). The upshot is that even if 
no Condition C violation holds, proper names will still be the wrong thing to use in a de 
se ascription.16 Controlling for this confound is difficult, and even the (a) example does 
not quite alleviate this problem – to say that Al is unaware of a claim about himself 
simply negates that he is aware that he (really, his de se counterpart) has had a claim 
made about him. 
                                                 
16 For instance, I know of no case where a proper name is used to express a de se counterpart. This 
is of course hard to see because such cases will generally also involve a Condition C violation. 
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 Kuno (2004) provides a better example. The predicate in the example below, 
expunge, is not one (like aware or repeat) that implies an attitude on the part of its 
subject. The object position of expunge is extensional. This greatly helps alleviate the 
perspectival confound and the condition C violation is absent. 
(78)     Which psychiatrist’s view that John1 was schizophrenic did he1 try to get 
expunged from the trial records? 
(Kuno 2004: 335(72)) 
 
We can actually make these better, as there is another confound in the data that needs to 
be controlled for. 
4.4.2 The individuation confound 
 There is a second confound, pointed out by Jacobson (2004:27-28ft10), that many 
of the examples that purport to show a contrast between modifier and argument CPs. The 
confound concerns how we individuate things with content. Many of the sentences 
reported in the literature involve questions headed by which, and this carries its own 
requirements that interact with content nouns. Take one of the pairs reported in the 
original literature: 
(79) a. *Which claim that John1 had helped develop new technologies did he1 make at 
last year’s national convention? (‘complement clause’) 
b. Which claim that John1 made did he1 later deny? (‘relative clause’) 
(Lebeaux 1992) 
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The sentence in (79)a is somewhat degraded even without a Condition C violation: 
(80) ??Which claim that he1 had helped develop new technologies did John1 make at 
last year’s national convention? 
 
To that end, Jacobson (2004) has pointed out that a contrast persists between relative and 
non-relative CPs where no Condition C issues arise: 
(81) a. Which claim (that he made) did John write down in his report? 
b. ?Which claim that Mary was guilty did John write down in his report? 
(82) a. Which argument (that she made) did he refute? 
b. ?Which argument that guns should be banned did he refute? 
 
The problem traces back to the fact that these question words – which x – require the 
individuation of x’s, such as individual claims or arguments. Now, while it is not difficult 
to individuate claims and arguments in general (even with relative clauses added to 
them), it requires a richer context to individuate claims that have the same content.  
 When a context is set-up that makes it more plausible for there to be different 
claims with the same content, the examples improve dramatically. Providing different 
authors or originators of the claim or argument help. In this case, bleeding of Condition C 
is natural even for clausal ‘complements’: 
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(83) a. Which witness’s claim that Mary1 was at the scene of the crime did she1 try to 
have stricken from the record? 
b. Which justice’s argument that Mr. B1 was within his right to protest the 
cutbacks did he1 refer to in his1 speech? 
 
Or consider the following scenario, where the content of the arguments can differ slightly 
according to their originator: 
(84)      Professor C. is well-known for being resistant to reviewers’ suggestions and 
criticisms. One proposal in Professor C.’s most recent submission was 
uniformly rejected by the reviewers, although they each had very different 
arguments against it. Professor C, surprisingly, changed his proposal. 
  The journal editor wondered which reviewer’s argument that Professor C’s1 
proposal was flawed he1 ended up accepting. 
 
Here, there are a number of different arguments that Professor C’s proposal is flawed, 
and so it is natural to ask whose argument Professor C ended up accepting. What makes 
Kuno’s (2004) examples from above particular good is that they control for this confound 
as well as the perspective confound. Kuno’s sentences involves cases where different 
claims, opinions, or views can be individuated (on the basis of their authors) even if they 
have the same content.  
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(85) a. Whose allegation that John1 was less than truthful did he1 refute vehemently? 
b. Whose opinion that Weld1 was unfit for the ambassadorial appointment did he1 
try to refute vehemently? 
c. Whose claim that the Senator1 had violated the campaign finance regulation did 
he1 dismiss as politically motivated? 
d. Which psychiatrist’s view that John1 was schizophrenic did he1 try to get 
expunged from the trial records? 
(Kuno 2004: 335(72a-d)) 
 
These examples also do well to alleviate the perspectival confound noted above. The last 
example is particularly natural. Here, the predicate that selects the moved complex DP is 
not a typical attitude verb: as noted, expunge doesn’t necessarily implicate any belief on 
the part of the embedded subject. In fact, just by varying the nature of the most embedded 
verb we get a contrast. Compare the variation on Kuno’s example with believe (and other 
belief-implicating verbs) instead of expunge (and others): 
(86) a. ??Which psychiatrist’s view that John1 was schizophrenic did he1 not believe 
(…understand/agree with/want to hear/…)? 
b. Which psychiatrist’s view that John1 was schizophrenic did he1 try to get 
expunged from the trial records? 
 
This example alleviates the difficulties of individuating things with the same content as 
well as the perspectival/de se confound. 
Taking into consideration the various confounds pointed out in the literature, we 
can now conclusively see that the clausal complements of nouns can bleed condition C. If 
the late-merger account of these bleeding effects is right, then we have powerful 
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confirmation that not only are the clausal complements of nouns semantically modifiers, 
but at the level of syntactic representation they are treated as such. Of course, one thing 
we need to do is to return to cases which are reliably arguments of the embedding 
predicate to make sure that we indeed have a contrast.  
4.5. Comparison to clausal arguments 
The clausal complements of verbs, in contrast to nouns, behave as expected: 
moving their complements does not render them impervious to disjoint reference effects. 
To test this I use verbal gerunds, as above, to ensure that we indeed have verbal 
complementation. To make sure we have a verbal gerund I add in an adverb (which is 
ungrammatical with nominal gerunds – e.g *Whose loudly singing of the national anthem 
vs. Whose loudly singing the national anthem). The sentences below are the result of 
crossing two manipulations: the presence of a possible Condition C violation (a,c) or not 
(b,d), and whether the CP is the complement of a noun (c,d) or a verbal gerund (a,b). The 
judgments reported here are compatible with the claim that only the CP complements of 
nominals bleed Condition C. 
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(87) a. *Whose loudly claiming that Bob1 is the murderer did he1 not hear? 
b.   Whose loudly claiming that he1 is the murderer did Bob1 not hear? 
c.   Whose loud claim that Bob1 is the murderer did he1 not hear? 
d.   Whose loud claim that he1 is the murderer did Bob1 not hear? 
(88) a. *Whose falsely alleging that John1 was less than truthful did he1 not witness? 
b.  Whose falsely alleging that he1 was less than truthful did Bob1 not witness?    
c.  Whose false allegation that John1 was less than truthful did he1 refute 
vehemently? 
d.  Whose false allegation that he1 was less than truthful did John1 refute 
vehemently? 
 
The lengths that need to be taken to ensure that the complements are arguments of a verb 
and not a noun degrade the acceptability. And we should be worried that the contrasts are 
not as glaringly bad as we might expect. Nonetheless, if these data hold up, we are safe in 
concluding that verbs still can take clauses as arguments. It is true, however, that these 
data require confirmation experimentally. 
 Another strategy is to use raising-to-object infinitival complements, whose 
subjects are case marked by the embedding predicate (see Chapter Four for a thorough 
discussion of these constructions).  Nouns (and nominal gerunds) do not allow these 
kinds of complements, unlike verbs and verbal gerunds: 
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(89) a.  John believed her to be upset. 
b.  John strongly believing her to be upset (is a mistake on his part). 
c. *John’s strong believing of her to be upset (is mistaken). 
d. *John’s strong belief of her to be upset (is mistaken). 
 
We can be sure that the embedded subject – which on many accounts raises to become 
the matrix object syntactically – is not a modifier. The contrasts between these 
complements and complements to nouns is clearest: 
(90) a. *Whose believing John1 to be a fool do you think he1 would be most upset by?  
b.  Whose believing him1 to be a fool do you think John1 would be most upset by? 
c.  Whose belief that John1 is a fool do you think he1 would be most upset by? 
d.  Whose belief that he1 is a fool do you think John1 would be most upset by? 
(91) a. *Whose desiring John1 to be hanged do you think he1 would be most upset by?  
b.  Whose desiring him1 to be hanged do you think John1 would be most upset by?  
c.  Whose desire for John1 to be hanged do you think he1 would be most upset by? 
d.  Whose desire for him1 to be hanged do you think John1 would be most upset 
by? 
 
I haven’t controlled for the perspectival confound in these cases (the embedding 
predicate, upset, has a perspectival component in that it requires belief on the part of the 
subject about the content of what he was upset by). Nonetheless, this feature is held 
constant across the items and a contrast emerges. Once again, experimental testing would 
be needed to verify these intuitions. 
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4.5.3 Relation to Higgins-Stowell facts 
Important to note here is the correlation between the Stowell-Higgins facts and 
the reconstruction effects (see Landau 2007 for remarks in this direction). Those 
predicates whose complements do not appear in the post-copular position (see (47)) also 
show stronger condition C effects than CPs that behave as modifiers in other respects. 
(92) a. *Whose attempt to discredit Nixon1 did he1 resent?   
 (Safir 1999: ft 1) 
b. *Which professor’s refusal to accept Bob1’s paper did he1 challenge? 
c. *Whose anger that Bill1 was responsible did he1 try to diffuse? 
 
We need to be just as careful, however, with these examples as we were with the original 
cases that purported to show an asymmetry. Below, are some minimal pairs contrasting 
“true” arguments with modifiers of nouns: 
(93) a. Whose desire to discredit Nixon1 was he1 not told about. 
b. *Whose attempt to discredit Nixon1 was he1 not told about. 
(94) a. Which professor’s choice not to accept Bob’s paper did he1 challenge? 
b. *Which professor’s refusal to accept Bob’s paper did he1 challenge? 
(95) a. Whose claim that Bill1 was responsible did he1 try to cover up? 
b. *Whose anger that Bill1 was responsible did he1 try to cover up? 
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The true argument clauses, then, behave as expected with respect to their inability to 
bleed condition C.  
5. Apparent problem: proof  
 There is an old objection to treating clausal ‘complements’ to nouns as modifiers 
that has cropped up in the literature. These data were marshaled by Safir (1985) against 
Stowell’s arguments that clausal complements to nouns are (always) appositive 
modifiers. The arguments of this class of verbs – the prove-class, also known as bi-
sentential verbs (Emonds 1976, Koster 1978) – can be either CPs or DPs. The internal 
argument refers to the content of what is proved by some fact instantiated by the subject 
argument. (Some speakers prefer the fact that rather than a bare CP as the subject 
argument.)  
(96) a. The mess in the kitchen proves that Smith was the culprit. 
b. (The fact) That there is a mess in the kitchen proves that Smith was the culprit. 
(97) a. The mess in the kitchen proves your theory. 
b. (The fact) That there is a mess in the kitchen proves your theory. 
 
Safir pointed out that while the nominal proof can take as its internal argument a CP, that 
same argument position cannot be predicated of by a CP in the post copular position, 
unlike predicates like believe and other content nouns. Evidence behaves similarly: 
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(98) a. The proof that Smith was the culprit (disappeared). Nominal complement 
b. *The proof was that Smith was the culprit.  Post copular CP  
      only means: Smith’s being the culprit proved some other thing. 
(99) a. The evidence that Smith was the culprit.   Nominal complement 
b.  The evidence was that Smith was the culprit.  Post copular CP  
    only means: Smith’s being the culprit was evidence for something. 
(100) a. The belief/claim/rumor that Smith was the culprit. Nominal complement 
b. The belief/claim/rumor was that Smith was the culprit. Nominal complement 
 
Instead, it is the subject argument that is identified by the post-copular element (as 
evidenced by the paraphrase above), and can be either a CP or DP. The internal argument 
CP can remain in complement position in these cases.17 
(101) a. The proof (that Smith was the culprit) was that he was late. 
b. The proof (that Smith was the culprit) is the mess in the kitchen. 
c. The evidence (that Smith was the culprit) was that he was late. 
 
First, it should be pointed out that a number of predicates, which appear to have a similar 
meaning to prove, do not work this way. Verbs such as indicate, suggest, demonstration, 
and reveal: 
                                                 
17 Angelika Kratzer has pointed out that proof may have two uses. One describes something that 
has content (as in the wording of the proof) and another use describes some fact that proves something (this 
fingerprint is the proof that John was here). It is the latter proof I am interested in. 
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(102) a.  The evidence indicated that no witchcraft was involved. 
b. The indication was that no witchcraft was involved.18 
(103) a.  The evidence suggested that no witchcraft was involved. 
b. The suggestion was that no witchcraft was involved. 
(104) a.  The evidence revealed that no witchcraft was involved. 
b. The revelation was that no witchcraft was involved. 
(105) a.  The evidence demonstrated that no witchcraft was involved. 
b. The demonstration was that no witchcraft was involved. 
 
So there is something particular about proof and evidence. Safir’s (1985) point is that the 
clausal complement of proof (which describes what was proved) does not behave like the 
clausal complements of belief and others in being something that can describe the noun 
proof. This provided evidence against Stowell’s claim that CPs were only ever modifiers 
of nouns, not true complements. (This was a problem for Stowell who tied the fact that 
CP could remain in situ after nouns to the fact that they weren’t true arguments.) The 
problem posed by proof appears to carry over to the analysis here: if CP ‘complements’ 
to nouns are predicates, then why can’t they appear in the predication construction with 
this class of verbs? 
                                                 
18 Indication appears to be ambiguous. It can, but needn’t, behave like proof.  
(i) a. (The fact) that there were no broomsticks around was the only indication that no witchcraft was 
involved. 
b. The only indication that no witchcraft was involved was (the fact) that there were no broomsticks 
around. 
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 I should point out first of all that the claim in this chapter is not necessarily that 
all complements to nouns are modifiers. Clearly, we have seen this is not the case for 
nouns like attempt. But it is worth looking at proof since the objection has been raised in 
a number of places. 
 The difference between proof and belief is that the nominal formed from prove is 
not an object nominal. If anything, it’s a subject nominal. As (106) above shows, the 
nominal proof denotes the entity that supports the conclusion – it can be the facts that 
prove something, for instance (a); as noted, the internal argument CP can co-occur with 
the post-copular element – which isn’t true of belief-class nominals (c). 
(106) a.  The proof was a fact/the mess/that Fred was missing. 
b.  The proof that Fred was the culprit was a fact/the mess/that Fred was missing. 
c. *The belief that Fred was the culprit was that he was missing. 
 
Proof simply denotes entities, like facts for instance, that prove things. It’s a property of 
the nominal itself. This doesn’t tell us anything about the status of the complement of 
proof.  
The internal argument of prove behaves differently from the internal arguments of 
believe and claim in just the expected way too. Unlike the object nominals such as belief 
and claim, the noun proof permits its internal argument to be expressed as a DP with of-
case (sometimes for is more appropriate): 
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(107) a. The proof of that/his guilt. 
b. The indication of this. 
c. The evidence for this. 
 
It’s the subject argument that cannot be expressed this way: 
(108) *The evidence for his guilt of that fact (is here).  
Cannot mean: That fact proves his guilt and that fact is here. 
 
It appears, then, that a verb such as prove takes two arguments: the internal argument is a 
proposition (type 〈s,t〉), the ‘subject’ is an individual-type argument, often picking out 
some fact or particular situation, which forms the basis of some conclusion expressed by 
the propositional argument.  
 This implies, then, that the external argument of prove is not severed.  Recall, that 
in deriving the object nominals for verbs like claim and belief we severed the external 
argument (à la Kratzer 1996) and nominalization applied to the verb root, which had only 
an internal argument (and an eventuality argument). That move allowed us to 
existentially close the eventuality argument, returning a predicate of things believed or 
claimed. The parse tree is given below again for belief: 
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(109) Object Nominalization of believe 
 
  a. The belief that pigs actually do fly (is widespread). 
 
  b.      DP: ιx.∃e [believe(x)(e) & [[CP]](x)] 
  
                  D   NP: λx.∃e [believe(x)(e) & [[CP]](x)] 
  
              the    NP: λx.∃e [believe(x)(e)]      CP: λx.[[CP]](x)  
                  
              Nom:∃    V                 that pigs actually do fly   
 
                 λx.λe.believe(x)(e) 
 
This treatment of nominalization assumes that it is the verb root that is nominalized. If 
the same is true of the nominalization of prove into proof, then the root of prove must 
have an external argument.  
 Let me put on the table a temporary meaning for prove. It requires talking about 
evidence made available by individual things – like messes and other situations. Assume 
the following informal meaning for prove (I suppress the eventuality argument). Further 
things would need to be said about how to define the worlds accessible from situations 
and other individuals that can be the subject argument of prove—these individuals 
provide evidence, perhaps the circumstances of x entail the conclusion. What I am 
interested in here are the semantic types involved. Let’s just translate prove and give it an 
informal meaning below that: 
(110) a. [[  prove ]]  = λp.λx.λw.prove(p)(x)(w) 
b. x proves p in w iff  ∀w’(compatible(x)(w)(w’) → p(w’)) 
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Now, let’s derive the (non-event) nominal from this entry for prove: the subject argument 
will be targeted as the referent of the nominal (I suppress world arguments for the 
predicate prove; the internal argument can be existentially closed or simply saturated by a 
proposition).  
(111)  “subject nominal” of prove 
 
  a. The proof (that Bob was guilty). 
 
  b.    DP: ιx [proof(q)(x)] 
  
                 D       λx[proof(q)(x)] 
  
             The        V                       CP   
            
            λp.λx.proof(p)(x)  that Bob was guilty (=q) 
 
The reason that the clausal complement of the noun does not behave like a predicate is 
because the nominal is not an object nominal, it’s a subject nominal. What the noun proof 
denotes is not the thing which follows from the facts described by the subject, but the 
subject itself. There’s really no mystery here about the status of (98)b – given the nature 
of the noun proof, the only thing the post-copular CP can do is identify the thing doing 
the proving, not that which is proved. It tells us nothing about the status of the 
complement CP. We’ve looked at two ways of finding this out. There is a mystery, 
however, since given the formula above, the CP complement of proof saturates, rather 
than modifies, the noun. And this is precisely what does not happen with the nouns we 
looked at, like belief. Two options arise. Either some CPs are true arguments of nouns or 
we just haven’t found the right evidence to determine the status of proof’s complements. 
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In the next section I will give evidence from reconstruction that indeed the complement 
of proof acts like the complement of belief-type nouns in their ability to ‘late merge’. 
5.1. Proof complements and Condition C 
 We now have an independent test to see whether a clausal complement to a noun 
is a modifier or not, which comes from Condition C. Here indeed even the object 
argument of prove allows for selective bleeding of Condition C: 
(112) a. What/whose proof that John1 was at the scene of the crime did he1 have 
expunged from the record. 
b. Whose evidence that John1 was at the scene of the crime did he1 have expunged 
from the record. 
 
This is to be compared to the verbal complement (again, as above, I used verbal gerunds 
to ensure we have a verbal complement): 
(113)   *Whose proving yesterday that John1 was at the scene of the crime did he1 not 
want his lawyer to hear? 
 
The controls show that (a) this is a reliable sentence and (b) that it is indeed that presence 
of the name that causes the trouble in (113). 
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(114) a. John did not want his lawyer to hear Mary proving yesterday he was at the 
scene of the crime. 
b. Whose proving yesterday that he1 was at the scene of the crime did John1/he1 
not want his lawyer to hear? 
 
If these data can be maintained – and I think they can – we learn that bleeding of 
condition C does not travel entirely with the Higgins-Stowell facts. That is, the 
complement of prove does not act like a modifier for the purposes of the post-copular 
constituents, but it does act like a modifier for the purposes of whatever distinguishes 
arguments of object/subject nominals from event nominals.  
 This can perhaps be seen even by looking at the DP arguments nominal proof 
takes: they are often introduced by a lexically specific preposition (Johns proof for/of his 
innocence). These too can bleed condition C: 
(115) a. Whose proof of John1’s innocence did he1 try to have entered into the court 
record? 
b. What kind of proof for John1’s claim does he1 think the judge wants to be 
given? 
 
Proof still denotes a noun that describes the subject of the proving – the evidence not the 
conclusion – but even its thematic objects (DP or CP) can bleed condition C. If the 
bleeding of condition C diagnoses non-argument status (and all nominal arguments are 
optional with result/argument nominals) then we need to find a way to let even the CP 
objects of nominal proof to compose as a modifier. 
   
75 
6. Summary 
 Following up on the program of giving complementizers the meanings in Kratzer 
(2006), we have seen a number of arguments that CPs are not arguments of nouns – 
whether those nouns are deverbal or not – but are predicates of contents that modify the 
nouns (which are themselves descriptions of individuals with content). The evidence 
came from several inter-related data points. The first consideration was that non-derived 
nouns like idea and story don’t take (syntactic) arguments at all. But they do take what 
appear to be CP arguments; treating the CPs like modifiers captured this state of affairs. 
Furthermore, the Higgins-Stowell facts showed that we want to treat the CPs that follow 
certain de-verbal nouns in the same way. Whether the CP denoted a predicate of contents 
that modified this noun depended on a number of factors, such as whether the predicate 
was itself something that had content and, in the case of the prove-class, what type of 
nominal is formed from the verb. 
 A mystery remains, however: why are the nominalizations of clause taking verbs 
always argument (subject or object) nominals? Why can’t nouns take clauses in the way 
nouns take arguments of other categories? It isn’t a property of clauses (cf. Stowell 
1981). We can see this best when we look to verbs that have different kinds of 
nominalizations: event versus object. 
As pointed out by Vendler (1967), Dowty (1979) and Grimshaw (1990), event  
nominalizations can preserve aktionsart distinctions found with the verb. The verb 
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(phrase) observe+NP is naturally interpreted atelically, while destroy is as telic.19 Their 
corresponding nominalizations preserve these distinctions. 
(116) a. The doctor observed the patient {for/*in} three hours. atelic 
b.  Only observation of the patient {for/*in} several weeks can determine the most 
likely [course of action]. 
(117) a. The Roman’s destroyed the city {in/*for} three hours  telic 
b. The total destruction of the city {in/*for} only two days appalled everyone. 
  (Grimshaw 1990:58(28b/29b)) 
However, an aspectual contrast is not preserved in the nominalization of clause-taking 
observe. Observe that p for several weeks is possible – requiring a repeated events 
interpretation (a). But the nominalization doesn’t allow this. 
(118) a.   Bob    [ [observed that Mary was sick ] for several weeks]. 
b.  *Bob’s [ [observation [that Mary was sick ]] for several weeks] was needed.  
c.   Bob’s [ [observation of Mary] for several weeks] was needed. 
 
This is true of clause-taking observe whether there’s a complement or not. The meaning 
of clause-taking observe just seems to be incapable of forming an event denoting 
nominal. Is that a property of all clause-taking verbs? And if so, why? 
                                                 
19 When destruction is interpreted as a result noun it does not show aktionsart distinctions 
(Grimshaw 1990). The point is, however, that clause-taking verbs appear only to allow “Result” or “object” 
nominals. 
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CHAPTER III 
CPS DON’T MOVE 
 
1. Introduction 
The status of sentential subjects was at one time a topic of much debate, and many 
of the questions posed then remain unresolved today. One of the central questions – 
whether sentential subjects exist – is still often answered in different ways, as witnessed 
by recent work on the topic (Alrenga 2005, Davies and Dubinsky 1998, 1999, 2001, 
2008). The present chapter addresses a related, but no less unsettled, question about CPs 
that appear in a left-dislocated position: do they move there or are they base generated 
there? I bring reconstruction data to bear on this question, and conclude that CPs do not 
move. I implement an analysis using the tools of de re attitude ascription that derives this, 
and discuss its implications for the representation of sentential subjects. 
1.1. What derives the Topic Analysis of sentential subjects? 
  The distribution of sentential subjects is not like that of DP subjects, and this has 
prompted many to puy left-dislocated clauses, even those that appear to be subjects, in a 
topic position (Emonds 1976, Koster 1978, Stowell 1981). Alrenga (2005) has recently 
provided corroborating evidence for this analysis for English, along with support for a 
derivation in which a null DP operator abstracts over the gap position in the clause, as 
schematized for the sentential subject below:  
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(1) a. That predatory lenders are responsible for the crisis is not widely accepted. 
b.  [CP [CP That predatory lenders are responsible for the crisis] [CP Op1  t1 is not 
widely accepted t1.]] 
 
The “Topic Approach” is designed to capture not only the non-subject properties of left 
dislocated CPs, but also the well-known requirement on the category of the gap in these 
constructions. Dislocated CPs – whether topics or subjects – are only licensed if their gap 
position is one that otherwise admits DPs, what I will call the DP Requirement (Williams 
1981, Grimshaw 1982, Postal 1986, Webelhuth 1992, Alrenga 2005).  
But this long-standing issue about sentential subjects is profitably separated from 
another question: what kind of dependency holds between the fronted CP and the gap 
position? That is, does a null operator move or does the CP move? This constitutes a 
mostly independent choice-point from the subject/topic question. As noted, whether 
sentential subjects exist or not remains one of the central empirical debates about 
dislocated CPs. Some claim that sentential subjects, contra Koster (1978), do exist but are 
degraded for extra-grammatical reasons (Delahunty 1983, Davies and Dubinsky 2008). 
However this issue is resolved, the question of whether the CP moves to its dislocated 
position or is base-generated there also remains unsettled. I will use reconstruction as a 
way of asking this question. Since left-dislocated CPs – I use the phrase to remain neutral 
on where they sit and whether they are moved there – are semantically opaque domains, 
the landscape of binding changes quite a bit. The logophoric and perspectival properties 
of the embedding verbs affects the tests in profound ways, although I hope to control for 
these effects. Here is a preview of the facts. 
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The base-generated topic analysis faces an immediate challenge from cases which 
appear to show that CPs reconstruct for the purposes of variable binding. This is true for 
topic CPs, (2)a, and CP subjects (2)b.20 
(2) a. That he1’ll end up just like his father, I don’t think any man1 expects. 
b. That he1’ll end up just like his father isn’t generally expected by any man1. 
 
Both (2)a,b can be understood so that the pronoun he co-varies with the choice of men, 
which on a naïve view of binding would suggest reconstruction. 
At the same time, it is possible to find cases where reconstruction is not forced, as 
demonstrated by the absence of Condition C effects. Below, referring expressions in a 
sentential subject (3)b and sentential topic (3)a/(4) are naturally co-valued with a pronoun 
in the matrix clause. 
(3) a. That the faculty would be so NICE to Mary1, I don’t think she1 ever expected. 
b. That the faculty were so NICE to Mary1 seemed to her1 to bode well for her 
graduate career. 
(4) That John1 would grow up to be so handsome and successful, I don’t think anyone 
ever expected of  him1. 
 
                                                 
20 It appears as though indexicals can be bound in dislocated CPs, although I have been unable to 
find convincing examples. A bound indexical is no worse in the dislocated CP, however, than the in situ 
one. 
(i) That my paper would be accepted, only I expected. 
(ii) Only I expected that my paper would be accepted. 
In both cases, this can convey that no one else expected their own paper to be accepted. 
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These dislocated CPs clearly ameliorate what is otherwise an (albeit somewhat weak) 
Condition C violation when the clause is in situ:21 
(5) a. *?I don’t think she1 ever expected that the faculty would be so NICE to Mary1. 
b. *?It seemed to her1 to bode well for her graduate career that the faculty were so 
NICE to Mary1. 
(6) a. *I don’t think anyone ever expected of him1 that John1 would grow up to be so 
handsome and successful. 
b. I don’t think anyone ever expected of John1 that he1 would grow up to be so 
handsome and successful. 
 
This appears to be a point in favor of the base-generation account.  
I wish to argue that the reconstruction effects in (2) are only apparent and that 
there is no movement dependency between the dislocated CP and the gap at all. The 
central piece of evidence is that sentential subjects and overtly topicalized CPs fail to 
exhibit evidence for syntactic reconstruction. As will be detailed in Section 3, moved 
constituents are sensitive to interactions between various binding requirements (Romero 
1998, Fox 1999). In particular, reconstruction for variable binding can feed Condition C 
violations (Fox 1999). In the case of fronted CPs (both subjects and topics), such an 
interaction is not found. The argument is centered on the following examples. In both 
                                                 
21 In these examples I have de-accented the referring expression (by focusing the predicate nice in 
the embedded CP). This helps some speakers avoid a Condition C violation, as does the great distance 
between the pronoun and referring expression. However, I will try to show that a contrast still exists 
between dislocated CPs and CPs in situ. 
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cases, we would expect a Condition C violation if the dislocated CP had to reconstruct to 
the underlined gap position for variable binding purposes.  
(7) a. That he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think she2 would 
want any man1 to believe __. 
b. That he1 might actually be too OLD for Mrs. Brown2 seemed to her2 not to 
enter any man1’s mind __. 
 
In both cases, however, the pronoun he can co-vary with the choice of men while at the 
same time the referring expression Mrs. Brown need not induce a Condition C violation.  
 Movement theories (in particular the copy theory of movement, Chomsky 1995, 
Fox 1999) are designed to ensure that reconstruction for variable binding and Condition 
C travel together. Since they don’t in the case of fronted CPs, it must be the case that 
fronted CPs have not moved to the position in which they surface. 
 We then have to understand why pronouns appear to co-vary as a function of 
quantifiers that do not c-command them. In this chapter I focus on a way of doing this –
achieving co-variation without syntactic reconstruction – in the case of complements to 
attitude verbs. An explanation for these cases becomes available once it is recognized that 
pronouns – especially those in opaque contexts like the complements of attitude verbs – 
don’t need to be directly bound by their apparent binders. I provide an analysis of how 
this can be carried out by using the mechanisms of de se and de re attitude ascription. I 
will also point toward similar ways to extend this proposal to fronted CPs that aren’t 
complements to attitude verbs.  
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I then provide a base-generation analysis along the lines of Koster (1978) and 
Alrenga (2005), with an eye toward understanding why CPs are forced to be base-
generated in, rather than move to, that position. I argue that the null operator that 
connects dislocated CPs with their gaps ranges over centered propositions (Lewis 1979, 
Chierchia 1989), variables of type 〈s〈e,t〉〉. I then show how this approach also offers a 
simple explanation for DP Requirement, once augmented with natural assumptions about 
the role that agreement plays in movement and composition (Adger and Ramchand 
2005). I follow Iatridou and Embick (1997) and attribute the rigidity of clauses to their 
inability to participate in agreement. 
1.2. Outline of chapter 
Section 2 offers a review of the issues involved in dislocated CPs, including a 
comparison between the Topic Analysis and accounts that put CPs in subject position. 
The goal of this section is to provide the historical background as well as to make clear 
that the issue of movement is something that both accounts need to contend with. In 
Section 3 I turn to reconstruction effects, and conclude that neither CP subjects nor CP 
topics reconstruct for the purposes of variable binding. Within section 3, the reliability of 
Condition C diagnostics is addressed. In section 4 I provide an account of apparent 
variable binding using the tools of de se and de re attitude ascription. Section 5 puts the 
pieces together and provides an account of the DP Requirement based on the way index 
features regulate movement (Adger and Ramchand 2005, Kratzer 2004, 2009b). I end 
with an open question about another movement derivation that is not possible for CPs, 
but that the account does not rule out. 
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2. Fronted CPs: The Issues 
2.1. The DP Requirement 
 Clauses that appear dislocated from their argument positions – sentential subjects 
and sentential topics – impose a constraint on the category of the argument position: the 
gap must be one that can otherwise be occupied by a DP (Williams 1981, Grimshaw 
1982, Postal 1986, Webelhuth 1992, Alrenga 2005). The generalization is summarized as 
the DP Requirement:  
(8) DP Requirement on dislocated CPs  
 
A verb allows a CP argument to front only if a DP is licensed in the gap 
position.22  
 
This famous generalization is takes root in contrasts of the sort found below. Adjectives 
like afraid and unaccusative verbs like seems do not select DPs, but do take CP 
arguments. Concomitantly, seems does not allow its CP to appear dislocated; afraid 
allows this only with a preposition:  
                                                 
22 There are CP and DP taking predicates that do not allow dislocated CPs, even when the DP is of 
the appropriate semantic type. As Postal (1986) points out, taking a DP is only a necessary condition for 
allowing a sentential subject or topic. 
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(9) a. *John’s losing seems/turns out/appears.   *DP 
b. It seems/turns outs/appears that John lost   CP complement 
c. *That John lost seems/turns out/appears.   *CP Subject 
(10) a.  I am afraid *(of) that.     DP 
b. I am afraid (*of) that Fred will leave me.   CP complement 
c. That Fred will leave me, (that) I am afraid of.  CP Topic 
 
A similar contrast appears for verbs: those that select DPs (like expect) license a 
dislocated CP: 
(11) a. People didn’t expect/believe/predict that. 
b. That Wisconsin would go Democrat wasn’t widely 
expected/believed/predicted.   
 
Verbs like boast and complain, which license CPs but not DPs, prohibit a dislocated CP 
(Postal 1994): 
(12) a.  *John complained/boasted that.     DP 
b. John complained/boasted that he could lift 100 pounds.  CP 
complement 
c. *That he could lift 100 pounds, John complained/boasted. CP Topic 
 
Further evidence for the requirement in (8) is provided by a class of verbs, which 
includes capture, reflect, contemplate, that select for DPs but not CPs (13)a,b. 
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Surprisingly, these verbs allow CPs that are CP subjects (13)c and CP topics (13)d (Kuno 
1973a, Grimshaw 1982, Jacobson 1992, Alrenga 2005).  
(13) a. This formulation of the rule {expresses/captures/reflects/brings  DP 
out} the fact that these nouns behave differently. 
b. *This formulation of the rule {expresses/captures/reflects/brings out}    *CP     
that these nouns behave differently. 
c. That these nouns behave differently is {expressed/     CP Subj. 
captured/reflected/ brought out} by this formulation of the rule. 
(Alrenga 2005 (30-32)) 
d. That these nouns behave differently, this rule simply can’t capture.CP Topic 
 
The source of the DP Requirement has often been attributed to the non-“nouniness” of 
clauses, in contrast to traces. Stowell (1981) famously proposed that CPs are subject to a 
Case Resistance Principle. Coupled with views of argument association at the time (Aoun 
1979), this forced CPs to move to, but then to vacate, case assigning positions. 
Webelhuth (1992) stipulates a general constraint that traces must be DPs. A CP, 
according to that constraint, can only move from a position that licenses DPs. Of course, 
that constraint is a description of the generalization. 
2.2. The Topic Analysis 
 As noted in the introduction, one particularly influential analysis of dislocated 
CPs is the proposal of Koster (1978), recently defended and expanded upon in detail by 
Alrenga (2005). This proposal holds that sentential subjects are not subjects in the first 
place, but are base-generated topics. A null operator abstracts over the argument position 
in the complement clause.  
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(14) a. That he would win the election was widely predicted. 
b.  [CP1 [CP2 That he would win the election] [C2’ Opi [TP ti was widely predicted 
ti]]]   
 
Koster (1978) and Alrenga (2005) suggest that sentential subjects have a more restricted 
distribution than DP subjects (Ross 1967, Hooper and Thompson 1973, Kuno 1973a, 
Emonds 1976, Koster 1978, Alrenga 2005). They can’t appear in Subject-Aux inversion 
structures (15); after other topicalized phrases (16); or in a case-marked ECM position 
(17). In each case below, I compare a dislocated CP – a sentential subject – in (a) with a 
DP (or expletive) in the (b) examples, and a complex DP embedding a CP in the (c) 
examples (to demonstrate that weight is not the issue). In the (d) examples a topicalized 
phrase is given, showing that sentential subjects pattern in the same way as topics. 
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(15) a. *Does [that Hillary will win] seem unlikely?  CP subject 
b. Does it seem unlikely that Hilary will win?  expl/extraposed CP 
c. Does the possibility that Hilary will win seem unlikely? complex DP 
d. *Did to Ms. Brown the win seem unlikely?  topicalized XP  
(16) a. *…but Rupert, [that Ms. Brown won Texas] really bothered. CP subject 
b. …but Rupert, the result really bothered.    DP 
c.  …but Rupert, the fact that Ms. Brown won really bothered. complex DP 
d. *John, the book I gave to. (Alrenga 2005:179(14a))  topicalized DP 
(17) a. *I planned for [that the cult members cloned a human]  CP subject  
 to be discovered (Alrenga 2005:178(11b)) 
b. I planned for that (fact) to be discovered.    DP 
c. I planned for the fact that the cult cloned a human complex  DP 
    to be discovered. 
d. *I planned for our cloning attempts, you to discover.  topic DP 
(Alrenga 2005:179(17b))   
 
Alrenga (2005) also notes that the availability of dislocated CPs in embedded clauses 
correlates with the availability of topicalized DPs in the same position. Both are 
uncomfortable in adjunct clauses (18), NP complement clauses (19), but not under certain 
bridge verbs (20): 
   
88 
(18) a. *The Dems are upset because [for Ms. Brown to win ] is very unlikely.  
b. *The Dems are upset because [the Florida primary] they have canceled.  
(19) a. *John raised the possibility that [for you to do that] would be nice.     
b. *John raised the possibility that Mary, your antics would upset. 
(Alrenga 2005:179(15c)) 
(20) a. I think that [for us to smoke] would really bother her. 
b. Mary thinks that John, the article really bothered. 
(Alrenga 2005:178-9(10a/16a)) 
 
The Topic Analysis locates the burden for explaining the DP Requirement on the nature 
of the null operator: the language must only supply null operators whose category is DP.  
2.3. The Subject Analysis 
Indeed clauses are difficult to put in positions that test whether they are subjects 
or not, but many authors think that the grammaticality judgments are the result of extra 
grammatical factors (Delahunty 1983, Davies and Dubinsky 2008). These critics point 
out, quite rightly, that clause-internal CPs are difficult from both a processing perspective 
and are quite rare cross-linguistically (Kuno 1973a, Dryer 1980). Furthermore, the weight 
of the CP is such that it is often much heavier than the material that precedes and follows 
it, making extraposition a more natural alternative (Delahunty 1983, Padgett xxxx). 
Davies and Dubinsky (1998, 2008) suggest that CPs can only sit in subject position if 
they are embedded in a DP (for Davies and Dubinsky, all subjects in English are DPs). 
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(21)     [DP/NP [CP that Fred left]] seems unlikely. 
 
This DP shell directly captures why the gap must be a DP – if only DPs can be subjects, 
their traces will only be of DP too. They argue that this silent structure poses problems 
for the processor and this is what makes subject-aux inversion degraded. I will return to 
the idea that dislocated CPs are embedded in a covert nominal structure at the end of the 
paper. But it should be clear that the Subject Approaches of this sort converge with the 
Topic Approaches in one respect: CPs cannot be subjects, only DPs can. The point of 
divergence is whether CPs can be embedded as part of DPs.23 
Even if the Subject Approach is right, though, we still require some way of 
deriving the DP requirement on sentential topics. Recall that these too require their gaps 
to be DPs: 
(22) a. *That John lost, it only seems/turns out/appears.    
b.   That Fred will leave me, (that) I am afraid *(of).      
c. *That he could lift 100 pounds, John complained/boasted.    
 
                                                 
23 The subject analysis comes close to a semantic analysis of sentential subjects, of a sort related to 
proposals in Chierchia (1984) (see also Potts 2002). Chierchia proposes that non-entity type expressions, 
like properties and propositions, can be shifted into entity-type expressions by a nominalizing function. 
Chierchia (1984:48) locates the nominalizer in C (suggested by the obligatory appearance of C in sentential 
subjects and topics). He then has to require that only terms that denote in the individual domain can be 
subjects. This is too strong, however. Forcing the term in subject position to denote individuals, of 
whatever sort, will prevent quantifiers from reconstructing (independently of whether reconstruction is 
syntactic or semantic). Expletives make a similar case. We simply don’t want to force things to be 
interpreted in subject position, a fortiori we don’t want to place restrictions on their semantic type. This is 
why I only consider the covert D analysis from hereon.  
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That null operators must be DPs may rest on something quite general of overt operators: 
various types of abstractions over clausal complements in English require their gaps to be 
DPs, showing just the same asymmetries that sentential subject/topics do.24  
(23) a. What every boy said/believed/was afraid *(of) was that he would win. 
b. What every boy boasted/complained/commented *(about) was that he would 
win. 
c. *What seems/appears/turns out is that he would win. 
 
Where the Topic Analysis and Subject analysis differ significantly, however, is how the 
dislocated CP gets where it is. The Topic analysis is usually25 coupled with the 
assumption that the clause is base-generated. The subject analysis admits of movement – 
both in the case of subjects and overtly topicalized CPs.  
                                                 
24 Potts (2002, 2003), Postal (1994) show that as-paretheticals involve a CP (proposition-type) 
gap. These constructions do indeed pattern differently from fronted CPs (and as Potts shows, which-
appositives) in requiring CP gaps and disallowing DP gaps: 
(i)  a. Albert {boasted/commented/complained} that the results were fantastic. 
      b. The results were fantastic, as Albert {boasted/commented/complained} 
(ii)  a. *Albert {boasted/commented/complained} {that/it/a belief that the results were fantastic}. 
       b.*The results were fantastic, which Albert {boasted/commented/complained}. 
       (Potts 2002:64(22-23)) 
If the as-parentheticals involve some sort of null operator, then we are in trouble since that would admit of 
CP null operators. Potts’ system makes the distinction between the two in terms of the semantic types, 
which involves nominalization of propostions (Cresswell 1972, Chierchia 1984). Chapter Two offers some 
discussion of taking CPs as denoting in the individual domain, and some difficulties that arise for that 
approach in the context of nominal CP complements. 
25 I have of course collapsed the Topic Analysis with a non-movement analysis. There is of course 
the possibility that CPs can’t be in subject position but nonetheless move to topic position (e.g. Stowell 
1981 and others). The real question I am concerned with comes down to movement.  
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In the next few sections I detail more fully the reconstruction data that bear on 
this issue, outlined in the beginning of the chapter. The evidence from reconstruction is 
not straightforward, however, since the opaque nature of the CP calls into question the 
very utility of standard tests for reconstruction. The take home point is that complement 
CPs – as opposed to relative CPs – fail to show the kind of sensitivity to syntax famously 
argued for by Fox (1999) for reconstruction. Accounting for this fact will lead us to the 
Topic Analysis. 
3. Apparent binding into fronted CPs  
As with certain other moved constituents, including DP topics, dislocated CPs can 
contain pronouns bound by quantifiers they move past. (In all the cases I test below, I use 
an NPI as the binding quantifier. If NPIs must remain low, this rules out a possible 
representation where the quantifier moves to out-scope the sentential subject entirely.) At 
least on simple inspection, a bound variable reading is available to pronouns in CP 
subjects and CP topics: 
(24)     That he1’ll end up looking like his father doesn’t seem to any young man1 to be 
very likely. 
(25)     That he1’ll end up looking like his father, every young man1 expects. 
 
At the same time dislocated CPs can bleed condition C. Below is a (contrastive) CP topic: 
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(26) That Texas would be a surprise was always possible, but… 
 
a.   That Ms. Brown1 would lose Ohio, she1 never expected. 
b.  That she1 would lose Ohio, Ms. Brown1 never expected. 
c. *She1 never expected that Ms. Brown1 would lose Ohio. 
 
Sentential subjects show the same bleeding of condition C:26 
(27) a. That she actually kissed John1 on the LIPS struck him as a real surprise. 
b. *It struck him1 as a real surprise that she actually kissed John1 on the LIPS. 
 
What needs to be established is whether the CP undergoes movement in the first place: 
that is, whether there is syntactic reconstruction. 
 To test if dislocated CPs syntactically reconstruct, we follow Romero (1988) and 
Fox (1999) in creating a conflict between various kinds of binding requirements. We 
implement a method from Fox (1999). Fox (1999) tests configurations like those in 
(28)a,b. Some moved XP contains a pronoun1, whose intended binder is a lower 
quantifier; the XP also contains a referring expression2 that is co-valued with a pronoun 
in the sentence. Following standard assumptions, bound variables must be in the scope of 
the quantifiers that bind them; referring expressions in the scope of co-valued pronouns 
induce Condition C violations.  
                                                 
26 If sentential subjects are really subjects, then we expect bleeding of Condition C, since A-
movement in general appears to leave a contentless trace (Lasnik 1998, Fox 1999, among many others). 
The fact that sentential topics bleed Condition C is the more important data, since A-bar movement 
generally (aside from selective bleeding by adjunctions) shows obligatory reconstruction.  
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(28)   Fox’s (1999) design 
 
a. [XP … pronoun1 … r-expression2 … ] … pronoun2 …  … QP1 …  
b. [XP … pronoun1 … r-expression2 … ] … QP1 …  … pronoun2 …  
 
In (28)a, the XP must reconstruct to the lowest position (identified by an underscore) for 
variable binding. But that puts the referring expression below a co-valued pronoun. This 
induces a Condition C violation. The higher reconstruction site in that same sentence 
fares even worse: the pronoun1 fails to be bound by the QP and the referring expression 
falls in the domain of a co-valued pronoun. In the configuration in (28)b on the other 
hand, the XP can reconstruct to the higher position, which allows for variable binding but 
doesn’t induce a Principle C violation. 
 The prediction for wh-movement, as below, is that (28)a is grammatical but (28)b 
is ungrammatical. The data and judgments reported are Fox’s. 
(29) a. *Which of the papers that he1 gave to Ms. Brown2 did she2 hope   that every 
student1 will revise  ?    
b. Which (of the) paper(s) that he1 gave to Ms. Brown2 did every student1 hope    
that she2 will read  ? 
(Fox 1999: 173 (37)) 
 
The same effect carries over to other A-bar movements, including topicalized DPs: 
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(30) a. *The papers that he1 gave to Ms. Brown2, she2 hoped that every student2 will 
revise. 
b. The papers that he1 gave to Ms. Brown2, every student1 hoped that she2 will 
read. 
(Anagnostopolou and Fox 2007) 
 
As reviewed in Chapter One, what allows the food examples is the ability for the relative 
clause to counter-cyclically merge to a position where the pronoun is bound but the 
referring expression doesn’t induce a disjoint reference effect. Updated in the copy theory 
of movement, counter-cyclic movement (late merger) permits adjuncts to appear in some 
copies and not others. In (29)a and (30)a, the relative clause can merge to the 
intermediate copy and thus allow for binding but prevent a Condition C violation. In 
(29)b and (30)b, the relative clause is forced to merge to the lowest copy for variable 
binding purposes, where it incurs a Condition C violation.  
 Similarly, A-movement shows that reconstruction feeds Condition C violations. 
The example below involves reconstruction for scope purposes. If a student or someone 
scopes under seems a Condition C violation is reported. 
(31) a. A student of David1’s seems to him1 to be at the party.  
b. Someone from David1’s city seems to him1 to be likely to win the lottery. 
*seems > someone 
(Fox 1999(197))  
 
Scope reconstruction is possible, however, if a Condition C violation isn’t incurred: 
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(32) a. A student of his1 seems to David1 to be at the party.  
b. Someone from his1 city seems to David1 to be likely to win the lottery.  
(Fox 1999(197))  
 
That subject positions exhibit just this kind of interaction will be important, since it 
allows us to apply the test to sentential subjects without having to make a decision about 
whether they are topics or subjects. 
3.1. Testing fronted CPs for syntactic reconstruction 
Turning to dislocated CPs, we expect that if the bound variable interpretations of 
pronouns they contain are achieved via syntactic reconstruction, then reconstruction for 
variable binding will feed Condition C. The following sentences are structurally identical 
to the scheme laid out by Fox in (28). The results, however, turn out quite differently. In 
(33)a, the quantificational binder is below a pronoun co-valued with the name, Mrs. 
Brown. If the bound variable interpretation for the pronoun in the Sentential Topic 
required reconstruction, then that reconstruction would induce a Condition C violation. In 
(33)b, the effect is expected to be absent whether or not bound pronouns require binding. 
Contrary to the expectations of reconstruction, (33)a is grammatical. I introduce the 
sentence with but, since fronted CPs are often most naturally understood as contrastive. 
(33) a. …but that he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think she2 
would want any man1 to believe __. 
b. . …but that he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think any 
man1 would want her2 to believe __. 
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Two points of note, however. First, I have de-accented the referring expression, as that 
appears to help alleviate a possible Condition C violation. While this in general may help 
alleviate a Condition C violation even when the CP is in the argument position (as in 
(34)b), there is still a difference between this and the dislocated CP ((34)a): 
(34)  a. That he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think she2 would 
want any man1 to accept. 
b. *I don’t think she2 would want any man1 to accept that he1 might be too old to 
WORK for Mrs. Brown2. 
 
Second, these examples involve a referring expression that is deeply embedded inside a 
clause that has a logophoric center different from the referring expression. The clause that 
contains Mrs. Brown could be reported from the perspective of any man, in which case 
the use of a name would be a plausible way to refer to her. If the complement clause 
reports an attitude of Mrs. Brown, an analogous Condition C violation is incurred (cf. She 
didn’t expect that any man would work for Mrs. Brown), perhaps because names are bad 
ways to express de se counterparts. (See below and Chapter Two.) (35) and (36) 
counteract this confound. Note that (36)  does not allow when the CP is in situ the 
referring expression to ever escape a Condition C violation (the referring expression John 
is in the complement of an attitude ascribed to John): 
(35)    *He1 didn’t expect of any woman2 that she2 would actually ask John1 out on a 
date. 
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However, a sentential topic helps alleviate the Condition C violation, even when the 
pronoun is construed as bound: 
(36) a. …But that she2 would actually ask John1 out on a date, I don’t think he1 ever 
expected of any girl in his class2. 
b.  …But that she2 would actually ask him1 out on a date, I don’t think John1 ever 
expected of any girl in his class2.  
 
It’s true that these two sentences are not equally good. But the difference is not related to 
reconstruction. While this speculation awaits further testing, part of the problem seems to 
be that the pronouns prefer to be in the same clause, and the quantifier and the name in 
another. For instance, there appears to be a weak contrast below – where nothing about 
reconstruction is at issue, assuming that the fronted CP does not reconstruct.  
(37) a. ?But that she would actually ask John out on a date, I don’t think he ever 
expected of Mary. 
b. But that she would actually ask him out on a date, I don’t think John ever 
expected of Mary. 
c. But that Mary would actually ask John out on a date, I don’t think he ever 
expected of her. 
 
Given that acceptability of these cases is subject to such subtle re-organization as that 
above, it’s unlikely that whatever small contrast is found in (36) is due to reconstruction. 
The amelioration, then, has to be the result of the position of the fronted CP/sentential 
subject. A pronoun is nonetheless bound. Dislocated CPs, then, do alleviate Condition C, 
in just the way we would expect if the CP did not reconstruct.  
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 Sentential subjects show the same insensitivity to syntactic reconstruction: 
(38) a. …But that he1 might actually be too OLD for Mary2 seemed to her2 not to enter 
any man1’s mind. 
b. But that he1 might actually be too OLD for her2 seemed to Mary2 not to enter 
any man1’s mind. 
 
Notice that the crucial case, (38)a, is on a par with cases where no reconstruction is 
forced for variable binding. That is, compare the two sentences below: 
(39) a. …But that he1 might actually be too OLD for Mary2 seemed to her2 not to enter 
any man1’s mind. 
b. …But that he1 might actually be too OLD for Mary2 seemed to her2 not to enter 
Bobby1’s mind. 
 
Reconstruction of dislocated CPs, then, is not necessary for variable binding. Before 
moving on, I would like to return to cases that argue for the interaction between variable 
binding and Condition C in the first place.27 
3.2. Re-evaluating syntactic reconstruction of DPs 
In this section I return to some of the original cases that motivated syntactic 
reconstruction, like Fox’s (29). Since there were a number of factors that made co-
variation for a pronoun in a fronted CP possible (without incurring a Condition C 
                                                 
27 There are, of course, other arguments for syntactic reconstruction than ones based on Condition 
C effects (Romero 1998, Fox 1999). 
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violation), we ought to control for those factors in all cases, to ensure that we indeed have 
a contrast between fronted CPs and DPs. I reach no firm conclusions about these cases, 
since some of the factors that help in the case of fronted CPs might be available in DP 
cases as well. Ultimately, what I will provide in this chapter is a way of achieving co-
variation without syntactic reconstruction from certain fronted CPs, and it will remain 
somewhat of an open question about whether (a) fronted DPs can behave similarly (i.e. 
allow variable binding while bleeding condition C) and (b) if so, how this is achieved.  
One of the strategies that appeared to improve the Condition C violation in the 
case of fronted clauses was de-accenting the referring expression. Let’s make the same 
alterations to the Fox-style sentences – i.e. DPs with a relative clause. I’ll focus here on 
non wh-DPs (i.e. the topics and subjects), since these are directly comparable to fronted 
CPs.  Consider first the pair of sentences below in (40). I have suggested de-accenting of 
the referring expression by putting contrastive focus on a clause-final adverbial in the 
fronted CP. 
(40)  a. …But the papers that he1 submitted to Mrs. Brown2 in his FIRST YEAR, she2 
didn’t want any student1 to publish. 
b. …But the papers that he1 submitted to her2 in his FIRST YEAR, Mrs. Brown2 
didn’t want any student1 to publish. 
 
The question is whether variable binding in (40)a is harder than in (41)a, a fronted CP: 
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(41) a. That he1 submitted to Mrs. Brown2 in his FIRST YEAR, she2 didn’t want any 
student1 to publicize. 
b. That he1 submitted to her2 in his FRIST YEAR, she2 didn’t want any student1 
to publicize. 
 
If there is a contrast between (40)a and (41)a, it isn’t as robust as one would like. Further 
work needs to be done to make sure that there remain cases where we are sure that 
reconstruction for variable binding feeds Condition C. 
However, there is one illuminating contrast that I wish to point out. It involves 
comparing relative clauses to complement clauses. To do so we choose a head noun, like 
idea, and compare idea with a relative clause versus a complement clause (actually, a 
modifier that characterizes the content of the idea, see Chapter Two). 
(42) a. ?…but the idea that he1 told Mrs. Brown2 about YESTERDAY, I don’t think 
she2 would want any student1 to believe. 
b. …but the idea that he1 presented his work to Mrs. Brown2 SUCCESSFULLY, I 
don’t think she2 would want any student1 to believe. 
 
In this case, it is not clear whether the relative clause example allows for co-variation and 
binding as successfully as the complement clause case (this indeterminacy is merely what 
“?” represents). DPs in subject position might provide a similar contrast: 
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(43) a. ?The idea that he1 presented in his draft for Mrs. Brown2  didn’t seem to her2 to 
be understood by any student1. 
b. The idea that he1 should present his draft to Mrs. Brown2, didn’t seem to her2 to 
be understood by any student1.  
 
These may be the kind of cases we are after to ensure that Fox’s original sentences (and 
the judgments) can be maintained in certain cases – at least, that there is a contrast 
between the complements as compared to the relatives of nouns. The crucial difference 
between (43)a and (43)b is that the complement in (43)b reports the content of the 
attitude holder. I’ll return to this contrast below, once I present an analysis of the fronted 
CP cases. 
3.3. Interim summary 
 Fronted CPs do not need to syntactically reconstruct for the purposes of variable 
binding. I then returned to some of the original kinds of sentences that motivated 
syntactic reconstruction for DPs. There the results here were less clear, and I explored 
some of the subtleties involved in determining whether fronted DPs exhibit the kind of 
effects predicted by syntactic reconstruction theories. 
 Since fronted CPs don’t show the effects of syntactic reconstruction, I conclude 
that they don’t move. They are base-generated in their surface position (leaving open 
whether that surface position can be the subject position). We then need to find another 
way to achieve co-variation. In the next section I will offer an analysis of fronted CPs 
that allows for variable binding with syntactic reconstruction. 
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4. An analysis: binding from the res 
We’ve seen that we need a way to allow for a bound variable interpretation in 
(44)  without putting the CP in a position that will induce a disjoint reference effect.  
(44) …but that he1 is too old for Mrs. Brown2 I don’t think she2 wanted any man1 to 
know. 
 
The solution I offer is to base-generate the CP in its surface position, following Koster’s 
(1978) analysis. To achieve co-variation for the pronoun in such cases, we will exploit 
the nature of certain ingredients of belief ascription. 
It is a general property of intensional contexts, like the complement of attitude 
verbs, that pronouns do not need to be bound directly by binders outside the complement. 
This is perhaps most easily seen in the case of de se. The most natural interpretation of 
(45)a,b is one where every man has the de se belief that he is too old to work for Mrs. 
Brown: 
(45) a. Every mani believes that hei is too old to work for Mrs. Brown.  
b. That hei is too old to work for Mrs. Brown, every mani believes.  
  
On this reading, he is not bound by the quantifier; rather, he picks, for each of the men, 
the individual that he identifies as himself in his belief worlds – his de se counterparts 
(Lewis 1979). On any formulation of de se meanings, some other mechanism for binding 
is implemented, often by an operator at the edge of the complement clause (Chierchia 
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1989). Even when the pronoun is not interpreted de se, as in (46), other mechanisms can 
be at work to achieve co-varying interpretations for the pronoun: 
(46) a. Every boyi’s mother believes that hei is too young to work. 
b. That hei is too young to work, every boyi’s mother believes. 
 
This is most naturally understood as meaning that each boy’s mother has the belief about 
her son – that he is too young to work. This interpretation can be signaled overtly by 
specifying what the belief is about with an adjunct phrase. These easily allow co-
variation of the pronoun without feeding condition C. 
(47) …but that he1 might be too old to work for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think she2 would 
want any man1’s wife to believe that of/about him. 
 
I am going to argue that the apparent binding into fronted CPs is actually rather indirect. 
What co-varies, I will argue, is this (sometimes) hidden phrase, overt above, that 
represents what the belief is about. This extra phrase describes the res of an attitude. The 
res is an argument of the attitude verb.  
(48) a. Ralph believed of Ortcutt that he was a spy. 
b. John believed about that situation that it was a card game. 
c.  The rumor about Mary is that she’s dating Fred.  
d.  Every boy’s mother hopes for her son that he’ll grow up happy. 
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My solution to the co-variation in fronted CPs implicates the mechanism of de re belief 
ascription. In the next section, I will introduce this and a means for allowing pronouns in 
the fronted CP to co-vary without syntactic reconstruction. The upshot will be that the 
pronouns are bound from within the fronted CP and needn’t fall under the scope of the 
quantificational binder. I turn to de re belief ascription now. 
4.1. Review: De Re belief ascription 
Consider the following famous scenario from Quine (1956). It’s the usual double 
vision scenario: 
(49)     There is a certain man in a brown hat whom Ralph has glimpsed several times 
under questionable circumstances on which we need not enter here; suffice it 
to say that Ralph suspects he is a spy. Also there is a grey-haired man, vaguely 
known to Ralph as rather a pillar of the community, whom Ralph is not aware 
of having seen except once at the beach. Now Ralph does not know it but the 
men are one and the same [Bernard Ortcutt]. (Quine 1956 (56)) 
 
a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
b. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
 
So that Ralph does not have contradictory beliefs, it’s standard to assume that Ralph’s 
beliefs are differentiated by the way he is acquainted with Ortcutt on these two occasions. 
This is modeled by Acquaintance Relations (Lewis 1979). An Acquaintance Relation is a 
way that an attitude holder is perceptually or causally related to the particular person, 
entity, or situation that he has a de re belief about—i.e. the res (see chapter 4 for 
discussion about what kinds of Acquaintance Relations count). Crudely put, in one 
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report, we say that Ralph believes the man wearing a brown hat is a spy; in the second 
case Ralph believes the grey-haired man is not a spy.  
In de re belief ascriptions, the attitude verb has a property type complement, a res 
argument (yres) and the attitude holder argument (xatt). The acquaintance relation is 
asserted to hold between the attitude holder and the res in the evaluation world and that 
relation in turn provides a description for a de dicto attitude.  
(50) de re belief 
a. [[ believe ]]  = λP〈e〈s,t〉〉.λyres.λxatt.λw.∃R.[Acqaint(R) & R(x)(y)(w) & 
        ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(〈x,w〉): P(ιz.R(x′)(z)(w′))(w′))] 
 
b. [[ believe(P)(res)(att)(w) ]]   is true iff, given any pair 〈x′,w′〉, 
     i. there is an Acquaintance Relation R s.t. x bears R uniquely to y in w 
     ii. 〈x′,w′〉 is a member of the doxastic alternatives of x in w  
                 iii. the unique individual z that x′ bears R to in w′ has the property P 
 
We need the notion of centered worlds in order to define doxastic alternatives appropriate 
for de re belief (Lewis 1979). DOX is defined below: 
(51) DOX〈x,w〉 = { 〈x′,w′〉 it is compatible with what x believes in w that x is x′ in w′} 
  
In the one case, the guise under which Ralph sees Ortcutt provides a suitable description 
– the man in the brown hat. On the other ascription, the man with grey hair provides a 
suitable description. A rough translation for each attitude is as follows: 
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(52) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
 
λw.∃R.[Acqaint(R) ∧ R(Ralph)(Ortcutt)(w) ∧ ∀〈x′,w′〉 ∈  Dox(〈Ralph,w〉):  
Be-a-spy(ιz.R(x′)(z)(w′))(w′)] 
 
R = λx. λy. λw. x sees y wearing a brown hat in w 
(53) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
 
λw.∃R.[Acqaint(R) ∧ R(Ralph)(Ortcutt)(w) ∧ ∀〈x′,w′〉 ∈  Dox(〈Ralph,w〉):  
¬Be-a-spy(ιz.R(x′)(z)(w′))(w′)] 
R = λx. λy. λw. x sees the y with grey hair in w 
 
We are almost in a position to tackle the fronted CP cases, but we need two more 
ingredients, which I will introduce in the following section. 
4.2. Proposal: binding from within the fronted CP 
Let me demonstrate with cases where the res argument is overt first. That 
sentence is repeated below. Recall that the pronoun he co-varies as a function of any man 
but this must not be achieved by syntactic reconstruction, as that would predict a disjoint 
reference effect. 
(54) …but that he1 might be too old to work for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think she2 would 
want any man1’s wife to believe that about him. 
 
The first ingredient we need is a way to create a property out of the fronted CP. 
Following Chierchia (1989) and ideas in Percus and Sauerland (2003) we form such a 
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property by abstracting over the pronoun. We might imagine that the complementizer 
houses a lambda that will bind the variable. The fronted CP is thus a property: 
(55)  [[ thatλx hex is too old for Mrs. Brown ]]  = λx.λw.Too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(w) 
 
Co-variation of the pronoun, then, will be determined by the value of the individual to 
which this fronted property is applied. And the individual to which this property is 
applied is the res argument – and it can be bound. (An important issue I sidestep is how 
the pronouns morphological features are determined, on which there is a large and vibrant 
literature, with special attention to bound indexicals (Heim 2004, von Stechow 2003, 
Rullman 2003, 2005).  
 The second ingredient we need is a way to interpret the fronted CP as the 
property-level argument of de re belief. Here I follow Koster (1978) and Alrenga (2005) 
in postulating a null operator. In this case, the null operator will range over properties.  
A null operator abstracts over the gap position of the main clause, which is 
semantically a variable of property type (I will return below to a more precise view of 
what the null operator is). 
(56) a. That he was too old for Mrs. Brown, Opi I don’t think any man’s wife believed 
ti about him.   
b. That he was too old for Mrs. Brown, λP〈e〈s,t〉〉 I don’t think any man’s wife 
believed P about him. 
 
The composition of all these pieces is shown below: 
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(57) The Composition of a Fronted CP 
 
…but that he1 might be too old for Mrs. Brown2, every man1’s wife believed of him1. 
 
     λw.∀y (man(y)(w) → believe([λx.λw′.Too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(w′)])(himy)(y’s wife)(w)) 
 
     Fronted CP    
             λP                   Main Clause   
λx.λw.Too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(w)   
                λw.∀y (man(y)(w) → believe(P)(himy)(y’s wife)(w)) 
  pronoun co-varies     
  with choice of res        binding in matrix clause 
 
 
Cases where the res argument is not overtly indicated, as in (70), require that the res 
argument be saturated by a null pronoun, which is then bound by the quantifier, just in 
the fashion shown above. 
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(58) …but that he1 might be too old for Mrs. Brown2, every man1’s wife believed pro1. 
 
(59) The Composition of a Fronted CP 
 
     λw.∀y (man(y)(w) → believe([λx.λw′.Too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(w′)])(proy)(y’s wife)(w)) 
 
     Fronted CP    
             λP                   Main Clause   
λx.λw.Too-old-for-Mrs.B(x)(w)   
                λw.∀y (man(y)(w) → believe(P)(proy)(y’s wife)(w)) 
  pronoun co-varies     
  with choice of res        binding in matrix clause 
 
(70) denotes, then, the proposition that is true if for every man there is a possibly 
different Acquaintance Relation that his wife bears to him, and in all the doxastic 
alternatives of each of his wives, the person each wife bears that relation to is too old for 
Mrs. Brown. (The acquaintance relation here could vary from wife to wife.) The binding, 
then, is very indirect. Co-variation is of the res, which indirectly lets the de re pronoun 
co-vary. It is the res argument that is bound by the quantifier. This should then become a 
general strategy for allowing pronouns to co-vary in the topic CP. We also predict that 
binding in dislocated CPs is going to be degraded if it cannot be interpreted as a res. This 
is difficult to show, since the nature of the res is quite flexible, but there may be ways of 
making a particular element a “degraded” res. In the example below I try to manipulate 
what the topic of the most embedded attitude (the wife’s expectation) is. In case (a), the 
format of the dislocated CP suggests that the res is the children; in (b) the res could more 
likely be each man’s parents.  
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(60) a.  That the children will be taken care of by his1 parents, I don’t think any man1 
wants his wife to expect. 
b. That his1 parents will take care of the children, I don’t think any man1 wants his 
wife to expect. 
 
My judgments detect a weak degradation in the coherence of the sentence in (60)a, one 
that is replicated if we try to make the res overt: 
(61) a.  That the children will be taken care of by [his1 parents]2, I don’t think any 
man1 wants his wife to expect of them2. 
b. That [his1 parents]2 will take care of the children, I don’t think any man1 wants 
his wife to expect of [them]2. 
 
As mentioned, the quantifier can be the attitude holder herself. Such cases we 
identified above as de se. The most natural interpretation of (45)a,b is one where every 
man has the de se belief that he is too old to work for Mrs. Brown: 
(62) a. Every mani believes that hei is too old to work for Mrs. Brown.  
b. That hei is too old to work for Mrs. Brown, every mani believes.  
  
On this reading, he is not bound by the quantifier; rather, he picks, for each of the men, 
the individual that he identifies as himself in his belief worlds – his de se counterparts 
(Lewis 1979). De se beliefs are particular kinds of beliefs about the self. Philosophers 
have discovered that de se attitudes are not strictly propositional (Perry 1979, Lewis 
1979). Imagine a scenario, as Kaplan (1977) does, in which John runs by a mirror in a 
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smoky room and sees the outline of a man whose pants are on fire. Because of the smoke, 
John does not recognize himself and because he’s running he doesn’t feel any evidence of 
his pants being on fire. His belief is that John’s pants are on fire, and if you asked him 
what he thought he would say “Some guy’s pants are on fire”. Very soon, however, once 
he begins to feel the heat, John’s belief will change. Once that happens, John will tell 
you, “My pants are on fire”. In both cases John’s pants are on fire, and the propositional 
content of these two beliefs is the same. But his beliefs have changed in a fundamental 
way, in a way that cannot be captured by treating belief as merely propositional. Lewis 
(1979) called John’s belief about himself once he discovers his predicament a de se 
belief, one that appears to be irreducibly from his perspective. It’s a belief only he can 
have. 
 The difference between de se and non-de se, quite remarkably, is found to play a 
role in attitude ascriptions, the linguistic means by which we report attitudes. This was 
discovered by Morgan (1970) and Chierchia (1989). Chierchia shows that controlled 
PRO can only report de se beliefs. Before coming to hold the de se belief that his pants 
are on fire, John will want the object of his belief (John) to be doused with water, but will 
not want his de se self to be doused with water. The control construction cannot report 
this desire of John’s (while the non-control construction can).  
(63) a. #John wants PRO to be doused with water. *non de se 
b. John wants himself to be doused with water. oknon de se 
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The control construction is only possible when John holds the de se belief that his pants 
are on fire and, assuming he doesn’t like this situation, has the de se desire that someone 
douse him. Lewis (1979) argues that de se beliefs are a type of de re belief, where the 
acquaintance relation is one of identity. Thus we can accommodate the cases in (45)a,b 
by assuming a de re account, and let the acquaintance relation be set to one of identity. 
4.3. The nature of the null operator 
The analysis follows Koster (1978) in that a null operator abstracts over the 
argument position in which the fronted CP is construed. We have construed the fronted 
CP as the property-level argument of believe. That a null operator pronoun can range 
over such types is corroborated by the fact that the overt pronominal that can allow for 
“sloppy” de se readings (Chierchia 1989): 
(64)      A: He expects his paper will be accepted. 
B: Yeah, she expects that too. 
  
(65)      A: I often think I am being followed. Am I paranoid?  
B: No, every one believes that, at one point or another. 
 
Both of the responses above can report de se ascriptions. In (64), she expects de se that 
her paper will be accepted. In (65), I am asserting that everyone believes de se that they 
are being followed. Pronouns, then, can stand in for properties. That can also stand in for 
the property in quantified de re belief ascriptions: 
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(66)      A: People say most kids end up resenting their parents. 
B: I don’t think any boy’s mother would want to believe that about her own 
son. 
 
The same that can serve as a resumptive pronoun in sentential subject/topic 
constructions, and binding is still possible. This pronoun can appear left-dislocated as 
well. 
(67) a. That he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t think she2 would 
want any man1 to believe that. 
b. That he1 might be too old to WORK for Mrs. Brown2, that I don’t think she2 
would want any man1 to believe. 
 
It’s not a difficult move, then, to assume that since overt pronouns can stand in for the 
property complements of attitudes, a null pronoun (which undergoes A-bar movement as 
an operator—see below for a refinement) can range over such things too. (In fact, 
whatever analysis one gives to that should immediately carry over to the null operator, 
which means that even if the present implementation is wrong, the correlation between 
the null operator’s semantics and that will have to deliver us co-variation.)  
4.4. Summary 
This tour of pronouns in the complements of attitude reports does not exhaust all 
the technical possibilities for capturing the apparent binding (more on this, below). The 
point, at the very least, is that there are ways of letting pronouns in the dislocated CP co-
vary in just the right way but without proposing reconstruction. I have suggested that 
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some the mechanics of de re ascription (which, following Lewis 1979, subsume de se) 
provide such a way. The upshot is that we need to find a way for the co-variation 
exhibited by pronouns in the matrix clause to be a function not of the apparent 
quantificational binder but of something else. Res arguments seem particularly well 
suited to make this connection in many cases. 
4.5. Looking beyond de re attitudes 
The semantics of de re ascription provides one way of achieving co-variation in 
the fronted CP without performing syntactic reconstruction. If this is the only way for a 
pronoun in a fronted clause to achieve co-variation then we predict that only fronted 
complements of de re attitude ascriptions will behave this way. There are a number of 
cases which suggest that this conclusion is too strong. I will take them in turn, and 
suggest how the project I have begun might find ways of being extended beyond de re 
attitudes. 
We’ve already seen examples where the clausal complements of nouns allow for 
co-variation of a pronoun and yet no disjoin reference effect. 
(68) …but the idea that he1 presented his work to Mrs. Brown2 SUCCESSFULLY, I 
don’t think she2 would want any student1 to believe. 
 
It seems likely that these nouns can report de re attitudes as much as the verbs can and we 
could exploit the strategy given to verbs here as well. The following examples confirm 
this: 
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(69) a. …but the idea (about himself) that he1 presented his work to Mrs. Brown2 
SUCCESSFULLY, I don’t think she2 would want any student1 to believe. 
 
b.  …but the claim (about himself) that he1 was too YOUNG for Mrs. Brown2, I 
don’t think she2 would want any man1 to believe. 
 
c. …but the belief (about him) that he1 was too YOUNG for Mrs. Brown2, I don’t 
think she2 would want any man1’s wife to hold. 
 
d. …but the rumor (about her son) that he1 was too YOUNG for Mrs. Brown2’s 
class, I don’t think she2 would want any boy1’s mother to believe. 
 
So if nouns like claim, belief and rumor can have res arguments, we might expect that it 
is these arguments that co-vary and the pronoun in the complement is bound indirectly by 
the embedded C, as suggested for the clausal arguments of verbs. However, applying the 
semantics of de re belief to nominal complements is not trivial, especially in light of the 
results of Chapter One. There it was shown that CP complements of nouns are modifiers 
– predicates of things with content. We have a new task now: how to formulate de re 
belief ascription for nominal complements while taking into account their status as 
modifiers. I leave this for future research. 
There is, however, a greater challenge to the account provided here for apparent 
binding. There are clear examples – examples that do not report the content of an attitude 
let alone a de re attitude – where a bound variable interpretation is available to a pronoun 
in a sentential subject. It seems that it is generally quite easy to construct examples where 
a pronoun in a sentential subject allows co-variation.  
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(70) a. That he1 was not chosen for the team made every short boy1 scream. 
b. That he1 was sick didn’t prevent any boy1 from attending school. 
c. That she1 also had a job made most working mothers1 during wartime very 
busy. 
 
Angelika Kratzer (p.c.) suggests cases that show that there may be interesting 
perspectival conditions that make a bound variable interpretation more easily available. 
While the first example easily allows a bound variable interpretation, such an 
interpretation is not as easily available in the second. 
(71)     That he1 was barefoot wouldn’t have prevented any one1 of those boys from 
walking on the hot sand. 
 
(72)   That he1 was barefoot wouldn’t remove any one1 of those boys from the list of 
suspects. 
(Angelika Kratzer, p.c.) 
 
The difference may relate to the kind of perspective taken on the clause. We might 
imagine that the fact of being barefoot in (71) is reported from the perspective of the boys 
– perhaps their goals to walk across the sand. In (72), however, that fact is not reported 
from the boys’ perspective. Below I take sentences in (70) and manipulate the 
perspective. These are paired with the original examples from above. 
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(73) a. That he1 was not chosen for the team made every short boy1 scream. 
b. That he1 was not chosen for the team made every short boy1 a reject. 
(74) a. That he1 was sick didn’t prevent every boy1 from attending school. 
b. That he1 was sick didn’t mean that every boy1 had the deadly flu. 
(75) a. That she1 also had a job made most women1 during wartime very busy. 
b. That she1 also had a job made most women1 during wartime the first working 
mothers. 
 
We might imagine that clauses that do not report the contents of an attitude could 
indirectly be presented from the perspective of certain agents. 
 In this vein, the presence of a psych-predicate improves bound variables in 
sentential subjects. Larson and Cheung (2008) provide nice pairs that show this (although 
they offer a structural solution). 
(76)      That he1 was praised by his1 teacher made no boy1 angry/happy/suspicious/ 
anxious/proud. 
(Larson and Cheung 2008(7c)) 
 
(77)      *That he1 was praised by his1 teacher made no boy1 responsible/culpable. 
(Larson and Cheung 2008(8c)) 
 
The presence of the psych verb suggests the content of the fronted CP is reported from 
the perspective of the psych-subject. Of course, in order for this to work, perspective 
shifting needs to allow variable binding effects without recourse to reconstruction. This 
requires appeal to notions of logophoricity, for instance (see Sells 1987, Kuno 2004, Culy 
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1997). It is possible, however, that even these pronouns can receive their co-varying 
interpretation within the fronted clause. In fact, such factors may help to make a D-type 
strategy available for the pronoun, which is itself another possibility for achieving co-
variation. 
5. Why clauses don’t move 
We have arrived at the conclusion that clauses can be base-generated in a non-
argument position. But this doesn’t answer two important questions. As noted in the 
introduction, this does not settle whether clauses can be in subject position or whether 
they are in a peripheral position in the spirit of Koster (1978). Nor does it conclusively 
settle whether clauses can move from their argument positions: it could be the case, of 
course, that CPs have two options for appearing left-dislocated, by movement or base-
generation. 
 If both of those options are available to clauses, though, we would need to 
understand why the DP requirement holds of all left-dislocated CPs. On the assumption 
that null operators are syntactically always DPs, the Koster-style approach captures this 
immediately. If we were to countenance CPs moving, we would have to then find another 
reason why their gaps were subject to the DP requirement. 
 If CPs cannot move, though, we are still left with an open question: why can’t 
CPs move? In the concluding part of this chapter I would like to indicate one direction for 
understanding this restriction on CPs which relates their inability to move with their 
inability to bear agreement. 
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5.1. Iatridou and Embick (1997): clauses don’t agree 
 Iatridou and Embick (hereafter IE) make the compelling case that clauses, CPs 
and TPs, do not have phi-features. They do so by looking at pro-drop languages. They 
show that while overt pronouns can take clauses as linguistic antecedents, null pro 
cannot. Their solution rests on the assumption that null pro requires licensing by phi-
features, and that pro’s referent must bear phi-features. Clauses simply don’t have phi-
features. This is a very helpful fact about clauses, because it allows us to make a stronger 
claim than Stowell: clauses will not be able to participate in agreement. I will offer a way 
of extending this in such a way that clauses can never participate in syntactic Agreement 
relations (in the sense of Chomsky 1999, Chomsky 2000, among others). This prevents 
them from becoming subjects and from topicalizing.  
 IE show that null pro cannot take a clause as its antecedent. For instance while 
English it and that take a clause as an antecedent, the Modern Greek pro can’t: 
(78)     A: John is always late. 
B: I know…that/it convinced his father to get him a car. 
(79) A: o    Kostas ine panda arγoporimenos 
The    Kosatas  is always delayed 
 
B: Praγmatika. *ke  pro epise ton patera tu na tu  
     Indeed.    And pro convinced the father his MOD     
  aγorasi aftokinito. 
  Buy a car 
  (IE 1997:58(2)) 
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IE are careful to rule out possible reasons for this – that pro can’t refer to inanimates (it 
can) or that there is some “ontological” reason that pro cannot refer to propositions or the 
things propositions describe (they can).28 
 Catalan too prevents pro from finding a clausal antecedent. (The following 
examples use conditionals, as do most of IE’s examples).  
(80)    *Si [arribem tardi]i proi convencerà   la Maria de comprar-nos un cotxe 
If  arrive-1PLlate pro covince-FUT the Maria to buy-us          a car. 
(IE 1997:61(11b)) 
 
Overt pronouns, though, are possible: 
(81)      Si [arribem tardi]i axiòi convencerà la Maria de comprar-nos un cotxe  
If  arrive-1PLlate that covince-FUT the Maria to buy-us a car.  
 
‘If we arrive late, that will convince Maria to buy us a car’ 
(IE 1997:62(15b)) 
 
IE show further that the generalization that holds here is a linguistic one. Pro can’t 
deictically refer in general, so there is something that prevents pro from finding CPs/TPs 
as linguistic antecedents. Their proposal for this generalization is that pro, when it takes a 
linguistic antecedent, must share all the person/number/gender (ϕ-features) of the 
antecedent. Their claim is that clauses simply don’t have these features. 
                                                 
28 IE also discuss that in certain cases it looks like pro can pick up clause meanings, but it turns 
out to be expletive pro. They show that this is just a different mechanism altogether. 
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(82)  Iatridou and Embick’s Generalization 
CPs and TP do not possess ϕ-features. 
 
Now, IE note that this conclusion may lend support to the idea (actually, implementation) 
that CPs do not bear case, given the connection between agreement and case assignment 
in general. But it could actually rule out more than just the clauses participating in case-
relations. If we extend IE’s observations to the syntactic operation of Agreement (in the 
sense of Chomsky 2000) we can get a handle on why they don’t move around at all. 
5.2. Topicalization Requires Agreement (and maybe agreement) 
  We are now in a position to ask why the DP requirement holds of sentential topics 
and subjects. The analysis I propose here rests on a recent view of the role that agreement 
and indices play in the syntax of movement and pronominalization. 
  A traditional view of the semantics of movement holds that moved phrases 
generate a lambda abstract (Heim and Kratzer 1998).  
(83)  
          XP      XP 
   
  YP[1]       XP          YP XP 
          
 [1] XP    λx     XP 
            
       …[1]…   …x… 
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 There is another view of the role that lambdas play in the syntax of movement 
(Adger and Ramchand 2005, Kratzer 2004, 2009b). This view holds that both binders and 
the variables they bind are features, numerical indices, bundled with heads. The binders 
are not created by movement, but are borne on functional heads (like F below). The 
indices that are born on DPs are the variables (i.e. traces). 
(84)  
            FP         FP   
 
     FP     DP  λ3. ...3...  
   
      F     XP       λ3               ...3...  
 
   …DP[3]…      ….3… 
     [3]   
 
 
In the tree above, the index [3] on some functional head F is interpreted as heading its 
own projection, creating a lambda abstract.  
 The range of verbal functional heads that host binder indices includes, at least, 
complementizers and perhaps v. Indices on determiners, or pronouns, are interpreted as 
variables. But how is the connection between binder-bindee made? Suppose indices in 
general aren’t able to enter a relationship without being dependent on some form of 
agreement.  
 This kind of system can be most easily appreciated by looking at relative clauses, 
as a number of authors have suggested (see e.g. Kratzer 2009b for a recent discussion). 
Relative clause C, much like the C that heads de se complements, binds a variable in the 
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clause. This variable is simply the relative pronoun, with phi-features (which C and then, 
via predications, the head noun must agree with). The CP is then interpreted as a 
predicate: 
(85) a. The man [CP [C’ C[n] [TP John saw D[n]]  
 
b. That man [CP λn John saw n] 
 
The spell-out of D[n] is then subject to principles of morphological insertion, and 
additional parameters that determine whether the pronoun appears in the specifier of C. 
(Further additional questions arise if the Determiner itself has an NP complement, as in 
raising analyses of relative clauses (Bhatt 2003)).  
 Let us assume, as is usually done for topicalization (Chomsky 1977), that 
topicalization resembles relative clause formation in these respects. Topicalization C, like 
relative clause C, bears a binder index which probes a matching index. The difference 
between relativization and topicalization, however, is that the goal DP must move and 
compose with the CP by function application. The idea for CPs would be the following. 
The index feature on matrix topicalizing C will probe for a matching feature on some 
functional head. But if we limit this operation to features like agreement (i.e. matching 
indices don’t count in probe-goal relations) then we can never establish an Agree relation 
with a CP because there are no agreement features (valued or otherwise) on CPs. The 
binding can’t even get started. 
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5.3. Open questions 
 There is a type of movement that I have not considered here, and that is what 
might be called semantically vacuous movement. Note that what we have prevented CPs 
from doing is topicalizing – which amounts to saying CPs can never undergo movement 
that is triggered by a binder index (such as a Topicalization C or a relative clause C). But 
there are movements that do not implicate such mechanisms.  
 Various types of predicate frontings, including predicate topicalization and 
predicate wh-movement, are thought to be semantically vacuous movements. 
(86) a. [Criticize John], I think Mary did. 
b. [Proud of John,] I think Mary is. 
(87) a. [How proud of John] does Sue believe Mary to be? 
b. [How angry at John] did Sue say Mary was? 
 
One reason for the conclusion that these are semantically vacuous movement is that they 
show frozen scope, or only total reconstruction effects. (Barss (1986), Huang (1993), 
Takano (1995), Heycock (1995), Sauerland and Elbourne 2003). These are the kinds of 
movements demonstrated below:  
(88) a. *[Criticize John1], I think he1 said Mary did. 
b. *[Proud of John1], I think he1 said Mary is. 
(Takano 1995:331) 
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Furthermore, if a referring expression is within an adjunct of a moved predicate, and the 
matrix clause contains a co-valued pronoun, a violation of Condition C is not 
circumvented (Fox 1999, Freidin 1986, Lebeaux 1988, and van Riemsdijk and Williams 
1981, among others). 
(89) a. *[Criticize a student that John1 taught], he1 said Mary did. 
b. *[Proud of a student that John1 taught], he1 said Marry is. 
c. *[How proud of a student [that John1 taught]] did he1 say Mary is? 
(Takano 1995:332) 
 
This is to be compared to topicalized DPs and CPs. In the case of topicalized DPs, the 
usual story is that adjuncts can late merge to these because the higher copy is interpreted, 
and so something can late-merge to it: 
(90) a. [The students [that John1 taught]], he1 said Marry criticized. 
b. [The pictures of the girl [that John1 loves]], he1 said Mary likes. 
(Takano 1995:331) 
 
The point here is that the kind of fronting involved in dislocated CPs cannot be of the 
predicate fronting sort, since as we have seen, both sentential subjects and sentential 
topics allow for bleeding of Condition C. This is thus another kind of movement 
derivation that we need to find a way of blocking for CPs. I am more encouraged in 
ruling out this movement for CPs, since the kinds of phrases that can undergo 
semantically vacuous movement in English are limited. Nonetheless, we need a theory 
that prevents CPs from drifting away leftwards, even if only phonologically. 
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that fronted CPs – subjects and topics – do not move to 
those positions but can be base-generated there. Bound variable interpretations for 
pronouns in fronted CPs do not involve syntactic reconstruction, as evidenced by the fact 
that these interpretations were available when a syntactic reconstruction account would 
predict a condition C violation. Since the theory of movement most commonly adopted 
(the copy theory and its attendant interpretative mechanisms (Fox 1999)) is designed to 
ensure that movement would produce a conflict in such cases, we concluded that CPs 
don’t move. I followed Koster’s account – that fronted CPs are base-generated – thus 
explaining the absence of Condition C effects. I then suggested ways of accounting for 
co-variation of pronouns in the fronted clause. I worked though cases where front CPs 
were interpreted as the arguments of de se and de re attitude verbs, and showed how to 
achieve co-variation without syntactic reconstruction. We then saw that bound variable 
interpretations may be available in a wider range of fronted CPs, and this might 
ultimately be related to perspectival properties.  
The message, then, is that clausal arguments do not participate in the kinds of 
movement dependencies that other arguments do, such as DPs. I suggested this is the 
result of the fact that CPs don’t participate in agreement relations. Whatever the source of 
this restriction, we must now ask why DPs can’t admit of the same mechanisms. In fact, 
given the difficulty in verifying data about whether moved noun phrases always show 
syntactic reconstruction effects, it may be worth re-examining those cases too. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INFINITIVES AND BELIEF 
1. Where’s the attitude? 
A standard formulation of attitude verbs, following Hintikka (1962, 1969), treats 
them as quantifiers over alternatives. This standard approach gives to a verb like think, 
for instance, the following denotation. (DOX delivers alternatives compatible with what 
the subject believes.) 
(1) [[ think]]  = λp.λx.λw.∀w′(w′ ∈ Dox(x,w) → p(w′)) 
 
On this formulation, attitude verbs take complement propositions directly, with the modal 
quantification ‘built into’ the embedding verb. We’ve already seen some reasons why this 
might not be true for all cases of attitude ascription. In Chapter Two we looked at clausal 
complements of nouns, which included the nominalizations of attitude verbs. We saw that 
one way of capturing the modifier status of these clauses involved decomposing attitude 
verbs. We followed Kratzer, who factored out to the complementizer the job of 
introducing propositional content. This means that the complementizer, not the 
embedding noun, can select for a proposition. This decompositional approach to attitudes 
has been applied elsewhere. Anand and Hacquard (2008) offer a variation of the idea for 
a class of attitude verbs they call ‘proffering verbs’ (like claim and wager). Kratzer 
(2009a) looks at modals interpreted under attitudes and concludes that the quantification 
(over the alternatives provided by the embedding verb) is in the embedded clause. On this 
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decompositional approach, the semantics once attributed to attitude verbs themselves in 
the Hintikka approach is instead contributed by other parts of the constructions in which 
attitude verbs appear.  
In this chapter, I will make another case for this kind of decompositional 
approach. It involves the selection of infinitival complements under attitude verbs, in 
particular, the accusative with infinitive construction (AcI). Getting a handle on the 
selectional properties of AcI-taking verbs, I will argue, requires that the ‘attitude’ of an 
attitude ascription be factored out to the embedded clause. 
1.1. The See Paradigm 
Perception verbs, like see and hear, among others, are famous for having different 
meanings depending on their complement. When see takes a bare infinitival complement 
(one without to) it reports direct perception and it is epistemically neutral (2)a. The 
subject needn’t believe what she saw was an event that has the description given by the 
verb phrase complement (Barwise 1981). The finite complement of see, in addition to 
being factive, requires that the subject believe the content of the complement clause and 
hence the continuation in (2)b is a contradiction: 
(2) a. Martha saw Fred driving too fast, but she believed he wasn’t. 
b. Martha saw that Fred was driving too fast, #but she believed he wasn’t. 
 
   
129 
Another complement option for see is an infinitival with an overt accusative subject, the 
Accusativus Cum Infinitivo or AcI construction.29 Like the finite clause, see with an AcI 
complement is epistemically non-neutral (3), but unlike the finite-taking version (4)a, it is 
not factive (4)b (Jesperson 1940, Higginbotham 1983, Safir 1993): 
(3) Martha saw Fred to be driving too fast, #but she believed he wasn’t. 
 
(4) a. Martha saw Fred to be driving too fast, but he actually wasn’t. 
b. Martha saw that Fred was driving too fast, #but he actually wasn’t. 
 
As I will detail more fully below, AcI constructions report a belief, of a sort that has the 
flavor of a judgment or opinion, a dimension that we’ll tackle later. Let’s abstract, for 
now, from this particular flavor of belief that see takes on here. 
The See Paradigm, as I will call it, presents a number of challenges for the project 
that seeks to regulate the syntactic complementation options of a predicate from its 
semantics (the “s-selection only” hypothesis, Pesetsky (1982, 1991)). There are several 
correspondences between complement type and meaning that a theory of 
complementation would need to capture in order to derive the See Paradigm. One 
‘correspondence’ – the focus of this chapter – involves the infinitival complements in (2) 
                                                 
29 The construction is usually called exceptional case marking (ECM) or Raising to Object. I use 
the more traditional, and theory neutral, term Accusativus Cum Infinitivo (AcI) because, while not exactly 
the best description, it makes clear that the focus is on infinitival constructions, those with to+bare 
infinitive, in English. There are a number of other constructions that involve AcI in the general sense: non-
finite clauses of various sorts with overt accusative subject (complements to causative and perception 
verbs, for instance) that do not have the same semantic effects. Indeed, all case marking (via Agree 
(Chomsky 2000)) is a kind of AcI. Section 4.1 reviews the syntax. 
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and (3). Here, we must ensure that see+AcI reports are epistemically non-neutral, unlike 
the bare infinitives, and that they are not factive, unlike the finite clause (Hegarty 1992, 
Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). The second ‘correspondence’ involves the meaning of 
finite clauses: these must deliver factive complements only, but only with certain verbs. 
That is, not only is see with an AcI complement not factive, see with a finite complement 
must be factive. (Note that the factivity here cannot be attributed to finite clauses alone, 
since there are plenty of finite clause taking predicates that can express what (4)a does, 
and none are of course factive.) In sum, the presence of the AcI construction forces a 
non-factive, epistemically non-neutral reading of see. The semantics of finite clauses is 
not the focus of this chapter – rather AcI complements are – but their distribution and 
interpretation under see indicates the depth of the puzzle posed by the See Paradigm. 
We can’t pin all this down on polysemy, at least not just on polysemy. Even if we 
resorted to several different lexical items all pronounced see, we would still need to 
account for the correlation between the meaning of see with its complement type.  As I 
will detail when I review the syntax of AcI constructions in Section 4, the syntactic status 
of AcI complements alone won’t deliver us an answer as to why they must report non-
factive beliefs, nor will standard assumptions about the semantic type of bare infinitives 
prevent them from reporting what AcI complements do. Something more drastic needs to 
be done. 
That there is grammar in this is further confirmed by the fact that see is not alone 
in its behavior. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to showing that a whole class of 
predicates – see type verbs – presents the same pattern. Simply explaining the 
complement options of these verbs by recourse to syntactic selection won’t capture a 
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general fact about English complement types. With AcI complements, but not bare 
infinitival or finite complements, verbs like hear, perceive, consider, understand, 
remember report (non-factive) beliefs, some sharing with see-AcI the particular flavor of 
a judgment. 
1.2. The attitude is in the complement 
We are not in a position to explain the whole of the See Paradigm. This chapter 
tackles the meanings delivered by see-type verbs with AcI complements (with an eye 
toward a larger inventory of complement options). Although it will take a few more steps 
to make my case – which I develop over the course of this chapter – complement patterns 
like that found with see and others will force us to draw the following conclusion: the 
meaning available to see in (4)a is delivered, in part, by something inside the AcI 
construction itself, not necessarily the verb see.  Simply put, see+AcI means what it does 
because that meaning is in the AcI complement. 
After ruling out a number of possibilities for what underlies the distinction 
between bare infinitival, finite and AcI complements, I will explore one option for 
building into the AcI complement the semantics of belief. Not just any kind of belief, 
however, but a belief about something that the embedding verb describes a relation to – 
that is, a de re belief. This can be best appreciated by looking at some other verbs of the 
see-type, such as perceive and hear. When these take AcI complements, they report a 
belief, and in particular a belief about what was heard or perceived. 
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(5) John hears Mary to be out of tune. 
≈ John believes of what he hears that it is Mary out of tune. 
 
(6) John perceives there to be a spider on his leg. 
≈  John believes of what he perceives that it is a spider on his leg. 
 
I will argue that what AcI does is describe a de re belief and that certain embedding verbs 
in this construction describe the way in which the believer is acquainted – causally 
connected – with the object of the belief, the res. In particular, I will propose that there is 
a meaningful functional head in the AcI complement that ascribes a de re belief. The 
semantics of de re belief, following Kaplan (1969) and Lewis (1979), already 
incorporates constraints on how an attitude holder is connected with the res. Following 
Lewis (1979), these are modeled as Acquaintance Relations. It will be argued that in AcI, 
a perception verb can provide the Acquaintance Relation. So not only will I suggest that 
the ‘belief’ component is in the complement, I will make a proposal for the role the 
embedded verb plays. 
A word is in order about the scope of the issue here. First, it is not the case that a 
verb like see can have a non-factive, opaque complement only in the AcI construction. 
There are uses of see (and some other perception verbs) which take opaque nominal 
objects, as in John sees a moose, but it’s really a bear. (See, among others, Zimmermann 
1993.) Intensional transitive verbs are beyond the scope of this chapter (but see Section 
3.4.5 for some discussion). The question we are asking is why – when we look at clausal 
complements – this sense of see must take an AcI and not a bare infinitival of finite 
complement. 
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Second, my focus is on AcI taking verbs that alternate like see. There is another 
class of predicates, which includes verbs of evidence and showing, whose finite and AcI 
complements are identical. 
(7) a. The evidence revealed/proved/showed/ there to be a real problem. 
b. The evidence revealed/proved/showed that there is a real problem. 
 
The existence of these verbs shows that AcI constructions are more varied than the subset 
discussed in this chapter. But it doesn’t take away from the major puzzle presented by the 
see-type verbs.  
1.3. Outline of chapter 
In section 2, I turn to a fuller discussion of the meanings that AcI constructions 
deliver in comparison to other complements – in particular, bare infinitival complements. 
I will show that see-AcI constructions report de re beliefs, and that the embedding verb 
provides the way in which the attitude holder is acquainted with the object of belief.  In 
Section 3, I argue that the de re belief component of this meaning is in the complement. I 
then provide a formal implementation of this, including a proposal for how the meaning 
of the embedding verb composes with a meaningful functional head in the complement. 
The surprising result is that the embedding verb is interpreted inside the complement. I 
then discuss the generality of the proposal for other AcI-taking verbs, including the verb 
believe itself. In section 3.2, I then turn to show that several predictions of the analysis 
are borne out. One prediction is about which verbs embed AcI complements, and another 
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is about the lexical variation – and variability of judgments – we find concerning the 
range of verbs that take AcI complements. 
In section 4 I turn to the syntax-semantics interface and ask why AcI carries the 
meaning it does. I conclude with speculative discussion about how the project of putting 
meaning in complement clauses might be extended to the finite cases.  
2. Semantic varieties of complements 
 Before turning to a full documentation of the properties of AcI constructions, we 
need some basic background in diagnosing whether complements are opaque or not. 
These tests are crucial to establish several of the basic generalizations about AcI 
predicates. 
2.1. Epistemically neutral and non-neutral reports 
It’s a well-rehearsed observation that the bare infinitival complement of a verb like 
see, which is used to report ‘direct perception’ is epistemically neutral. When see takes a 
finite complement, often described as an ‘indirect perception’ report, it is epistemically 
non-neutral (Barwise 1981, Higginbotham 1983). I’ll run through some familiar scenarios 
to show this.  
Suppose Mary is holding a can of soda with a straw in it, but she’s not drinking 
from the straw. Rather, the straw is resting against her cheek. John is watching all of this, 
but the straw and the cheek are indistinguishable from his distance. So as far as John is 
concerned, the event he thinks he is seeing is one of Mary drinking a soda. But the event 
that John is actually seeing is an event of Mary holding a straw up to her cheek. We can 
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report his perception of this particular event as an epistemically neutral direct perception, 
without implying that John believes the verb phrase we use to be the correct description 
of what he saw or found. 
(8) a.  John saw Mary hold the straw up to her cheek.  true 
b. John found Mary holding a straw up to her cheek. true 
(9) a.  John saw Mary drink a soda.    false 
b. John found Mary drinking a soda.    false 
 
Following Barwise (1981), epistemically neutral reports are automatically delivered if the 
matrix predicate selects for an individual situation or event (debate ensues about whether 
we need situations or Davidsonian (1967) events for this (Higginbotham 1983)). To 
ensure transparency on the event description, the verb must not be looking for a property 
of events but an individual event. And this, in turn, ensures that the description of the 
seen event is epistemically neutral. Following Higginbotham (1983), we might treat the 
bare infinitive like an existential quantifier over events, which, like other quantifier 
phrases, will raise, leaving a variable that ranges over events. This gives the verb see the 
right type of complement and, most importantly, it ensures that the event description of 
the thing seen can vary, independent of the seer’s mental state – hence it’s epistemically 
neutral. The ingredients of this analysis are shown below: 
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(10)  [[ see ]]    =  λs′.λx.λs.see(s′)(x)(s) 
 
(11) a. John saw Mary hold a straw.  
b. ∃s∃s′ [hold(straw)(Mary)(s′) & saw(s′)(John)(s)] 
 
There is some event s′, which is an event of Mary holding a straw, and there is an 
event s which is an event of John seeing s′. 
 
Of course, the same is not true of an indirect perception report. In the scenario described 
above, the following are false: 
(12) Epistemically non-neutral Reports  
 
a. John saw that Mary was holding the straw up to her cheek. false 
b. John found that Mary was holding a straw up to her cheek. false 
 
John didn’t see or find that Mary was holding a straw up to her cheek, because he didn’t 
believe of what he saw or found that it was (or was evidence that) Mary was holding a 
straw up to her cheek. (Nor, of course, is it true to say that he saw/found that Mary was 
drinking a soda, because that betrays the factivity of see-that.)  
AcI constructions, on the other hand, are like finite complements, and unlike bare 
infinitivals, in that they are always used to report epistemically non-neutral see. This is 
the first of several properties of AcI constructions that I detail in the following sections. 
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2.2. AcI constructions are epistemically non-neutral 
Below are some naturally occurring examples of see with AcI complements.30 As 
noted, in some cases the AcI complements have the flavor of a judgment. This is 
especially clear in the following examples: 
(13) a. The fact that Bill Clinton is Hillary[’s] top advisor, and she has miserably 
mismanaged her campaign shows that Bill Clinton is not after all that 
economic wizard that Americans saw him to be in the 90’s. 
(http://women.barackobama.com/page/community/post/bloju/gGCN8J) 
 
b. I see him to be an indolent, selfish bon vivant. (Jane Austin, Mansfield Park) 
 
c. He went over to him and saw him to be in great stomach pain and seemingly 
very ill. (http://www.geocities.com/craigavonhs/rev/mccorryloughsiders.html) 
 
The sentences above report a judgment or opinion about what might be best described as 
subjective qualities. What seems to make a judgment different, intuitively speaking, from 
a garden-variety belief report is that predicates that are otherwise matters-of-fact – say a 
person’s citizenship – are interpreted as being subject to personal opinion, along the lines 
of predicates of personal taste as investigated by Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson 
(2007). Borkin (1984) discovered many such contrasts. The AcI example in (14) does not 
report the discovery of someone’s citizenship, but an opinion about how to characterize 
the way someone appears or behaves: 
                                                 
30 The first involves a relative clause, with the predicate of the infinitival serving as the head. 
Moving the embedded predicate improves the acceptability, I have found, and the majority of Google hits I 
get involve such constructions, for reasons not yet clear to me. The second two examples keep the predicate 
in situ. 
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(14) a. When I looked into the files, I found that she was Canadian 
b. #When I looked into the files, I found her to be Canadian. (Borkin 1984) 
 
Aside from ‘coercing’ predicates that otherwise describe matter-of-fact properties, AcI 
complements of these verbs can contain gradable predicates (tall) and familiar predicates 
of personal taste, such as rude or pretty (Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007)):  
(15) a. I found/felt/saw her to be very Canadian (even though she’s technically 
American). 
b. I found/felt/saw him to be rude/pretty/a good doctor/tall. 
 
In fact, just about any kind of embedded predicate is possible, as long as we admit that 
people could have different opinions about whether it applies. Higginbotham (1983) 
notes that AcI constructions that contain verb phrases that describe states or events that 
are typically matters-of-fact come out as judgments in AcI. 
(16)     From the perspective of those who house the homeless, the building was seen 
to have collapsed, but in view of the Housing Authority, the building was 
merely classified as substandard. (Higginbotham 1983) 
 
I will devote Section 3.4 to a discussion of the judgment effect with these verbs. What is 
important at this point is that unlike epistemically neutral bare infinitival complements, 
AcI constructions are always semantically non-neutral. Of course, this is intuitively clear, 
since they express judgments. The following tests confirm this intuition. While it is a 
contradiction to deny the content of an epistemically neutral perception complement, it 
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isn’t in the case of AcI (since see AcI constructions impose judgments on their 
complements, more matter-of-fact predicates like drinking a soda are slightly odder in 
these sentences.)  
(17) Direct Perception 
John saw Mary hold(ing) a straw up to her cheek. 
 …#but she was not holding a straw up to her cheek; she was drinking a soda. 
 …okbut he thought she was drinking a soda. 
 
(18)  AcI Complements 
John saw Mary to be holding a straw up to her cheek. 
 …okbut she was not holding a straw up to her cheek; she was drinking a soda. 
 …#but he thought she was not holding up the straw; he thought she was drinking 
a soda. 
 
Of course, it is possible that Mary was just holding the straw up to her cheek, and we can 
report John’s true belief about this event. The point is that in AcI (a) the complement 
needn’t be a true description of the event and (b) the description of the event must be true 
for the subject, hence epistemically non-neutral. 
 Hear AcI is likewise epistemically non-neutral, as demonstrated by the contrast 
between AcI in (20) and the bare infinitival complement in (19): 
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(19) Mary heard the teacher drop a book,   bare infinitive 
 
a….#but he actually slammed a door. 
b. ….okbut she believed that he was slamming a door. 
 
(20) Mary heard the teacher to be dropping a book, AcI 
 
a….okbut he actually was slamming a door. 
b. …#but she believed that he was slamming a door. 
 
Feel acts similarly, although the set-up requires a context that involves feelable stimuli in 
the bare infinitival case: 
(21) Lewis felt Bruce lick his face,     bare infinitive 
 
a….#but Bruce was actually rubbing sandpaper across his face. 
b. ….okbut Lewis believed that Bruce was rubbing sandpaper across his face. 
 
(22) Lewis felt Bruce to be licking his face.    AcI 
 
a….okbut he actually was rubbing sandpaper across his face. 
b. ….#but Lewis believed that he was rubbing sandpaper across his face. 
 
Predicates like find and perceive take gerundive complements, in which case they are 
epistemically neutral. With AcI, they are epistemically non-neutral. 
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(23) John perceived Mary holding a straw up to her cheek.   Gerund 
 
a. …#But she was really drinking a soda.   
b. .…okBut he thought she was drinking a soda. 
(24) John perceived Mary to be holding a straw up to her cheek.  AcI 
 
a. …okBut she was really drinking a soda. 
b. ….#But he thought she was drinking a soda.  
(25) John found Mary holding a straw up to her cheek.    Gerund 
 
a. …#But she was really drinking a soda.   
b. …okBut he thought she was drinking a soda. 
(26) John found Mary to be holding a straw up to her cheek.   AcI 
 
a. …okBut she was really drinking a soda. 
b. …#But he thought she was drinking a soda. 
 
In sum, AcI complements are epistemically non-neutral. Let me add one more 
corroborating piece of evidence for this. 
2.2.1 A clarifying note on passive see 
Direct perception see cannot passivize (*Mary was seen eat a bagel) and instead 
requires the infinitival marker to. The question is whether the presence of to is merely a 
(mysterious) syntactic reflex of passivization or whether to always implicates belief when 
it appears with see. The latter is the case, as Kroch, Santorini, and Heycock (1988) 
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already concluded. To see this better, there needs to be an attitude holder; a by-phrase is 
therefore helpful. 
(27) a. Fred was seen to be driving too fast by the police, #but they thought he wasn’t. 
b. Mary was seen to be drinking a soda by her father, #but he thought she was 
holding a can of grease in front of her face, not drinking a soda. 
 
These are contradictions. If the passive of see with a to-infinitive complement could 
report epistemically neutral direct perception, these would not be contradictions. Note 
they are not with bare infinitival complements: 
(28) a. Mary saw Fred driving too fast, but she thought he was riding a spaceship and 
so was fine with the speed. 
b. Mary saw Fred drinking a soda, but she thought he was holding a can of grease 
in front of his face.  
 
And passive in general – which is possible with a –ing complement – can be used with 
epistemically neutral direct perception: 
(29)      Fred was seen by Mary drinking a soda, but she thought he was just holding a 
can of grease in front of his face. 
 
The other perception verbs behave similarly: 
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(30) a. Mary was heard by her friends to be singing out of tune, #but they thought she 
was in tune. 
b. Mary’s friends heard her sing out of tune, but they thought she was in tune. 
 
(31) a. Bruce was felt by Lewis to be rubbing sandpaper across his face, #but Lewis 
thought the cat was just licking him. 
b. Lewis felt Bruce rub sandpaper across his face, but Lewis thought the cat was 
just licking him. 
 
(The attitude holders can be correct in their belief, of course, so it doesn’t rule out the 
event described having occurred.) So to does correlate with a meaning difference here. Of 
course, this still means we must find some reason why the subject of bare infinitivals 
cannot be passivized, as *Fred was seen drink a soda. But to is no mere syntactic reflex 
of this in the case of perception verbs.31 This much is clear: AcI constructions are always 
epistemically non-neutral. This distinguishes them, first of all, from their bare infinitival 
counterparts.  
2.3. AcI complements report belief 
Of course, being epistemically non-neutral does not tell us what kind of attitude 
AcI constructions must report. AcI constructions always report what Stalnaker (1984) 
terms attitudes of acceptance, those attitudes which can be said to be correct if the 
content of their complement is true, and false if they are not (Stalnaker 1984, p.79). This 
                                                 
31 This is not to say that sometimes to may be merely a syntactic reflex of passivization, as in causatives 
(*Mary was made *(to) leave). I don’t know if there is a meaning difference here. 
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typically distinguishes belief attitudes (or doxastics) from desiderative (or bouletics) 
embedding verbs. This is what is behind Pesetsky’s (1991) tests that distinguish among 
these. The test predicates truth or falsity of the embedded complement. In the following 
sentences, the appositive relative is to be read as commenting on the embedded rather 
than matrix clause. 
(32) a. John believed that Mary went to Paris, which was true/false 
b. John wanted/ordered/desired/ that Mary go to Paris, #which was true/false 
 
As Pesetsky notes, all the verbs that participate in the AcI construction – not just the 
perception verbs we are concentrating on here – are compatible with these kinds of 
truth/falsity modifications.32 
(33) AcI constructions report attitudes of acceptance/belief 
 
John {believed /considered /fancied/held/judged/suspected/presumed/ 
recognized/remembered/understood/figured/fiound/imagined/reckoned/ 
regarded/felt/knew/took} Mary to be Canadian, which was false.  
 
These AcI constructions, then, are not only epistemically non-neutral, they report belief, 
as opposed to any number of other attitudes we might imagine. Moreover, these 
interpretations are absent when these verbs take other types of clausal complements. The 
                                                 
32 In this way, they are distinguished from the Want-class constructions with infinitival complements 
discussed in Section 4. 
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bare infinitives report epistemically neutral perception. The finite clauses, in turn, do a 
third thing – many come out as factive, indirect perception reports. Put simply, it is a 
property of these verbs with AcI complements that allows them to have the semantics of 
believe. As I will argue more below, simply positing a verb see (hear, perceive) with the 
lexical semantics of an attitude verb – taking a proposition – won’t help in determining 
why that version of hear can’t take a bare infinitival clause. I will argue that the meaning 
see verbs take on in AcI constructions – belief ascription – is delivered by the AcI 
construction itself.  
But See AcI verbs clearly aren’t synonymous with the verb believe. The 
embedding verb makes a contribution. It is to that question I turn next. 
2.4. AcI complements report de re belief 
Take the verb hear. It is not perfect in the AcI construction, but it is possible. 
What hear+AcI requires is some amount of auditory perception, and, importantly, this 
auditory perception is of the thing the belief reported is about. This contrasts with the 
finite clause complements: 
(34) a. I hear that she is playing out of tune  (some one told me) 
b. I hear her to be playing out of tune. 
 
The AcI example commits me to having heard something I took to be her playing out of 
tune. Hear-that merely requires that I heard or read some report (or utterance, perhaps) 
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whose content was that she is playing out of tune. With hear-that I needn’t believe the 
content of the complement – not so with hear+AcI: 
(35) a. I heard from my friends that she was out of tune …but I don’t think she was. 
b. I heard her to be out of tune …#but I don’t think she was. 
 
The AcI construction reports a belief in contrast to both the finite and bare infinitival 
complement. We are seeing here that if we want to maintain some connection between 
different uses of hear, the belief component must be contributed by AcI and AcI alone. 
The kind of belief reported with hear+AcI is a belief about something heard. That 
kind of belief is a de re belief. Informally, I heard Mary to be out of tune reports a de re 
belief about some particular thing I heard, and the belief is that some thing is a state of 
Mary being out of tune. It appears, then, that the difference between the interpretation of 
AcI and bare infinitival complements boils down to a difference about whether the 
complement describes what was heard or what the attitude holder thought he heard. (I’ll 
treat Mary’s being out of tune as a state of her being out of tune.) 
(36)  John hears Mary to be out of tune. 
≈ John believes de re of a state s he hears that s is a state of Mary being out of 
tune. 
 
(37) John hears Mary being out of tune. 
≈ John hears a state s and s is a state of Mary being out of tune. 
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Hear+AcI is quite literally hear plus an ascription of a belief about what was heard. And 
this is exactly the analysis I will give. There are of course some immediate questions that 
arise once we take this route, particularly whether all perception verbs when with AcI 
complements require the same perceptual relation to hold between the subject and the res 
as they do when they report direct perception (the verb see, for instance). But this route 
also offers several advantages. It requires us to decompose attitude verbs – at least for see 
type verbs like hear so that the belief component will be in the complement. This will 
help us explain why hear implies belief only when it takes AcI. Ultimately, then, 
controlling the form-meaning correspondences of the See paradigm requires that we 
abandon the Hintikka-style approach to attitude ascription, and factor out the modal 
quantification to the embedded clause. I turn now to a proposal for exactly how to do this 
for see AcI constructions. 
3. The attitude is in the complement 
The starting hypothesis of the proposal is that there is no verb perceive or hear or 
see that attributes belief – i.e. these verbs are not proportional attitude verbs of the 
Hintikka sort.  These verbs can take as internal arguments things heard and seen. That 
much lexical semantics we must give them. Assume, then, that hear, for instance, 
describes an eventuality of hearing something.  I sever the external argument throughout 
(Kratzer 1996). A Voice head introduces the external argument, either a holder or agent. I 
will remain neutral on whether direct perception verbs like hear describe states or events. 
I’ll identify the external argument as a holder, although I don’t see that anything hinges 
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on this. (Crucially, we’ll see that it does matter that the external argument of hear + AcI 
is a holder.) The denotations of hear and Holder are given below. 
(38)  [[ hear ]]    =  λs′.λs.λw.hear(s′)(s)(w) 
 
(39)  [[ Holder ]]    =  λs′.λs.λw.hear(s′)(s)(w) 
 
The interpretation of direct perception proceeds in the way outlined in (11)b. Assuming 
the bare infinitival complement can QR as an existential quantifier of eventualities 
(following Higginbotham 1983), the internal argument is saturated by a variable bound 
by the existential. In the case at hand, John heard Mary play(ing) out of tune, we claim 
there is an event of Mary playing out of tune, and John heard that event.  
(40) a. John heard Mary play out of tune.  
b. ∃s∃s′ [Holder(John)(s)(w0) & heard(s′)(s)(w0) & play-out-of-tune(s′)(w0) & 
Agent(Mary)(s′)(w)] 
 
There is some event s′, which is an event of Mary playing out of tune, and there is 
an eventuality s that is a hearing of s′ and John is the holder of s. 
 
There is simply no belief in sight in direct perception report, because hear selects for an 
individual-level argument.  
In order to handle the epistemically non-neutral AcI sentence John heard Mary to 
be out of tune one option is to posit a different verb hear which ascribes belief. That verb 
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would have to (a) quantify over the belief alternatives of its subject and (b) take a 
propositional complement. There are some pretty solid reasons that there does not exist 
such a verb. 
If there were a verb hear that had the semantics of a (non-factive) attitude verb, 
then we would be at a loss as to why such a verb does not allow a finite clause. 
Moreover, we really wouldn’t be able to explain why bare infinitives couldn’t 
complement such a verb either. Preventing a bare infinitive from being a suitable 
‘propositional’ complement is not easy. While I have treated bare infinitives as properties 
of events (or existentially quantified events), we could imagine that the eventuality 
argument is closed off, returning a proposition. That is Mary play out of tune could 
describe the proposition that is true if there is an event of Mary playing out of tune.  
(41)  [[ [VP Mary play out of tune]  ]]    =  λw.∃s.Play-out-of-tune(Mary)(s)(w) 
 
Surely this would be a suitable complement for hear if hear were an attitude verb that 
took propositional complements.33,34,35 And bare infinitival complements are perfectly 
                                                 
33 And in a system that only has one intensional argument – like the situation semantics of Kratzer, 
to take an example, see Kratzer (2007) – a VP could simply be of type <s,t>. 
34 Moreover, intensional transitive verbs are often thought of as taking property-type complements 
(see Zimmermann 1994). Why couldn’t there be an intensional transitive hear that took properties of events 
as its complement? (See Section 3.4.5 for more discussion of the intensional transitive uses of See-type 
verbs.)  
35 And lastly, direct perception complements may actually have (viewpoint) aspect in them (Felser 
1999). On most standard assumptions, viewpoint aspect maps a property of events into properties of times. 
Properties of times are perfect semantic types for the complements of attitude verbs. The point here is that 
the ‘size’ of the bare infinitive – and the fact that it may denote a property of events – won’t necessarily 
ensure that it must be a complement to a direct perception verb. What ensures direct perception is that the 
internal argument of the embedding verb is an individual. Complement clauses just need to find a way to 
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good complements to other intensional operators, such as modals (John can/must play out 
of tune). In sum, there is nothing particular about bare infinitives, it seems, that would 
prevent them from being complements to a hypothetical verb root hear that had the 
semantics of an attitude verb. 
 On the other hand, we have an immediate answer as to why hear with a bare 
infinitive reports only direct perception on the hypothesis that hear simply never does 
anything more than take a individual-level internal argument. The question then becomes 
why hear with an AcI complement reports a belief. And here we can see why we want to 
put the attitude ascription component of hear + AcI in the complement. Within the 
infinitival AcI complement there is a meaningful functional head. That head has the 
meaning of de re belief. (In Section 4 I will address the syntactic status of this functional 
head, which will of course have to determine the difference between bare and to-
infinitives.) The strategy, then, is to keep constant the meaning of hear and derive the 
difference between direct perception and AcI from within the complement. We can 
decompose hear+AcI then in the following way: 
                                                 
saturate that position. Nothing says bare infinitives couldn’t also saturate argument positions of intensional 
operators – which could be selecting for properties of events.  
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(42) John hears Mary to be out of tune. 
 
Informally:  
a. John hears some state s  
     (provided by the matrix clause) 
b. John believes de re of that state s that s is a state of Mary being out of tune. 
     (provided by the embedded clause) 
 
In order to put the belief component in the complement, we have two tasks. One task is to 
determine how the embedding verb makes the contribution it does. My answer is that the 
role of the embedding verb is to specify how the attitude holder is connected or causally 
related to the object of their belief, the res. Following Lewis (1979), the relation between 
the attitude holder and the res is an Acquaintance Relation. The role of the embedding 
verb, I suggest, is to provide the Acquaintance Relation. 
 The second ingredient of the proposal involves getting the doxastic alternatives of 
the matrix subject. By putting the attitude in the embedded clause, we’ve lost the subject 
argument – from which we typically recover doxastic alternatives. We’ll incorporate a 
solution to this in the proposal as well. 
 In the next section I will show how to implement both of these aspects of the 
meaning of AcI complements formally. After that, I will turn to other verbs (like believe 
itself) and show, with a slight modification, how they can be accommodated on this 
approach. Then I turn to some of the predictions of the analysis. 
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3.1. De Re belief and Acquaintance Relations 
Beliefs about things, which will include states and events and other individuals, 
are usually de re beliefs. To review from Chapter Three, double vision scenarios show 
that an attitude holder, like Ralph, can have apparently contradictory beliefs about one 
and the same res, Ortcutt. Ralph sees Ortcutt in a brown hat and believes him to be a spy. 
On another occasion, Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach, and maintains the belief that this 
particular individual is not a spy. What Ralph doesn’t know, of course, is that these two 
individuals are one and the same:  
(43) Double Vision sentences 
a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
b. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
 
But Ralph wouldn’t assent to the proposition that one person both is and isn’t a spy. We 
need to make sure Ralph has consistent beliefs. The solution to this, following Kaplan 
(1969), is to treat these belief reports as ascriptions of properties under certain 
descriptions. In Chapter Three, we settled on a representation in which believe has three 
arguments: the subject/attitude holder, a res, and a property (plus the usual world 
argument). Following Lewis (1979), an Acquaintance Relation R is said to hold between 
the attitude holder and the res. The Acquaintance Relation is further used as the 
“description” of the res’s counterpart in all the attitude holder’s doxastic alternatives. A 
denotation for de re belief along these lines is given below: 
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(44)  [[ believe ]]  = λP〈e〈s,t〉〉.λyres.λxatt.λw.∃R.[Acqaint(R) & R(y)(x)(w) &  
    ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(〈x,w〉): P(ιz.R(z)(x′)(w′))(w′))] 
 
The individual z here is the counterpart of the res y. Here are the truth conditions again 
for de re belief : 
(45) [[ believe]] (P)(yres)(xatt)(w) is true iff, given any pair 〈x′,w′〉 
 
i.  〈x′,w′〉 is a member of doxastic alternatives of x in w 
ii. there is an Acquaintance Relation R s.t. x bears R uniquely to y in w 
iii. the unique individual z that x′ bears R to in w′ has the property P in w′ 
 
The two beliefs attributed to Ortcutt come out true in the scenario as long as we choose 
different acquaintance relations. In each sentence, these different modes of acquaintance 
will pick out different individuals as far as Ralph’s beliefs are concerned. 
(46) Different Acquaintance Relations 
 
a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
 
∃R.[Acqaint(R) & R(Ortcutt)(Ralph)(w0) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ 
Dox(〈Ralph,w0〉):Be-a-spy(ιz.R(z)(x′)(w′))(w′))] 
 
R = λx. λy. λw. x sees y wearing a brown hat in w 
 
b. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
 
∃R.[Acqaint(R) & R(Ortcutt)(Ralph)(w0) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ 
Dox(〈Ralph,w0〉):¬Be-a-spy(ιz.R(z)(x′)(w′))(w′))] 
 
R = λx. λy. λw. x sees y on the beach in w 
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As pointed out by Kaplan (1969) and Lewis (1979), what counts as an Acquaintance 
Relation is constrained in certain ways. There must be a causal connection between the 
attitude holder and the res. One puzzle that motivates such a constraint is Kaplan’s 
(1969) shortest spy case. Ralph has the belief that there is a shortest spy, a reasonable 
enough belief to have if you think no two spies are ever of exactly the same height. Ralph 
has no contact with Ortcutt, but it turns out Ortcutt is the shortest spy. Ralph cannot 
believe Ortcutt is a spy qua the shortest spy. The report of this belief is odd too. 
(47) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.  
 
Kaplan (1969) thus requires that the attitude holder “vividly associate” a particular name 
or description with the res.36 There is no vivid association for Ralph for Ortcutt. Lewis’ 
Acquaintance Relations (1979) capture the causal connection between attitude holder and 
res simply because that causal connection is “built into” what it means to be a relation of 
acquaintance. Lewis suggests a few kinds of Acquaintance Relations: 
                                                 
36 See Anand (2006, Chapter One) for some interesting discussion about whether we need to 
impose such a strong constraint of causal rapport (Kaplan 1969) between subject and res. The issue has to 
do with whether, once we control for the fact that the description in the shortest spy case gives rise to a 
tautological belief (possibly ruled out on Gricean principles), the non-causal cases are better. See Aloni 
(2001). 
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“It will be helpful to have a collection of examples, uncontroversial or so I hope, 
of the relationships in which belief de re is possible. I can have beliefs de re (1) 
about my acquaintances, present or absent; (2) about contemporary public 
figures prominent in the news; (3) about the famous dead who feature 
prominently in history; (4) about authors whose works I have read; (5) about 
strangers now face to face with me; (6) about strangers I am somehow tracing, 
such as the driver of the car ahead of me, or the spy I am about to catch because 
he has left so many legible traces; and (7) about myself”.  
 
… “in each case, I and the one of whom I have beliefs de re are so related that 
there is an extensive causal dependence of my states upon his; and this causal 
dependence is of a sort apt for the reliable transmission of information” (Lewis 
1979:541-2). 
 
What is crucial is that the range of Acquaintance Relations includes relations that 
describe the “transmission” of information. Direct perception is an ideal candidate. 
3.2.  AcI: Constraining the Acquaintance Relation 
In the formulation of de re belief in (44), the type of Acquaintance Relation is left 
unspecified. Exactly how the attitude holder is acquainted with the res is resolved 
contextually.37 My proposal is that in AcI constructions, at least those involving 
perception verbs, the matrix verb actually determines the Acquaintance Relation. In the 
hear case from (34)b – I heard her to be out of tune – this will require that the attitude 
holder be put in some auditory contact with something he believes to be Mary playing out 
of tune. 
                                                 
37 Questions arise as to whether the Acquaintance Relation is existentially quantified or remains a 
free variable (as in Abusch 1997). Existentially quantifying the Acquaintance Relation accounts for cases 
where the subject of attitude is quantified. Zimmerman (1991) and Heim (1993) consider cases where 
several attitude holders may each have de re beliefs about Ortcutt, but they are acquainted with him in 
different ways. 
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Our strategy is to put the meaning of (de re) belief into the AcI complement. To 
that end, I propose that there is a meaningful functional head – which I will call FDox – in 
AcI complements which has the semantics of de re believe from (44). But there are two 
crucial changes. Here is the denotation of FDox: 
(48) The Proposal for AcI 




  [[ FDOX]] = λp.λR.λs.λw.∃yres [R(y)(s) & Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈  
                                              DOX(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) → p(ιy′.R(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
 
Complement    Acquaintance relation 
 
Let’s walk through this. FDox has the familiar ingredients of de re belief but there are 
some differences in how those ingredients are put together. One difference between FDox 
and de re believe is motivated by the fact that the subject whose doxastic alternatives we 
are quantifying over in see-AcI constructions is the subject of the matrix verb. But the 
doxastic alternatives are introduced in the embedded clause with FDOX. To get at the 
attitude holder, I follow a strategy (pursued, for instance, in Anand and Hacquard 2008) 
for recovering an attitude holder and hence doxastic alternatives via an eventuality 
argument. That is, FDox takes an eventuality argument s and finds the (unique) holder of 
this eventuality s (in the evaluation world) , and quantifies over that individual’s doxastic 
alternatives (in the evaluation world). As will be shown below, the eventuality argument 
of FDOX is identified with that of the embedding verb and the head that introduces the 
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external argument, and this is how we will ensure – assuming states have unique holders 
– that it is the subject’s doxastic alternatives that are at issue.  
The second – and most important – feature of FDOX has to do with the 
Acquaintance Relation. In the formulation of de re believe in (44), the Acquaintance 
Relation was existentially closed. In FDOX it is opened up. The idea is that perception 
verbs like hear ‘lambda in’ as the acquaintance relation. The result of this is that what is 
heard, seen, or perceived (in the actual world) is the res, which is what is existentially 
bound.  
Finally, we need to make sure the complement of FDOX is the right type. To do so, 
the clausal complement will be a property that is applied to the res argument. In most 
cases at hand, I will treat the complement clause as a property of eventualities since the 
res is an eventuality. In the attitude holder’s doxastic alternatives this property of 
eventualities is applied to a (counterpart by acquaintance of) the res. Let’s consider, then, 
what this does for a sentence like the following: 
(49) John hears Mary to be out of tune. 
 
    vP 
 
 John         v’ 
  
      v        VP 
       Holder 
         V            FPDOX 
                             hears    
          FDOX      S 
 
            Mary to be out of tune 
 
   
158 
The complement of FDOX I simply identify as S. In this case, it will be a property of states 
of Mary being out of tune. 
(50)   [[ [s Mary be out of tune ] ]]  =  λs.λw.Out-of-tune(Mary)(s)(w)    
 
In the computations below, I’ll write P for this property for ease of demonstration. FDox 
takes S as its first argument, forming FPDox: 
(51)  [[ FPDox ]]   = λR.λs.λw.∃yres [R(y)(s)(w) & Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈  
        Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) → P(ιy′.R(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
FPDox now calls for some R. That R must be a suitable Acquaintance Relation (i.e. 
Acquaint must be true of R). Hear is such a relation. 
(52)  [[  [VP FPDox(hear)] ]] =  λs.λw.∃yres [hear(y)(s)(w) & 
               Acquaint(λx.λs.λw.hear(x)(s)(w)) &  
                           ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) 
       → P(ιy′.hear(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
The external argument is then added. Since the denotation of FPDox requires that the 
eventuality argument s have a holder, s must be a state with a holder. So we add Voice, 
Holder and the external argument: 
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(53)   [[ [vP John [v’ Voice [VP]]] ]] =   
λs.λw.∃yres [Holder(John)(s)(w) & hear(y)(s)(w) & Acquaint(hear38) & 
∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) → P(ιy′.hear(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
After existential closure of the eventuality argument and evaluation of the proposition at 
w0 we get the following: 
(54)      ∃yres [Holder(John)(s)(w0) & hear(y)(s)(w0) & Acquaint(hear) & 
∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w0),w0) → P(ιy′.hear(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
‘John bears the Acquaintance relation of hearing to some res y in w0 and 
believes in w0 of y that it is a state of Mary out of tune’ 
 
What this requires, informally, is that John hear some res y and believe of y that it is a 
state of Mary being out of tune. If John merely believes Mary is out of tune (and is 
nonetheless in a hearing state), then the AcI construction will be false. Thus we connect 
the role of the matrix verb to the attitude ascribed by allowing the embedding verb to 
describe the acquaintance relation.  
 Moreover, if John merely hears about Mary’s being out of tune – say by hearsay – 
then hear-AcI will be false, since John has not heard a state which he believes to be Mary 
out of tune. Recall, that this is exactly what the data shows. Hear-AcI doesn’t allow 
‘indirect’ perception: 
                                                 
38 This should really be the denotation of hear, as above, but I just write the verb name for brevity. 
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(55) John heard Mary to be out of tune (*from his friends) 
 
 One amendment to the formulation of FDOX is necessary. Now that we have treated 
Acquaintance Relations like verbs, i.e. by severing the external argument, we need to add 
their external arguments by a separate head. This creates some technical problems for 
how we treat the occurrence of the Acquaintance Relation in the doxastic alternatives. 
Notice our FDOX, repeated below, we have as usual quantified over individual-world pairs. 
But the consequent of the conditional in FDox doesn’t contain an occurrence of the attitude 
holder’s de se counterpart (i.e. x’).  
(56) [[ FDOX]] = λp.λR.λs.λw.∃yres [R(y)(s)(w) & Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈  
            DOX(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) →p(ιy′.R(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
We need to fix this. The denotation of FDox should read: 
(57) [[ FDOX]] = λp.λR.λs.λw.∃yres [R(y)(s) & Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈  
DOX(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) → p(ιy′(R(y′)(s)(w′) & Holder(x′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
The de se counterpart is thus the holder of the Acquaintance Relation in the doxastic 
alternatives, which is crucial to make the complement a centered proposition (Lewis 
1979). 
Questions now arise as to whether this strategy is true for all the verbs we have 
looked at. There are two questions here. First, we predict that whether a verb can appear 
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in this kind of AcI construction is determined by whether it can describe a suitable 
Acquaintance Relation. And second, we seem to be making the strong prediction that the 
embedding verb in AcI is that very same verb that appears in, say, direct perception 
reports. In the latter case, this appears to be true for verbs like perceive and hear. 
However, there are non-perceptual uses of see, for instance, that can be used in the AcI 
construction. 
(58) a. John sees a new syntactician to be needed. 
b. John sees there to be fewer problems with the piece now. 
 
It is unavoidable, I conclude, that we admit that see with an AcI complement can describe 
a different kind of seeing than see with a bare infinitival complement. It is difficult to tell 
whether this see describes a suitable Acquaintance Relation, because there could just as 
well be a bleached use of see that does not require literal visual acquaintance, but rather 
some cognitive contact with a state of affairs. (The case above, say, involves a belief 
about the needs of a department). 
Of course, for the skeptic, this just means that the project of deriving the 
differences in meaning from the complement alone is on the wrong track. One could say 
that there are more sees than I have suggested, each with different complement-taking 
options. But that approach still wouldn’t capture why belief-ascribing see went with AcI 
complements but not bare infinitival complements. (Recall, there is nothing inherent in 
bare infinitives that prevent them from serving as complements to intensional operators, 
such as modals.) The see that appears with AcI is semantically bleached, then: the kind of 
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Acquaintance Relation it describes doesn’t just have to be visual. But the major claim of 
this chapter remains: the quantification over doxastic alternatives is in the complement 
clause. That’s how we ensure that see only means believe when it combines with clausal 
complements. 
However the lexicalization properties of see are accounted for, there are probably 
clearer cases where we don’t want to say that the embedding verb describes the 
Acquaintance Relation. The verb believe itself is troublesome on this account because 
we’ve given the AcI complement the semantics of  de re believe. So what would the 
actual embedding verb do? In the next section, I will offer suggestions for believe. 
3.2.1 Believe and AcI 
We have several options for treating believe when it takes an AcI complement. 
The first option is to let the verb believe have its Hintikka-style semantics – one where 
the quantification over doxastic alternatives is built into the verb itself. There are some 
advantages to this approach, since it means that believe merely takes a propositional 
complement (or, if it’s a de re belief, a property complement). This comports with the 
impression that believe describes the same kind of attitude whether it takes a finite or 
infinitival complement. 
(59) John believes Mary to be out of tune/that Mary is out of tune. 
 
See-type verbs, then, would be special in needing the functional head FDox to report 
attitude ascriptions. This option has the advantage of keeping the semantics clean – only 
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proposing FDOX where it has the most motivation (i.e. with see-type verbs) – but at the 
cost of a non-uniform treatment of AcI. Moreover, we’re left with looking for an 
explanation as to why bare infinitives can’t be used to report attitudes under believe. 
 A second option for believe is to put the attitude in the complement clause as well. 
This involves rethinking the lexical semantics of believe to allow it to compose with FDox. 
As noted, it is not clear that believe describes a suitable Acquaintance Relation, so we 
probably don’t want to treat it as we did hear and perceive. We might imagine, however, 
that if an embedding verb doesn’t saturate the Acquaintance Relation of FDOX, the 
Acquaintance Relation could be closed off by existential closure. All the embedding verb 
would do is simply provide the state from which we recover the holder and her doxastic 
alternatives. This means that even believe doesn’t take a propositional complement. 
Perhaps it describes a mere belief state: 
(60) [[ believe ]]  = λs.λw.believe(s)(w) 
 
On the assumption, described above, that if a verb can’t saturate the Acquaintance 
Relation of FDOX, then that argument is by default existentially closed. FPDOX would have 
the following denotation. 
(61) Default Existential Closure of R 
 
 [[ FPDox ]]   = λs.λw.∃R.∃yres [R(y)(s)(w) & Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈  
                                    Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) → P(ιy′.R(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
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FPDOX composes with believe via predicate conjunction. After the external argument is 
added, the computation returns the following: 
(62)   [[ John believes Mary to be out of tune ]] 
 
             = λs.λw.∃R.∃yres [Holder(John)(s)(w) & believe(s)(w) & R(y)(s)(w) & 
Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w),w) → 
P(ιy′.R(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
        = ∃s.∃R.∃yres [Holder(John)(s)(w0) & believe(s)(w0) & R(y)(s)(w0) &  
Acquaint(R) & ∀〈x′,w′〉(〈x′,w′〉 ∈ Dox(ιx Holder(x)(s)(w0),w0) → 
P(ιy′.R(y′)(s)(w′))(w′))] 
 
  ‘There is a belief state, whose holder is John, and that state’s unique holder 
(=John) believes de re of y that it is a state of Mary out of tune’ 
 
Putting the meaning in the complement in the case of believe poses difficulties, of course. 
I will leave it an open question as to whether we want to pursue a decompositional 
approach for believe. (But see Kratzer 2006, 2009a for one way of giving believe a non-
Hintikka-style semantics; see also Chapter Two.) When I discuss the syntactic 
implementation of FDOX, the treatment of believe will be relevant again. 
3.3. Predictions: stativity and belief attribution 
There are two features of the analysis that make certain predictions about what 
verbs allow AcI complements. The first is a stativity requirement imposed on verbs that 
can embed AcI. The second feature is that AcI complements report beliefs. Both 
predictions are borne out. In the latter case, this feature will help us provide a 
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characterization for the variability in judgments about which verbs allow AcI 
complements. 
3.3.2 Stativity Requirement 
 FDOX requires that the embedding verb provides an eventuality argument from 
which the attitude holder and her doxastic alternatives are recovered. Since states, not 
events, have unique holders, the verbs that tolerate AcI complements are going to be just 
those verbs that describe states with holders. This appears to be borne out. As Pesetsky 
(1991) discovered, all AcI verbs are stative: 
(63)      believe, consider, fancy, hold, judge, suspect, presume, recognize, remember,  
understand, figure, find, imagine, reckon, regard, feel, know, take, ?gather  
 
Interestingly, as Pesetsky suggests, some AcI verbs can describe events when they take 
non-AcI complements, but when they take AcI complements, they are stative. While 
more sophisticated tests could be devised to test stativity/eventivity, it is sufficient to see 
that some verbs (like consider) can be used in the progressive when they take either DP 
or CP complements, but not with AcI complements: 
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(64) a. John was considering his options. 
b. #John was considering his options to be bad. 
(65) a. John was judging every act of Mary’s. 
b. #John was judging Mary’s actions to be upsetting. 
(66) a. John was thinking that Mary was crazy. 
b. #John was thinking Mary to be crazy.   
c. (cf. Mary wasn’t as crazy as John thought her to be) 
 
Consider can describe an activity when it takes a DP complement; when it takes an AcI 
complement it describes a state. Some verbs, on the other hand, in virtue of their lexical 
semantics, do not have lives as descriptions of states. The verbs watch and witness, while 
similar to see, then simply fail to compose with FDOX because they don’t describe states: 
(67) a. *Rita watched/witnessed Mary to be upset. 
b.   Rita witnessed that Mary was upset. 
 
The manner of speech verbs likewise don’t tolerate AcI. We can tell that manner of 
speech verbs are eventive because they report repeated events when they are put in the 
progressive. If John was shouting to Mary that he was in danger for several hours he has 
to shout that more than once (not even a very long, drawn out shout will do). States don’t 
require this: 
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(68) a. For several hours, John was shouting to Mary that he was in danger. 
b. For several hours, John believed that he was in danger. 
 
And these verbs do not tolerate AcI at all: 
(69)    *John shouted/whispered/screamed/pouted/giggled/muttered himself to be in 
danger. 
 
An event of muttering just can’t also be a state with a unique holder.  
3.3.3 Belief attribution: a source for Lexical Variation 
The second feature of FDox is that it requires that an AcI construction report belief. 
This feature takes on an interesting twist when we look at variation among verbs. What I 
would like to do is explore some of the variation in AcI-taking verbs from this 
perspective. That variation gives us some evidence for the view that the attitude is built 
into the AcI complement, not necessarily the embedding verb. 
Pesetsky (1991: 23) noted that “there is an unfortunate degree of fuzziness in 
people’s judgments concerning AcI”. Indeed, of the predicates Postal (1974) claimed 
could not take AcI – a sample is in (70) – Kayne responds that “we do not find Postal’s 
… facts to be at all clear; that is we accept [AcI] with almost all the cited verbs” (Kayne 
1984:121 ft 15). 
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(70) He  alleged         Melvin to be a pimp. (Postal 1974:304(40)) 
  acknowledged 
  affirmed 
  conceded 
  demonstrated 
  discerned 
  established 
 
Kayne’s is a common reaction in the literature. Similar remarks are leveled against other 
works where inventories of AcI-taking verbs are compiled (e.g. Collins’ 2002 review of 
Bošković 1997, see also Rooryck 1997). It could be, of course, that there are simply 
different idiolects at work: Kayne speaks a different English than Postal. But the 
fuzziness – not only its nature but the very fact that such variation exists – tells us 
something important. If we can find what factors affect the availability of AcI this should 
tell us what it requires to have an AcI complement. 
Pesetsky (1991) suggests that the grammaticality of AcI is subject to the 
following cline: predicates that describe manner of speech and content of speech verbs, 
like mutter and admit, respectively, are much less comfortable with AcI complements 
than verbs that describe, in Pesetsky’s terminology, changes of mental state (like 
confirm). These are in turn much less comfortable than verbs that describe mental states, 
like assume and believe. (The judgments indicated below are Pesetsky’s.)  
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(71) a. *Bill muttered Sue to be happy. 
b. ?*Bill admitted Sue to be happy. 
c. ??Bill confirmed Sue to be happy. 
d. ?Bill assumed Sue to be happy. 
(Pesetsky 1991:23(92)) 
 
The following table, adapted from Pesetsky (1991:23(93)) and using his labels, confirms 
that the variability follows the lines just suggested. 
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(72)    Lexical factors affecting AcI acceptability judgments 
 























































verbs: see, hear, 
perceive] 
 
The classification above is not absolute – there are some predicates that can be “pushed” 
into taking AcI complements. In part, the table above classifies verbs based on their 
aktionsart properties (the event vs. state distinction already noted). We’ve already seen 
the role the stativity plays for AcI. But there is another point of lexical variation that is 
relevant for determining the acceptability of AcI: belief. I’ll concentrate on a few cases 
where we can bring out some contrasts. 
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3.3.4 I’d say AcI means something 
 The verbs in the first two columns of the chart in (72) do not ascribe beliefs to 
their subjects. The simplest way I know of to determine whether an embedding verb 
ascribes belief is to see whether it can report a lie. The true verba dicendi, the manner of 
speech verbs, and the verbs Pesetsky calls content of speech can report a lie. Those verbs 
that are perfect with AcI cannot. (I omit the factive verbs, of course, since they always 
entail belief.) 
(73)      He {whispered, said, asserted, declared, conjectured, …} that Mary was 
guilty…but he knew she wasn’t. 
 
(74)      He {believed, held, fancied, suspected, understood, remembered, assumed…} 
her to be guilty/that she was guilty … #but he knew she wasn’t. 
 
This is a simple point about attitudes, but it interacts with AcI – and gets rather 
interesting when we look at the verbs where the grammaticality judgments concerning 
AcI are not stable. Take say, which on simple inspection is not an AcI taking predicate 
(Postal 1974). In fact, it seems to be the one verb that people agree cannot AcI, at least 
when they are presented a sentence like the following: 
(75)  *The doctors said John to be sick. 
 
But there are actually grammatical examples of AcI with say – and, as we will see 
shortly, the say here is one that requires the subject to believe the content of the 
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complement. And that’s precisely what the analysis predicts. Here’s a sample of naturally 
occurring examples of AcI with say. The first several are from contemporary speakers. I 
don’t mean to suggest these are perfect. What’s important is that ACI with say is attested, 
and the examples below are better than (75).  
(76) a. I have seen about 10 movies from Colin and I would say him to be a height of 
between 5ft9.75'' (177cm) and 5ft10'' (178cm)… 
(http://www.celebheights.com/s/Colin-Farrell-96.html) 
 
b. After seeing a lot of his vids I would say him to be a lil over 9NBP by a little 
over 6. (http://www.mattersofsize.com/forum/showthread.php?t=11872) 
 
c. Some would say her to be more than handsome, if not pretty. 
(http://forums.worldofwarcraft.com/thread.html?topicId=14990770355&sid=) 
 
d. A girl of my dreams - I would say her to be. 
(http://www.helium.com/items/715875-poetry-humorous) 
 
e. I would say him to be about the size of the foal of a horse.  
(New Comedies, Lady Augusta Gregory 1913. 
http://infomotions.com/etexts/gutenberg/dirs/1/1/7/4/11749/11749.htm) 
  
The most telling property of say+AcI is the presence of would, which improves the AcI 
version. AcI is degraded – not impossible – without it: 
(77) a.    I’d say him to be about the size of a foal. 
b.  ?I said him to be about the size of a foal. 
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The collocation would-say brings out the use of say that reports an opinion – this is one 
of the many uses of say. As with other belief reports, the continuation below is a 
contradiction.  
(78) a. I’d say that he’s about 5 foot. #...but I know he’s not. 
b. I’d say him to be about 5 foot. #...but I know he’s not. 
 
It is important to distinguish this form from the compositional would say, which doesn’t 
implicate belief on the part of the subject:  
(79)      If I were you, I’d just say that she’s about five feet tall, even though we know 
she’s shorter. 
 
This kind of speech report is simply not possible with ACI: 
(80)  # If I were you, I’d just say him to be about five feet tall, even though we know 
he’s shorter. 
 
I don’t know why the modal would makes it easier to understand say as describing a 
belief or opinion,39 nor do I know if these are two different uses of say or different verbs. 
                                                 
39 Would is not necessary in this respect. Present tense (a generic here) brings out the opinion 
meaning:  
(i) They say that he’s taller than Mary, #but they know he isn’t. 
I think AcI is possible here as well. 
(ii) They say him to be taller than Mary.  
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What’s important is that there is a use of say that reports a belief – perhaps in addition to 
its properties as a verb of communication. And it can be used, although somewhat 
marginally, with AcI.  
Wager – another verb typically taken to resist AcI (Pesetsky 1991) – also has a 
use that implicates belief and this is brought out with would as well. It, too, allows AcI:  
(81)      I’d wager him to be on the wrong side of fifty and you’re young enough to be 
his daughter. 
(Preseli Bluestones, Sion Pysod. 
http://homepages.which.net/~j.fish/aderyn3.htm) 
 
The manner of speech verbs seem never to be used as verbs that report opinions in this 
way even with finite complements. The modal would can only be interpreted in its usual 
sense: 
(82) I’d whisper/shout/scream/mutter that he’s about five feet tall.  
 
And this is consistent with the fact that they quite squarely resist AcI:  
(83)   *I’d whisper/shout/scream/mutter him to be about five feet tall.  
 
 The fact that verbs like say and wager are forced into reporting beliefs with AcI is 
bears out the analysis. Moreover, the general strategy of putting the attitude ascription in 
the embedded clause actually predicts that we would find cases where verbs like say – 
which don’t necessarily report belief – must report belief with AcI complements.  
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So say and wager can take AcI as long as they assume a meaning that describes 
an opinion. Some work needs to be done to bring out these uses of see and wager, and so 
it is not surprising that some speakers may not access those uses in out-of-the-blue 
presentation – especially if the complement doesn’t expresses something naturally subject 
to opinion. Verbs like believe and others are always compatible with FDOX. See-type 
verbs, in turn, are possible in AcI as long as they describe states and can make suitable 
Acquaintance Relations. 
3.4. The judgment effect 
As noted, many AcI constructions describe subjective opinions, and as such they 
require that the complements contain predicates that describe subjective properties. So a 
predicate like Canadian, which normally describes someone’s citizenship, is interpreted 
in certain AcI constructions as a judgment about someone’s behavior or appearance, a 
subjective property (Borkin 1984): 
(84) a. I see that she’s Canadian. 
b. I see her to be Canadian. 
(85) a. We found that she is Canadian. 
b. We found her to be Canadian. 
(86) a. We heard that she is Canadian. 
b. We heard her to be Canadian.  
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These kinds of subjectivity effects are reminiscent of a class of predicates that are also 
known to be subject to personal or subjective opinion – the so-called predicates of 
personal taste, like fun and tasty. They are noted for giving rise to “faultless 
disagreement” (Kölbel 2003). That is, while A can disagree with B about the tastiness of 
something, there is a sense in which they are both right: 
(87)      A: This tastes good. 
B: No it doesn’t. 
 
The interpretation that appears to be forced upon the embedded predicates in AcI 
complements has a similar quality. Below, there needn’t be the sense that one of the 
attitude holders is correct and the other false. Rather, it’s just the way they judged Mary’s 
qualities. 
(88) a. John sees Mary to be Canadian, but Fred doesn’t. 
b. The INS sees Mary to be Canadian, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs doesn’t. 
 
We might wonder, then, if the operative distinction between finite and AcI complements 
is that AcI complements are forced to contain predicates of personal taste, coercing 
otherwise matter-of-fact predicates (like be Canadian). The answer is no, but it’s worth 
showing why. 
Lasersohn (2005) argues that predicates of personal taste (POPTs) require an 
enrichment to the procedure of semantic interpretation. Specifically, part of the index in 
evaluating a sentence will include, in addition to a context (c), world (w), and time (t), a 
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judge (j). The meaning of a predicate of personal taste, like tasty, is sensitive to the value 
of the judge while a non-judge-dependent predicate (like Canadian) is not: 
(89) a. [[ tasty ]]c; w,t,j = λx. x is fun for j in w at t 
b. [[ canadian ]] c; w,t,j = λx. x is canadian in w at t 
 
Lasersohn argues that this captures the phenomenon of faultless disagreement.40 
Important for us is what happens under attitude verbs. When a POPT is embedded under 
an attitude verb we typically take the perspective of the attitude holder, and so the judge 
is typically construed as the attitude holder. This is what Lasersohn calls an autocentric 
stance. A different perspective – and exocentric one – is possible though. Examples like 
those found in Stephenson (2007) make this point. In the following, the tastiness of the 
cat food can be assessed by the attitude holder John or by the cat Mittens. 
(90) John thinks the cat food is tasty. 
a. because he likes tuna,           j = John 
b. because Mittens gobbled it up      j = Mittens 
 
                                                 
40 Specifically, it allows (i)B to negate the content of the sentence in (i)A. The content of A’s 
statement is a function from indices <w,t,j> to true or false iff the cake tastes good to j in w at t. Speaker B 
negates this content. She’s not negating Tastes good to A, which is bad, but tastes good to j. 
(i) A: The cake tastes really good. 
     B: No it doesn’t. 
Lasersohn shows that a competing analysis, whereby the “judge” is an indexical, is not correct. 
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Both Stephenson and Lasersohn note that some attitude verbs actually require that the 
judge for an embedded predicate be the attitude holder – they do not permit the ambiguity 
that think does. Surprisingly, these are usually small clause or AcI complements (see 
Borkin 1984 for the original observation). The following example, with find, is modeled 
after Stephenson (2007): 
(91)     After watching all the cats try the new food, the researchers could get a sense of 
which food was cat-tasty. 
 
#The researchers found the tuna mixture tasty. 
 
This suggests that the researchers ate the food (Borkin 1984, Stephenson 2007) We might 
then suspect that what AcI does is force complements to contain predicates of personal 
taste (or coerce those that aren’t) and require that the attitude holder be the judge for 
those predicates. 
 However, while find shows this behavior (especially with small clause 
complements), AcI complements in general do not. For instance, see with an AcI 
complement – although it reports an opinion – does not force the attitude holder to be the 
judge for a predicate of personal taste: 
(92)      After watching all the cats try the new food, the researchers could get a sense 
of which food was cat-tasty. 
 
The researchers see the tuna mixture to be tasty (…but their RAs don’t). 
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This does not imply that the researchers were the judges of tasty in any way that requires 
them to have eaten the cat food. Furthermore, as Stephenson notes, the presence of an 
overt “judge” is odd with find (presumably because the verb simply requires the judge to 
be the attitude holder) but fine with think (which doesn’t): 
(93) a.   The researchers thought that the tuna mixture was tasty to the cats. 
b. *The researchers found the tuna mixture tasty to the cats. 
  (after Stepehenson 2007) 
 
AcI constructions, however, are fine with an overt judge argument, even with find: 
(94) The researchers saw/considered/found/ the cat food to be tasty to the cats. 
 
This is not to suggest that there aren’t attitude verbs that, as Stephenson and Lasersohn 
show, require judge-dependent predicates in their complement. Nonetheless, it is not a 
property of AcI constructions. 
 This is a welcome result, too, since there are plenty of AcI complements that do 
not coerce predicates in their complements to be judge-dependent, such as believe and 
hold: 
(95) John believes/holds/knows/understands her to be Canadian. 
 
These sentences simply report John’s beliefs (or understandings, etc.) about someone’s 
citizenship. 
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 Of course, we are still going to have to understand why the AcI complements of 
verbs like see and hear must describe opinions about subjective matters. We don’t have 
to worry too much about this yet, however, since there are uses of these verbs that have 
the same requirement. I turn to these uses next. 
3.4.5 Intensional transitive perception verbs 
Many of the perception verbs that can take AcI can also take opaque nominal 
complements. These are the opaque transitive uses of see discussed by Zimmerman 
(1993), among others. An example is given below: 
(96) (Looking out at some dark figures across the lake), John sees a moose. 
 
The object position has the features we expect of an opaque position, such as failure of 
substitution of extensional equivalents and lack of existential import. In terms of the latter 
test, (96) of course does not imply that there is a moose. Other perception verbs have uses 
as intensional transitive verbs as well. 
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(97) a. As for the identity of the instrument, John hears a lute, not a guitar. 
b. …#but he believed it was a guitar. 
c. …okbut it really was a guitar. 
(98) a. As far as the identity of the object, John perceives a ghost. 
b. …#but he believes it’s just a billow of smoke. 
c. …okbut it really was just a billow of smoke. 
 
The judgment flavor we found with AcI is present in these constructions. That is, there 
are intensional transitive uses of see and hear that report opinions like AcI does. 
(99) Given the state of the building, the tenants see a collapsed house. 
 
(100) a. In Mary, John sees a Canadian/Mary to be a Canadian. 
b. John hears a lute/it to be a lute. 
 
The semantics of intensional transitive verbs is a topic of much research (Zimmerman 
1993, Moltmann 2003, Schwarz 2008) and it goes beyond the scope of this chapter.41 
Crucially, though, the judgment requirement of these complements is replicated in their 
transitive versions, and so it is not a property of AcI constructions in general, but of the 
                                                 
41 The situation here is a little different from other intensional transitive verbs, like look for and 
seek and perhaps need (see Schwarz 2008 on differences among these). These do not take finite clause 
complements either, but there is a general incompatibility, it seems, between the kinds of modality involved 
and finite clauses (?John needs that he leave). In fact, there is a general question of course about why verbs 
like want and need do not take finite clauses. The question of why see doesn’t take a finite clause in its 
(non-factive) epistemic meaning is a different kind of puzzle, because it appears that finite complements 
are generally available to express what the AcI complement of see appears to express. 
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kinds of beliefs that verbs like see and hear report when they are used as intensional 
verbs. The existence of intensional transitive perception verbs poses a complication for 
the proposal made here. If see type verbs do not in and of themselves involve belief, then 
some extra material is going to be needed to get opacity in these DP-taking cases just as 
in AcI. I leave this for future research.42 
4. The syntactic distribution of FDOX 
See AcI constructions report de re beliefs and part of the analysis involved putting 
the belief component inside the AcI complement itself. I identified a meaningful 
functional head, FDox. The basic claim, then, is that see only means believe when there is 
FDox. Direct perception reports, then, must simply not have FDox. But we need to make 
sure that the presence of FDOX lines up with the syntax we observe. Here it is helpful to 
have some basic syntax about AcI constructions on the table. 
4.1. AcI constructions: some history and syntax 
AcI constructions have played a central role in generative syntax. The interest in 
AcI constructions – now standard textbook fare – revolves around the status of the 
accusative-marked noun phrase (i.e. her (in a)). 
                                                 
42 Deal (2008) has suggested intensional transitive verbs might require the use of a modal 
subordinating head that introduces modal quantification. This is consistent with the ‘meaning in the 
complement’ approach taken here.  
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(101) a. I believed her to be sick. 
b. We hold these truths to be self-evident. 
 
It’s well established that the embedded subject is not a semantic argument of the matrix 
verb. Besides evidence from idiom expletives and chunks (He believes there to be a 
problem/believes advantage to have been taken), the scopal behavior of the embedded 
subject shows that it enjoys a position inside the embedded clause. This fact serves to 
argue against a possible objection to the very characterization of AcI complements of see 
as clausal complements. In particular, one might treat AcI-taking see as a 3-place 
predicate – a type of ditransitive – essentially an object control verb (see e.g. Bach 1977, 
Chierchia 1984:251 for such an approach to AcI constructions).43,44 The question is 
whether these infinitival constructions receive, then, the parse in (102)a or (102)b? 
(102) a. Martha saw [himi] [PROi to be driving too fast]. Object control analysis45 
b. Martha saw [him to be driving too fast].  AcI analysis  
 
                                                 
43 Other frameworks, which pursue a kind of lexicalist treatment of AcI (following Bresnan (1982)) don’t 
assume movement, but they do offer a view sophisticated enough to allow the matrix object to bear certain 
relations to the embedded clause (see, e.g., the head driven phrase structure grammar approaches in Pollard 
& Sag 1994; Sag, Wasow & Bender 2005). I imagine anything I say here is compatible with these 
frameworks. 
44 Of course, as we saw in Chapter Three, believe is often give a 3-place analysis as a de re belief 
(Quine 1956, Kaplan 1969). The extra argument might be the res. The data presented below show 
conclusively that the embedded subject/raised object in AcI constructions is not the syntactic expression of 
the res argument. 
45 Chierchia (1984) doesn’t actually posit a controlled PRO. His 3-place analysis of AcI is couched 
in theory of property type meanings for infinitives without PRO. 
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That the AcI analysis is the right one is demonstrated by the fact that the embedded 
subject can receive a narrow scope interpretation (Partee 1973): 
(103) John believes a communist to have been at the heart of the plot. 
  (Partee 1973) 
 
There needn’t have been a communist of which John believed anything. Below, I test the 
scope of the embedded subject with respect to an embedded predicate, because this 
makes it most clear that the embedded subject can be interpreted inside the complement 
clause. (It can also be interpreted in the scope of the attitude verb, of course.) In the 
following two cases of AcI, the indefinite embedded subject can be interpreted narrow 
scope and opaque with respect to need. 
(104) a. Martha sees a new syntactician to be needed – any one would do. 
b. Martha believes a new syntactician to be needed – any one would do. 
 
 A new syntactician falls under the scope of need: (104)a can mean that Martha believes 
that what’s needed is some syntactician or other. It can, but needn’t, mean that that there 
is a particular syntactician she believes is needed.46 
                                                 
46 This doesn’t exhaust the scope possibilities for the indefinite (especially when we consider 
various combinations of scope and opacity/transparency options available). What’s important here is that 
the indefinite can be interpreted narrow scope, opaque with respect to the embedded need. I am collapsing 
here the distinction between narrow scope for the quantifier and the opacity/transparency of the description 
(Fodor 1970), which cross-classify to some extent. All that is important here is that it can get a narrow 
scope, opaque reading with respect to need. 
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(105)     There is a new syntactician that Martha sees/believes to be needed #any one 
would do. 
 
The position the embedded subject occupies, then, is one that can scopally interact with 
predicates in the embedded clause. (104)a expresses the proposition in (106). In all 
worlds that satisfy the relevant needs, there is a (possibly) different syntactician 
(according to Martha’s beliefs). I give predicates like syntactician a world variable 
(assuming it is bound syntactically, see Percus 2000). 
(106)      λw.∀w′(w′ ∈ DOX(Martha,w) → ∀w′′(w′′ ∈ACCneed(w′) → 
∃x(syntactician(x)(w′′)))) 
 
We would not generally expect a new syntactician to be able to scope below need if it 
were a matrix argument, much as this is not possible in (107):47 
(107) John sees of a new syntactician that he or she’s not needed. 
A new syntactician > need; *Need > a new syntactician 
 
                                                 
 
47 I am not confident whether it would be technically impossible to invent a way to get the low 
scope reading while treating a syntactician as a matrix argument, but it would considerably complicate the 
raising/control distinction. The usual evidence for expletives and idioms should be enough to support the 
AcI diagnosis for these cases of see: 
(i)          a. Martha sees there to be a problem with this account. 
b. Martha sees too much advantage to have been taken of her time. 
I think the reconstruction evidence is the strongest, since it doesn’t rely on assumptions about idiom chunks 
and difficulties with expletives (e.g. while object control verbs resist expletives, this could be the result of 
the semantics of verbs like persuade as opposed to force, for instance). 
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The simplest account, then, is that the embedded subject belongs in the embedded 
complement, at least at one level of representation. The AcI construction is a clausal 
complement. 
The second question posed by AcI constructions is the position the embedded 
subject ends up in. Postal (1974) argued that it occupied an object position in the matrix 
clause at surface structure. Bresnan (1972, 1976) and Chomsky (1981) allow it to remain 
in the embedded clause and yet still bear the grammatical function of an object (the 
exceptional case marking approach). And the debate has gone back and forth several 
times (see Johnson 1991, Runner 1995, and Runner 2006). At no point will this chapter 
decide this question, nor will the evidence I offer about AcI bear on it. 
Another question about AcI is the categorical status of the infinitive. Here it is 
instructive to distinguish the AcI complements from a number of other similar types of 
embedded non-finite complements, for which the observations made here do not hold, but 
are quite reliably different kinds of constructions. Since Bresnan (1972) and Postal 
(1974), at least two different kinds of infinitival constructions with overt, accusative 
subjects are distinguished. One class is what I have been calling the AcI construction, 
identified by Postal as the believe-class. In contrast there are constructions superficially 
similar to AcI, typically found under bouletic or desiderative attitude verbs like want 
(hence the want-class) which show a slightly different behavior. In want-class infinitives, 
as in (108)a, the embedded subject does not enjoy full status as a matrix object.48 
Passivization cannot promote the embedded subject (108)b. In addition, a 
                                                 
48 Lasnik and Saito (1991) offer additional evidence from binding that purports to show that W-
class construction’s embedded subjects cannot move into the matrix clause. 
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complementizer, for, can appear with want-class verbs. This can be seen most clearly 
when the complement is extraposed (108)c or fronted (108)d: 
(108) a.   John wants/needs/would like/would hate there to be a better solution. 
b. *There is wanted/needed/liked/hated to be a better solution. 
c.   What John wants/needs/would like/would hate is for there to be a better  
solution. 
d.   For there to be a better solution, that’s what I want/would like/need most. 
 
AcI constructions show the opposite behavior, allowing passivization but not an overt 
complementizer, and so they do not allow the infinitival complement to appear removed 
from its embedding verb. 
(109) a.  John believes/sees/hears/holds/considers there to be a better solution. 
b.  There was believed/seen/heard/held/considered to be a better solution. 
c. *What John believed/seen/heard/held/considered is there to be a better solution. 
 
The want-class verbs are also different from the AcI predicates in allowing control: 
(110)  Want-class vs. AcI: control 
 
a.    John wants/needs/would like/would hate to be a better linguist. 
b. *John believes/sees/hears/holds/considers to be a better linguist.  
 
A standard approach to this range of facts, due primarily to Bresnan (1972), is that the 
infinitival complements to want-class verbs are headed by a complementizer, which can 
appear overtly as for. This complementizer, often null, is sometimes treated as the case 
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marker of the embedded subject, while in AcI constructions, it is the embedding verb 
(like believe) which is responsible for licensing the embedded subject (abstract case being 
the most widely assumed mechanism). A further assumption is required to block 
passivization in want-class complements. This is usually reduced to a general ban on 
letting arguments undergo A-movement from clauses headed by complementizers. 
Cashing this out is non-trivial. (See Bošković 1997 for an earlier attempt, as well as 
recent approaches making use of the Phrase Impenetrability Condition – see recent 
discussion by Nevins 2004). And it is by no means uncontroversial that there is a null 
version of for that licenses case on the embedded subject in (108)a (Pesetsky 1991, 
McFadden 2008). What I wish the reader to take away from this is simply that the kind of 
infinitives found with these verbs are sufficiently distinct to warrant a different treatment, 
and that the very ability of these clauses to appear with a complementizer is all that needs 
to be established at this point. 
  The AcI construction, on the other hand, never shows any presence of a 
complementizer, null or otherwise. Following Bresnan’s suggestion, it appears to be the 
case that the complementizer for is simply incompatible with the semantics of the AcI 
verbs (see Portner 1992): 
(111) AcI verbs incompatible with for complementizer 
 
*What John sees/considers/believes/heard was for Mary to be Canadian. 
 
In the Government and Binding literature (and much of what followed), AcI 
constructions are treated on a par with raising constructions. And when it comes to 
raising, there is evidence that complementizers are absent. Here we turn to languages that 
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express complementizers in non-raising constructions. Italian, for instance, allows control 
under verbs like sembrare and parere. Here there is a complementizer di (see Kayne 
1984 for evidence that this is a complementizer), and the dative argument (mi below) 
controls the null infinitival subject: 
(112) Control complements with complementizer 
 
Mi  sembra/pare  di aver  capito 
to-me  seems/appears  Comp to-have  understood. 
‘I seem to have understood.’  
(Kayne 1984:106(30)) 
 
When these verbs are used as raising predicates, however, the complementizer di is 
ungrammatical: 
(113) Raising complements do not have complementizers 
 
Gianni   sembra/pare  (*di) essere  partito. 
Gianni  seems/appears  Comp to-have left. 
‘Ginanni seems to have left.’  
(Kayne 1984:106(27)) 
 
Icelandic is helpful in this respect as well, since it has AcI constructions of the English 
sort and it has complementizers that head non-finite clauses under verbs of acceptance 
(the ‘simultaneous’ complements). The complementizer að is compatible with control 
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verbs49, but not with raising or AcI. In (114), the verb claim embeds a non-finite 
complement with a controlled subject and the complementizer is present. 
(114)   Control Verbs compatible with Complementizer 
 
Þess vvegna fullyrðir Pétur að hafa oft hugsað  um  





‘Therefore, Peter claimed to have often thought about his parents.’ 
(Johnson and Vikner 1998:(6)) 
 
With both raising and AcI complements, the complementizer is prohibited:  
(115) Raising and AcI verbs incompatible with for complementizer 
 
a. Maria hafði virst      (*að) hafa  vasað upp  diskana 
    Mary had  seemed     Comp to.have  washed up the.dishes 
   ‘Mary had seemed to have washed up the dishes’ 
b. Eg  tel    (*að)  hana  hafa     borðað  epli 
I believe   Comp her to.have    eaten  an.apple 
‘I believe her to have eaten an apple’  
 
                                                 
49 In this case, the complementizer is not limited to the kinds of bouletic verbs that the English 
non-finite complementizer for is. This means that the unavailability of the complementizer in the raising 
and AcI constructions can’t merely be attributed to a “clash” in the semantics of the verb with the 
complementizer. In fact, að is compatible with finite complements of the belief sort, here under say.  
(i)   Hann segir að hún lesi bækur  
       He says that she reads books 
       (Thráinsson 1993 (13)) 
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The classic Government and Binding approach (see especially Kayne 1984, and 
Chomsky 1981) sought a general correlation: control complements (here included are 
want-class infinitives with overt subjects) are headed by a complementizer, whereas 
raising complements (which includes AcI) are smaller, Inflectional Phrases (IPs) or Tense 
Phrases (TPs).50 The control theory of this era was designed so that control complements 
had to have more “structure” separating the matrix verb from the embedded subject 
position – theories of government made this connection (see Chomsky 1981). 
 With the advent of Minimalism, the government approach to control was 
abandoned, and so with it went the CP~IP distinction for handling control. Bošković 
(1997) and Martin (1996, 2001), spell out a theory of control that does not rely on the 
presence of a complementizer for control. They follow a long tradition of connecting 
tense to the licensing of subjects, and these authors sought a way to connect control and 
raising to temporal properties of infinitives. Following Stowell (1982), Martin and 
Bošković suggest that the difference between control and raising complements can be 
traced to differences in the temporal properties of these two types of infinitival 
complements. The operative intuition that these authors want to exploit is that control 
infinitives denote future possibilities (Stowell 1982), while the AcI infinitives denote 
temporally simultaneous complements (most often verbs of acceptance in the sense of 
Stalnaker 1984, see section 2.3):51 
                                                 
50 This misrepresents Kayne (1984) a little. He proposed that raising complements had a 
prepositional complementizer, but one that could tolerate – in English at least – stranding. 
51 I am glossing over “simultaneous” here. What I mean is that the running time of the event must 
hold throughout the time at which the attitude holder believes he is at. It is often thought that the internal 
now of an attitude is a point and eventive predicates can’t “fit” in it (see, e.g. Cable 2008, among many 
others on this point). Sequence of tense complements – that is, the ‘uninterpreted’ tense directly under an 
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(116)  a. Lilah promised/wanted/tried/decided/hoped/ to be in bed later that night. 
 
b. Lilah’s parents believed/knew/understood/considered her to be in bed  
…okat that very moment).  
…#later that night 
 
Aspectual properties of the embedded clause also reveal a difference. In simultaneous 
infinitives, eventive predicates are not possible without have or be, whereas they are in 
future-oriented infinitives. 
(117) a.  John tried/wanted/expected/hoped to prepare the meal. 
b. *John believes/considers/knows/understands/sees Mary to prepare the meal. 
c. John believes/considers/knows/understands/sees Mary to be preparing/have 
prepared the meal. 
 
While there are certainly differences between simultaneous and future-oriented infinitives 
(Abusch 2004, Katz 2001), the distinction doesn’t line up with control/raising. There are 
raising/AcI complements that are “future” oriented and there are control complements 
that aren’t (Collins 2002; see also Wurmbrand 2006 for similar counterexamples). Verbs 
like forecast/anticipate allow raising and yet their complements are future oriented 
(surely, a result of the lexical semantics of anticipate and forecast). Claim, on the other 
hand, is a control verb but like raising verbs, requires a simultaneous interpretation for its 
                                                 
attitude verb – show the same effects. Both types of complements would be properties of times, once we 
incorporated tense into the picture. But both would be – so again, nothing about tense will help us. There’s 
work to be done on the semantics on simultaneous complements. But the main point here is that it cross-
cuts the raising/control distinction – even the finite, non-finite distinction. 
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complement. This makes eventive predicates ungrammatical in the complement without 
the “stativizing” effects of have or be (or a generic/habitual interpretation). 
(118) a. There was forecast/anticipated to be a storm tomorrow. 
b. *John claimed to prepare the meal tomorrow 
 
The temporal connection, then, is closed. A general theory of control is slightly 
beyond the scope of this chapter. But I would like to suggest that the best candidate for 
this distinction remains the classic one – English raising constructions don’t have 
complementizers but control ones do. (See Landau 2006 for a more comprehensive, 
modern approach to control that relies on properties of complementizers.)  
The earlier approach to AcI complementation – the complementizer deletion rule 
(Chomsky 1981) – simply made it a lexical property of verbs that triggered this rule, 
which was attractive in that it accounted for the seeming “idiosyncrasies” as to which 
verbs allow AcI. But we have seen that there are semantic generalizations about AcI that 
won’t be captured on such a story. The evidence provided in the first part of this chapter 
– that see AcI involves a meaningful functional head in the complement, FDOX,  actually 
turns the question around: why does FDOX correlate with AcI and not bare infinitives? It is 
to this question I turn next. 
4.2. FDox: to or syntactic selection? 
We have two options for making the connection between FDox and AcI. If we stick 
closely to the surface distinction between bare infinitivals and AcI, one possibility is that 
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FDox is in fact spelled out as to itself. Of course, this can’t be the only meaning that to 
spells out and this poses problems concerning the generality of the proposal. The second 
option is to treat FDox as a head that selects for infinitivals. This would have to be a form 
of syntactic selection, of course, but not by the embedding verb. I’ll evaluate both options 
in turn. 
One difficulty for associating FDox with to is that it requires a view of believe type 
verbs as involving FDox. I suggested a way of letting believe combine with FDOX in 3.2.1, 
but at the cost of recognizing a version of believe that merely described a belief state. 
Another problem with identifying FDOX as to is that we would have to have many to’s; de 
re belief cannot be the meaning of to generally. However, one wonders if it is a general 
function of the infinitival marker to indicate some sort of modality. Many – but not all – 
instances of infinitivals implicate modality. It appears, though, that the consensus is that 
to is not responsible for modality. 
 The existence of implicative infinitivals also casts doubt on infinitival to always 
imposing modality (Karttunen 1971): 
(119) John managed/remembered/forgot to turn out the lights. #But he didn’t. 
 
And the existence of what Pesetsky calls ‘factive’ infinitives – albeit control ones – 
further complicates the issue (Pesetsky 1991: 31(117a,b)): 
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(120) John loved to ride in the back seat yesterday. 
(121) The Angels hated to lose Sunday’s game to the Red Sox. 
 
It’s of some interest, though, that AcI constructions are not possible with the ‘factive’ use 
of love and hate: 
(122) a. *John loved Mary to be riding in the back seat. 
b.   John loved Mary(’s) riding in the back seat. 
c. *The Angels hated the Expos to be playing the Red Sox. 
d.   The Angels hated the Expos playing the Red Sox. 
 
Bhatt (1999) investigated the modality of infinitivals and concluded that the modality of 
infinitives is represented in the complementizer, not to. Although the flavor of modality 
is different than with AcI, Bhatt observes, for instance, that non-subject infinitival 
relatives must be modal, but subject infinitival relatives are not: 
(123) a. This is the best book to appear until now (on this topic).  
(non-modal, subject gap)  
 
b. This is the best book to read.  
(modal, object gap) 
 
Bhatt traces the obligatory modality in object infinitivals to the presence of a 
complementizer. The subject infinitival relative, Bhatt argues, is a reduced relative. No 
complementizer, and therefore no modality. 
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 The second option is that FDOX merely selects for infinitives. This is certainly a 
possibility but we would need to identify what and where FDOX is. Is it in the main or 
embedded clause? Certainly the category most usually associated with selecting for tense 
is complementizer (Bresnan 1972, Stowell 1981). Could FDOX be a complementizer? I 
closed off the idea that there is a complementizer in AcI constructions given the syntax 
evidence. We could either reassess that option52 or find a way to ensure that FDOX – 
whatever it is – only has to-infinitive as its complement. Identifying FDOX as to – while 
raising difficulties of its own – is the most natural and straightforward way to make the 
connection.  
5. Conclusion and speculation: finite clauses 
We have distinguished AcI complements from bare infinitival complements. AcI 
complements report belief and do so because AcI contains the morpheme FDOX (which in 
turn determines, via selection or because FDOX is to, the syntactic shape of the 
complement). A full theory of complementation would need to derive how AcI 
complements differ from the finite clause complements, too. We have already seen how 
AcI see differs from finite see, in that the latter is factive. In this concluding section I 
want to lay out what the landscape of finite clause complementation looks like, and point 
to where this project would go in these cases. 
                                                 
52 Kayne 1984 actually proposes that AcI complements have a complementizer, but one that 
undergoes reanalysis with the main verb (see also Pesetsky 1991). 
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The first thing to know, as Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) showed, is that AcI 
complements are not factive. There is a class of verbs that must always be factive and 
these never allow AcI complements: 
(124) a. Martha didn’t{regret/resent/comprehend/forget/grasp/make clear} that Fred 
was a fool. 
b. *Martha didn’t{regret/resent/comprehend/forget/grasp/make clear} Fred to be a 
fool. 
 
As Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) also showed, there are predicates that are not 
necessarily factive. With finite clauses they are, but with AcI complements they are not 
(see also Hegarty 1992). This class includes remember and understand. The familiar tests 
(negation and denial of the complement by the speaker) show that the AcI complement is 
not factive. 
(125) a. Martha didn’t remember that John was bald. 
b. Martha didn’t remember John to be bald. 
(after Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970) 
c. Martha remembered that John was bald, #but he wasn’t. 
d. Martha remembered John to be bald, but he wasn’t. 
(126) a. Martha didn’t understand that Fred was mocking her. 
b. Martha didn’t understand Fred to be mocking her.  
c. Martha understood that Fred was mocking her, #but he wasn’t. 
d. Martha understood Fred to be mocking her, but he wasn’t. 
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It’s old news that AcI complements are not factive. The puzzle – the one we found with 
see – is that the finite complements must be factive. They cannot report the kinds of 
beliefs that the same verbs with AcI complements can. The reason this is a puzzle is that 
(a) there’s nothing about see (or remember or understand) that require factivity (given 
their interpretation with AcI complements) and (b) there’s nothing about finite 
complements that requires factivity. This is surprising. 
The verb consider shows the same thing. Consider can take finite clause 
complements (cf. Postal 1974) but in this case, the finite complement reports a fact, 
unlike the AcI complement. Some naturally occurring examples of consider with a finite 
complement are below.53 
                                                 
53 There are, however, numerous examples a Google search revealed that suggest that some 
speakers can use consider with a finite clause without committing to the truth of the complement. 
(i)  What can I do if the Taxman considers that I have ´lied´ over the real price of the property declared on 
the deeds? (http://www.marbella-lawyers.com/questions/showQuestion/19) 
I find such examples ungrammatical. I suspect that consider may be like believe for certain speakers in 
having the ability to take finite complements. When it is made clear that consider is being used to report an 
opinion, the finite clause is clearly out: 
(ii) *John considers that Mary is taller than Fred. 
(iii) John considers Mary to be taller than Fred. 
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(127) a. Even a polemic has some justification if one considers that my own first poetic 
experiments began during a dictatorship 
(http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/s/salvatore_quasimodo.html) 
 
b. …Particularly when one considers that some images were crossed out.  
(www.lotsofessays.com/essay_search/considers_deep.htm) 
 
c. This feat is even more impressive when one considers that in order to deduce 
the approximately 24-million-base-pair sequence of the Y chromosome, the 
team had to sequence well over 50 million base pairs of DNA.  
(http://news.bio-medicine.org/) 
That these complements can be paraphrased by the fact that, following Kiparsky and 
Kiparsky (1970), confirms that they can report facts. With an AcI complement, non-
factive interpretations are available; with finite clauses, they are not. And, recall, this 
can’t be a general property of finite clauses. 
But the landscape of finite complements is even more complicated. The verb hear 
is not factive when it takes a finite clause. Instead, we have seen that it reports something 
like hearsay.  
(128) a. Martha heard (from her friends) that Bob was out of tune, but he wasn’t.  
b. Martha heard Bob to be out of tune, but he wasn’t. 
 
The distinction between hear AcI and hear-that, then, is more complex than factive vs. 
non-factive. Finite clauses are able to report more varied kinds of attitudes than AcI 
complements. 
 The strategy for handling the selection of finite complements should be to re-
assign the meaning from the embedding verb to the embedded clause. But that project is 
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even bigger than the one I have attempted for AcI complements, since the variety of 
meanings that finite clauses correspond to appears to be bigger. We would have to admit 
of finite complements that reported facts and those that reported beliefs, and those that 
report the things one hears, as in (128)a. We would need to line up the right complements 
with the right embedding verbs. And that is no easy task since the interpretation of the 
finite complement is determined, it would seem, by the embedding verb. That’s different 
from AcI. There we saw a uniform contribution of AcI complements – that’s what 
allowed us to factor out the meaning to the complement. But it looks as though the lexical 
semantics of the embedding verb should determine the complement meaning for that-
clauses. We now have something of a paradox. We factored out meaning to the 
complement to capture the distribution and meaning of AcI, but now we’ve lost control 
of the kinds of finite complements these verbs can select.  
But the proposed extension of the project – that finite clauses bear the meanings 
once thought to be part of the embedding verb – finds some initial support from 
languages that lexicalize differences among finite complements, often via 
complementizers. Factive complementizers, for instance, are well attested (Japanese 
(Kuno 1973b), Greek (Roussou 1991, 2004), Marathi (Wali 1988)). A language such as 
Korean (Yoon 1990) lexicalizes, via meaningful complementizer-like heads, the 
difference between factive and non-factive complement clauses. One clause-final 
functional head –um signals factive clauses, while another, -ko, non-factive complements: 
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(129)      John-un [CP Mary-ka      cengcikhay-ss-um]-ul alassta 
John-nom Mary-nom  honest-past-CompFACt-acc knew 
‘John knew that Mary was honest’ 
 
(130)      John-un [CP Mary-ka      cengcikhay-ss-ta-ko]  malhay-ss-ta 
John-nom Mary-nom  honest-past-decl-Comp  said 
‘John said that Mary was honest’  
(Jeon 2008:2a,c) 
 
What makes systems like Korean particularly tantalizing for investigating the meaning of 
complement types is the extent to which the embedded clause determines the meaning of 
the embedding verb (much in the way AcI forced verbs like say and wager into ascribing 
beliefs). In Korean this “flexibility” of lexical items comes out when we exchange the 
complementizers for the verbs shown above. The factive marker -um can “shift” non-
factive verbs into reporting facts, e.g. think becomes think about (Jeon 2008): 
(131)      John-un [CP Mary-ka cengcikhay-ss-um]-ul  sangkakhay-ss-ta 
John-NOM    Mary-NOM honest-PAST-C-ACC  think-PAST-DECLAR. 
‘John thought about that Mary was honest’ 
 
#Kulnea Mary-nun cengikhaci anhassta. 
  But Mary wasn’t honest. 
(Jeon 20098:18c) 
 
With the non-factive complementizer, know is not factive and it is reported (Yoon-Ho 
Jeon (p.c.)) that it translates to “think”: 
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(132)      John-un [CP Mary-ka cengcikhay-ss-ta-ko]  alassta 
John-NOM      Mary-NOM  honest-PAST-DECL-C  knew 
‘John thought that Mary was honest’ or ‘thought he knew’ 
 
Kulena  Mary-nun cengcikhaci anhassta 
But Mary was not honest. 
(Jeon 2008:7c) 
 
It is clear, then, that the complementizers carry meaning and that the embedding verbs do 
not determine, entirely, the interpretation of the complement. It is, in some ways, the 
other way around. As with AcI, it seems the complement selects the verb. The standard 
Hintikka account of attitude verbs needs revising in the face of this. But that may not be a 
bad thing, because once we put the meaning in the complement, we suddenly have a very 
straightforward way of accounting for why certain clause types appear as the 
complements to certain classes of verbs with similar meaning. They do so because the 
meaning is actually in the complement. 
But we’re still not quite ready to make the case for English. English lexical items 
aren’t so flexible as Korean, it would seem. Know is always factive with a finite clause; 
believe always non-factive. That would suggest the meaning is in the verbs. The evidence 
I gathered from AcI suggests otherwise. In fact, know appears not to be factive with an 
AcI complement: 
(133) a. Donna never knew him to lie.   …so he must not have 
b. Donna never knew that he lied  …#so he must not have. 
 
   
203 
The semantics of knowledge ascription is another topic altogether – raising difficult 
philosophical issues (the Gettier cases (1963) to start with) – and so a full accounting of 
the famous See Paradigm will have to wait. 
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